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Assignment 12

"The Unconscious," Standard Edition, Volume XIV, pp. 166-204.

- 1) What are the conceptions, relations, and defining characteristics of latent states, unconscious, preconscious, consciousness, repression? [p. 329] What are the phenomena which necessitate introducing them? [p. 340] What is the course of the mental process? [p. 343]
- 2) What is the topography of drives, affects, ideas, consciousness, and repression? [p. 347]
- 3) What are the dynamics of drives, affects, ideas, consciousness, and repression? [p. 368]
- 4) What is the economics of drives, affects, ideas, consciousness, and repression? [Among others, pp. 345, 357, 370, 372]
- 5) What is the relationship between the Freudian and Kantian positions? [p. 341]

Assignment 13

"Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams," Standard Edition, Volume XIV, pp. 222-235.

(Supplementary reading: (1) Freud, "Negation," Collected Papers, Volume V, pp. 181-185; (2) Rapaport, "A Survey of the History of Psychoanalytic Ego-Psychology," Bulletin of the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis, 8:105-116; 1958. Also in: Psychological Issues, International Universities Press, 1:5-17;1959.)

- 1) In what sense is this an attempt to introduce the concept of narcissism into the theory of dreams? [pp. 376, 386]
- 2) What is the cathexis-withdrawal theory? [p. 377] What limitations of it does Freud point out? [p. 392]
- 3) How is this theory tied to the topographic point of view and how does it consequently clash with the beginnings of the structural point of view (in "The Unconscious") which invalidate the topographic point of view? [p. 396]
- 4) What is the "belief in reality" and how is it related to reality testing? [p. 404]
- 5) What general comments concerning metapsychology do we find here and what are their implications? [p. 418]

Assignment 14

"Mourning and Melancholia," Standard Edition, Volume XIV,
pp. 243-258.

(Supplementary reading: Freud, The Ego and the Id, Sections
III and V)

- 1) What are the similarities and differences between mourning, melancholia, and obsessive self-reproaches? [p. 421]
- 2) What are the several ways in which Freud's explanation of depression and of its differences from mourning is an application of that abortive attempt at building an ego-psychology which we call the theory of narcissism? [p. 433]
- 3) What is the conception of the work of mourning and how does it apply to the economics of depression and mania? [p. 431]
- 4) Would you draw any conclusions (other than those Freud drew) from the continuity between moods on the one hand and depression and mania on the other? [pp. 461, 463]
- 5) What do you make of Freud's comment that "worthy" people are more liable to succumb to depression than "worthless" ones? [p. 423]

"The Unconscious"

Lustman: You did a job on this, you know. This syllabus is not the way the paper is written.

Rapaport: No. I hope that you went by the syllabus rather than by the paper. I have followed meekly until now, just a little bit of back and forth, but here we have to organize, and by now you should be used to it. Well, gentlemen, here is the last Supper, or what is it, so let me try to see; what about the latent states; what are the conceptions and the defining characteristics of the latent states? Do you have the reference?

Lustman: Page 167:

"The greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be for very considerable periods of time in a state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically unconscious. When all our latent memories are taken into consideration it becomes totally incomprehensible how the existence of the unconscious can be denied. But here we encounter the objection that these latent recollections can no longer be described as psychical, but that they correspond to residues of somatic processes from which what is psychical can once more arise. The obvious answer to this is that a latent memory is, on the contrary, an unquestionable residuum of a psychical process.

Rapaport: Here are two questions: 1) Is it clear what a psychical process in a condition of latency is, and 2) what is the difference between these and somatic processes?

Lustman: First he seems to be talking about the preconscious.

Rapaport: Well, yes. But from a general point of view, latent means everything that is not--?

Mahl: Conscious.

Rapaport: Momentarily conscious. When we become aware of it that it was not conscious. By the way, this awareness of our awareness, this knowing that it was not conscious and is now conscious, is awareness of awareness, you realize. Clinically that is a very important point, because you will notice that one of the major things that you run up against with patients is that they don't have an awareness of something they are aware

of. They are aware of it, they talk about it, but they are not aware that they are aware of it. And you encounter the gravest difficulty in making them aware of it--by the way, that is the problem of many a complex state, like amnesia, fugue, etc. but just the same it is very important to note this primitive fact that when something comes to consciousness and you reflect that it was not conscious before although it could have been, then this is an act of awareness of awareness. It's a most simple, most primitive thing, common to most of us, a simple fact of such moment but so little noticed, that it is well worth pointing out that it is one of the simplest forms of what Freud talks about here. It is totally neglected, but it is the great area of future study.

Gentlemen, I still want to see whether there is any problem about these states of latency, whether there are any objections against his argument about somatic processes, and how you understood his argument on the somatic process.

Lustman: Well, the sentence on p. 174:

"...every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as travelling along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely."

I thought he was talking about these being stored somatically, a latent state in a physiological sense.

Rapaport: How do we understand this, that every such attempt has miscarried? Do you know first of all historically what is the reference? This refers to Freud's own attempt in 1895, in The Project. He says, "I have tried it; I didn't succeed. Nobody tried it as seriously as I did, and so what the hell? The things that we have to account for are so complicated that when we try it it doesn't work." If you try it in a primitive fashion, just for associations which you don't know anything about anyway, okay. But when you try it for symptoms, when you try it for primary and secondary processes, as he did try it for in 1895, then it doesn't work. I must say this is an ex parte argument.

Mahl: But he also leaves the way open for future work; you notice that? In two places there, he said---pp. 174-175:

"There is a hiatus here which at present cannot be filled, nor is it one of the tasks of psychology to fill it. Our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy."

He's not shutting the door.

Rapaport: Yes. You understand that this is the Helmholtz program, which said that it is the task to reduce everything that occurs in nature to the basic known mechanical processes, forces of attraction and repulsion as they rule in nature; and if that is not successful, to search for new processes of equal dignity. Now the first part of this program was what was followed strictly by people like the behaviorists in this country. The second part of the program was not noticed. It is that which Freud is trying to do here, namely, trying to find lawfulnesses of equal dignity, never giving up in the meanwhile the assumption that they will ultimately be reducible to processes of attraction and repulsion, within the somatic organization. This is the Helmholtz program shouting at you from Freud at every point. Shakow and I have been analyzing some of this stuff and soon, I hope, we will have a monograph on it out, to show what this program did to Freud, and what he did to it too.* But all I would like to say at this point is that though to my mind this is an ex parte argument, I agree with Dr. Mahl that Freud also feels it to be ex parte because he leaves the door open. The argument here is a little different. Who will state it? P. 168:

Sacks: "It is clear in any case that this question--whether the latent states of mental life, whose existence is undeniable, are to be conceived of as conscious mental states or as physical ones--threatens to resolve itself into a verbal dispute."

Rapaport: But why?

Sacks: Well, he says here that equating the mental with the conscious is impracticable.

"It disrupts psychical continuities, plunges us into the insoluble difficulties of psycho-physical parallelism, is open to the reproach that for no obvious reason it over-estimates the part played by consciousness, and that it forces us prematurely to abandon the field of psychological research without being able to offer us any compensation from other fields." (p. 168)

*[Meanwhile, see Bernfeld, "Freud's Earliest Theories and the School of Helmholtz," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. 13, 1944.]

Rapaport: "...forces us prematurely to abandon the field of psychological research..."

The point about the equation of the conscious and the mental --that you mentioned, Dr. Sacks--together with premature retirement from the field of psychological research, means that if we assume that psychological research is limited to that which is conscious, and that beyond that only physiological research can work, then we throw up our hands and wait until physiology does the job. Do you see the point? He puts it in an exaggerated way if he says that that which is unconscious is not somatic. That would make no sense. It is a war of words, as he himself puts it. That's not the point. Obviously he believed--and we believe--that everything conscious and everything unconscious has somatic equivalents. The formulation I myself like to give this issue is that when you say psychological and when you say physiological, you are talking about two methods of investigation. The subject matter is always the same. The question is only with which method the subject matter can be reached. If we had more time, I would show you that you can piece together what I am saying from what we read here. I hope you feel the sense of it is the same. Otherwise it goes into what he says the others go into, namely a war of words.

Where else is there a significant statement about the latent states?

Lustman: P. 170:

"In the second place, analysis shows that the different latent mental processes inferred by us enjoy a high degree of mutual independence, as though they had no connection with one another, and knew nothing of one another...we have to take into account the fact that analytic investigation reveals some of these latent processes as having characteristics and peculiarities which seem alien to us, or even incredible, and which run directly counter to the attributes of consciousness with which we are familiar."

Rapaport: But this is latency in the other sense. We are still talking about the descriptively unconscious. Let's see p. 171.

Mahl: "In psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs. We can even hope to gain fresh knowledge from the comparison."

Rapaport: Keep that passage in mind for the topographic problem, which we will come to. Let me point out to you that on the next page there is a detailed discussion.

Mahl: "The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent, temporarily unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the other hand, processes such as repressed ones..." (P. 172)

That's the distinction.

Rapaport: That's right. So you have here the sharp clarification of the relation between the latent state and the unconscious. Do you have any more important statements on latency?

Mahl: There's one on p. 191 which is really a repetition of this, but it makes something clearer.

Rapaport: Yes, but that is already topography, isn't it? --Read it.

Mahl: "A very great part of this preconscious originates in the unconscious, has the character of its derivatives..."

Rapaport: You see, it is all in terms of topography. We will deal with that in a minute. You see the characterization of the latent states, their relations to somatic businesses, and the first differential statement in to the unconscious. Let's have the statements on the unconscious now.

Lustman: First he has just the very broad statement--on p. 166--that the repressed is just a part of the unconscious.

"The unconscious has the wider compass..."

Rapaport: That's a specifying statement. It's an important statement, to be sure, but it is a specifying statement. As long as you are there and you make that specifying statement, under it is another most important statement about the unconscious.

Rapaport: So here you have two characterizations. Not yet the broad characterization, only two characterization which state for you how you know about it and what it is not, or what it is more than. Let's have more general statements.

Lustman: On p. 170--after discussing whether one has a series of states of consciousness, he winds up by saying,

"Thus we have grounds for modifying our inference about ourselves and saying that what is proved is not the existence of a second consciousness in us, but the existence of psychical acts which lack consciousness."

Rapaport: This talks about the distinctions from what? Dr. Lustman, do you want to sum up what he talks about on p. 170? Just a topical heading.

Lustman: Subconscious, double conscience...

Rapaport: Yes, that's the topic. He tries to separate himself from the guys who talk about double consciousness, subconsciousness, etc. What are these guys?

Mahl: Morton Prince would be one of them.

Rapaport: Sure, but first of all they are the French. Janet primarily. And then comes Morton Prince. We know that this is against Morton Prince--where have we already encountered that?

Mahl: Chapter Seven.

Rapaport: Would you quote a passage which makes fun of this whole business of theirs? Which would be the passage? P. 170:

"Those who have resisted the assumption of an unconscious psychical are not likely to be ready to exchange it for an unconscious consciousness."

If the consciousness is split, then there ought to be a second consciousness which is unconscious and still conscious. The essential issue, however, does not become absolutely clear here--that in Janet's theory the unconscious is created by such splits, is a pathological product; while in Freud the unconscious is the very nature of the human animal. You see, that's what lies behind here, in the splitting of conscious, the ridiculousness of unconscious consciousness.

Sacks: In constructing this clever argument he stuck his neck out in terms of his own self-analysis.

Rapaport: Where is that?

Sacks: P. 170:

"Here some special hindrance evidently deflects our investigations from our own self and prevents our obtaining a true knowledge of it."

He goes on and implies that self-analysis cannot be very effective. It's one way of looking at it.

Rapaport: You can say that, but to walk a road for the first time is very different. You are not yet confused or deflected by all that you expect, if you walk it for the first time. Have you ever searched for something in a forest? If you do that, at times what happens is that you look for it where you know it will be anyway. Therefore you don't notice it where you don't know that it is. You know, this is the kind of thing against which Heraclitus has warned. If you don't expect the unexpected, you won't find it.

It's much more difficult to go on a road that other people knew. It's much more difficult to read a book that you know well than a book that you are reading for the first time--if it is interesting. This is one of the reasons it is very important to listen to a patient, because he walks the road himself. He walks roads that are newer than our roads. True, he gets onto a lot of detours if he's heard too much about psychoanalysis and all that kind of stuff. But sooner or later he gets onto his own road, if you (and he) are lucky.

Gentlemen, I haven't yet gotten a good characterization of the unconscious. Dr. Lustman had it earlier, but somehow he doesn't want to go back to it. How about it, sir? Where did you have it?

Lustman: "...we have to take into account the fact that analytic investigation reveals some of these latent processes as having characteristics and peculiarities which seem alien to us, or even incredible, and which run directly counter to the attributes of consciousness with which we are familiar." (p. 170)

Rapaport: This is the first thing about latent states that we are struck by. This is different from all the others which we have read.

These processes could just as well be conscious--but they happen not to be. Now comes the differentiation you already mentioned, Dr. Lustman, that the unconscious has a greater compass than the repressed.

Sacks: Jones made a comment about this. He feels that he made this statement rather early in the paper to take care of the people who say that the unconscious is only the result of repression of things which make us uncomfortable in life.

Rapaport: Tell me, do you recognize now the relevance of this to something we just talked about?

Lustman: That makes it pathological.

Rapaport: Yes, the idea that the unconscious is all pathological. You know, you must realize that there are people, like Silverberg and others--even Kubie will go at times to something that resembles that--who think that logical functioning is the normal and that everything else is interference with it. Well, it ain't so. You will see later in this paper how much it ain't so, when we get to the interrelations of the communications. But this is the preparation.

Gentlemen, still more about the unconscious. Obviously what I expected you to tell me is that the whole characterization is on p. 186, but then I would have told you that the passages beginning there should follow this statement on p. 170. We will discuss it, however, only when we come to the economics, the dynamics, and the topographic issue. But this is what should follow here. I am trying to put the paper in order. This is a paper which was written in a funny order, if one wants to understand the unconscious. It is poor as an instruction book. So I am trying to reorganize. You complain that I turn this upside down. True, but I had to.

I want to make sure that you understand that the point on p. 169 jumps and goes to p. 171, and is continued there in the form of primitive animism.

Lustman: Do you mean the statement where he says--

"...without any special reflection we attribute to everyone else our own constitution and therefore our consciousness as well, and that this identification is a sine qua non of our understanding."
(p. 169)

Rapaport: Do you understand the point? If you extend the method of drawing inferences concerning what comes to your mind about other people so that you understand these other people and piece together out of their behavior what they are up to, the same can be done with the isolated pieces of your own consciousness as it reflects your unconscious. But in doing the inference concerning other people, you operate by the ancient animistic principle, and try to reconstruct the other the only way you can, on your own image. Thus, naturally, reconstruction of the unconscious operates the same way, but what Freud doesn't add is that sooner or later you can refine this so that this point of departure becomes as much science as the animism concerning nature turns sooner or later into real science. That was the origin of all science. So he says, here on p. 171,

"The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the one hand, as a further expansion of the primitive animism which caused us to see copies of our own consciousness all around us,..."

This is a further continuation, that we see something human, something processlike, that we compare with our conscious functions, in this unconscious that encroaches on us just as the other things encroach on us from the outside. It is the continuation of that argument about consciousness in the Seventh Chapter.

There is another statement we have to see about the unconscious, on page 168.

"On the other hand, we know for certain that they have abundant points of contact with conscious mental processes; with the help of a certain amount of work they can be transformed into, or replaced by, conscious mental processes, and all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions and so on, can be applied to them. Indeed, we are obliged to say of some of these latent states that the only respect in which they differ from conscious ones is precisely in the absence of consciousness."

You see how that links to the original proposition (on p. 166) that we arrive at knowledge of the unconscious only from the knowledge of the conscious. Here it continues, "parallel to"

the argument about animism on pp. 169 and 171. You see how the argument hops over?

Now let's have the crucial statement. Where is it? Before you get into real topography.

Lustman: There's one on p. 173:

"It is not yet conscious, but it is certainly capable of becoming conscious (to use Breuer's expression)--that is, it can now, given certain conditions, become an object of consciousness without any special resistance. In consideration of this capacity for becoming conscious we also call the system cs. the 'preconscious'."

Rapaport: See, there is a confusion in terms. We will return to it later. How about consciousness? What crucial statements would you quote?

Mahl: The most crucial one is this one--p. 171--

Rapaport: There is a yet earlier one. P. 166:

"...the data of consciousness have a very large number of gaps in them;..."

Then p. 169.

Sacks: "Consciousness makes each of us aware only of his own states of mind; that other people, too, possess a consciousness is an inference which we draw by analogy from their observable utterances and actions, in order to make this behaviour of theirs intelligible to us. (It would no doubt be psychologically more correct to put it in this way: that without any special reflection we attribute to everyone else our own constitution and therefore our consciousness as well, and that this identification is a sine qua non of our understanding.)"

Rapaport: See, this is the beginning of this animism argument. Where was that statement on p. 171 that you wanted to quote?

Mahl: "In psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes

are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs."

Rapaport: You see how all of this flows together and really forms a unity. There is one on p. 172, namely the difficulty of talking about these things. Did you understand that argument?

Lustman: "...we cannot escape the ambiguity of using the words 'conscious' and 'unconscious' sometimes in a descriptive and sometimes in a systematic sense..."

Rapaport: Correct. So here for the first time he complains that if you talk about consciousness, it is hard to know whether you are talking about the quality of consciousness or about the potentially and actually conscious things together. When you talk about the unconscious, it is hard to know whether you use it descriptively, including the latent states, or not. Introducing this notation (which is the representation of the topographic point of view) introduces a contradiction. Later we will come to a second such contradiction--what he calls the "functional antithesis" on p. 192. We will come back to this later, but I want you to see it now too.

"Hence consciousness stands in no simple relation either to the different systems or to repression. The truth is that it is not only the psychically repressed that remains alien to consciousness, but also some of the impulses which dominate our ego--something, therefore, that forms the strongest functional antithesis to the repressed."

Do you recognize this? What does it mean?

Mahl: He's talking about the unconscious ego.

Rapaport: You see, these two things have to be seen together. What we just read before shows you that contradiction out of which the topographical point of view arises. This is the second contradiction--out of which the structural point of view arises. You ought to see them together. You also ought to note how early the second contradiction is seen. He barely managed to bring the topographic point of view under the roof before the roof began to collapse. You see why I call your

attention now to that, lest you miss the two crucial pivots here. The paper pivots around these two things.

Is there anything else you want to mention about consciousness? If not, then let us go to repression. Where is the crucial statement about repression?

Mahl: The first sentence of the paper, on p. 166:

"We have learnt from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious."

Rapaport: Yes. The next is then what was already quoted: the repressed is part of the unconscious. Is there any other general statement you would like to quote now?

Mahl: P. 173:

"In the first phase the psychical act is unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs.; if, on testing, it is rejected by the censorship, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be 'repressed' and must remain unconscious."

On p. 172 there is another, the contrast of the repressed processes with the latent processes.

Rapaport: Yes. I think that we can let repression ride at that for the moment.

Let's see, what are the phenomena which necessitate introducing these things?

Sacks: Pp. 166-167:

"These not only include parapraxes and dreams in healthy people, and everything described as a psychical symptom or an obsession in the sick; our most personal daily experience acquaints us with ideas that come into our head we do not know from where, and with intellectual conclusions arrived at we do not know how. All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we

insist upon claiming that every mental act that occurs in us must also necessarily be experienced by us through consciousness; on the other hand, they fall into a demonstrable connection if we interpolate between them the unconscious acts which we have inferred."

Rapaport: Correct. This last sentence seems to me to be the crucial one. Do you feel that there is anything else which is crucial in relation to the necessity to introduce these distinctions?

Lustman: P. 168:

"Incidentally, even before the time of psychoanalysis, hypnotic experiments and especially post-hypnotic suggestion, had tangibly demonstrated the existence and mode of operation of the mental unconscious."

Rapaport: Very good. Anything else?

Mahl: P. 167:

"We can go further and argue, in support of there being an unconscious psychical state, that at any given moment consciousness includes only a small content, so that the greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be for very considerable periods of time in a state of latency,..."

Rapaport: So here are a variety of these things. Let's take up the fifth question in this connection, because it gives us the most general phrasing of the factors which necessitate the introduction of such concepts. Did you understand the Kant argument? Who wants to read it?

Lustman: P. 171:

"...on the other hand, as an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psychoanalysis warns us not to equate perceptions

by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object."

Rapaport: Will anyone volunteer to sum up quickly the Kantian proposition?

Mahl: Our perception is determined by our modes of perceiving and our modes of experiencing whether it's external reality or part of ourselves.

Rapaport: Gentlemen, ever since Descartes, who become willy-nilly the spiritual father of Anglo-Saxon empiricism (which is Hobbes, Hume, Locke)--ever since the time of Anglo-Saxon empiricism, the assumption was that man is born as a clean slate; impinging sensations write on this slate; and sooner or later the traces of these experiences take the form of ideas and relationships in man's mind. Everything that exists in man's mind exists there because it existed in nature and encroached upon man's mind through the experiences and their sequences. And since nature is regular--this is particularly Hume's argument--frequently things will recur, and the more frequent something is in recurrence the more regularly will it impinge on the mind, and thus nature's relationships will be represented as thought relationships in the mind. Is this clear so far?

This was then overturned by Kant in Prolegomena to All Future Metaphysics, which preceded his Critique of Pure Reason in which he stated in detail the point of view which I will state now. He asserted that the individual objects in nature, "the things in themselves," are unknown and unknowable to us. Nature encroaches on us only in the form of individual sensations, and these individual sensations are synthesized in us in terms of the inborn categories of pure reason. That is, we are born with synthesizing principles and they, rather than nature, organize thoughts and their relationships. It is not only that we have categories of pure reason, but we have forms of sensuous apprehension. These are space and time. These are also not in nature, though Hume and the other Anglo-Saxon empiricists believed that time, space, and causality are imposed upon us by the contiguities and sequences in nature. Causality is a category of pure reason, but time and space are forms of sensuous apprehension. This is the sensory organization which put perceptions together prior to the integration by the categories of pure reason. Are you following how this stands in sharp contrast with Anglo-Saxon empiricism?

Now what Freud says here is that Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that perception is subjectively conditioned, namely, perception does not come to us as an object. The object is

created by us, by the forms of sensuous apprehension and by the categories of pure reason. I continue: (p. 171)

"...must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object."

You see that parallel? But there is a deeper parallel, and I tried to point that out to you. For Kant there are innate, a priori givens; these are the categories of reason and the forms of sensuous apprehension. For psychoanalysis there are also innate givens; they are the drives and the drive-controlling structures. (If somebody gets interested in that, I have an unpublished paper on dynamic psychology and Kantian epistemology.) Now this does not mean that we are Kantians, that we believe in categories of pure reason. Those categories represented the heroic attempt of a man to capture something before science got to it. Yet the orientation of the scientist can be either Kantian or Humean, and one can't avoid it, because these pioneers split up the world of ideas. This is the basic difference, for instance, between psychoanalysis and the American psychology that is addicted to pragmatism and logical positivism and symbolic logic and all that. It's a cleft marked out by philosophical systems. This is a very important issue, and much should be done about it and thought about it, but who has the time? Can we get to the last point in the first question? What is the course of the mental process?

Mahl:

Pp. 172-173:

"Proceeding now to an account of the positive findings of psycho-analysis, we may say that in general a psychical act goes through two phases as regards its state, between which is interposed a kind of testing (censorship). In the first phase the psychical act is unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs.; if, on testing, it is rejected by the censorship, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be 'repressed' and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this testing, it enters the second phase and thenceforth belongs to the second system, which we will call the system Cs. But the fact that it belongs to that system does not yet unequivocally determine its relation to consciousness."

Rapaport: Do you notice this last?

Mahl: Another instance of the descriptive vs. the systematic.

Rapaport: That's right. Now we have covered the next part already. Do you care to indicate a few more places where we have something on the course? One of them is p. 173, where the pivotal question of this paper is raised.

Mahl: "If we are to take the topography of mental acts seriously we must direct our interest to a doubt which arises at this point. When a psychical act (let us confine ourselves here to one which is in the nature of an idea) is transposed from the system Ucs. into the system Cs. (or Pcs.), are we to suppose that this transposition involves a fresh record--as it were, a second registration--of the idea in question, which may thus be situated as well in a fresh psychical locality, and alongside of which the original unconscious registration continues to exist? Or are we rather to believe that the transposition consists in a change in the state of the idea, a change involving the same material and occurring in the same locality?

Rapaport: What is the meaning of this? Can you figure it out?

Mahl: Are we to really believe that there is a topographical hierarchy through which ideational processes move, or are we to think of the cathectic economic changes as explaining the becoming conscious of an unconscious idea?

Rapaport: If the first is true, what happens? What about the topographic point of view if the first is true?

Lustman: He spells it out on p. 175. He says,

"With the first, or topographical, hypothesis is bound up that of a topographical separation of the systems Ucs. and Cs. and also the possibility that an idea may exist simultaneously in two places in the mental apparatus--"

Rapaport: This would be the consistent carrying through of the topographic point of view. If this doesn't come through, then something less than a full topographic point of view is valid. The temporal

sequence that he talked about in the Seventh Chapter--the sequence need not be spatial--that still may be true, but the topographic point of view as such would leave us only with that sequence business if this existence in two places at once does not hold up. So you see now from a second point of view, the whole business is rattled. Remember, we had one such rattling on p. 192.

Lustman: But he rattled this on p. 610 of the Seventh Chapter.

Rapaport: Would you read it?

Lustman: "Again, we may speak of a preconscious thought being repressed or driven out and then taken over by the unconscious. These images, derived from a set of ideas relating to a struggle for a piece of ground, may tempt us to suppose that it is literally true that a mental grouping in one locality has been brought to an end and replaced by a fresh one in another locality. Let us replace these metaphors by something that seems to correspond better to the real state of affairs, and let us say instead that some particular mental grouping has had a cathexis of energy attached to it or withdrawn from it, so that the structure in question has come under the sway of a particular agency or been withdrawn from it. What we are doing here is once again to replace a topographical way of representing things by a dynamic one."

Rapaport: See the slip-up?

Lustman: It's an economic one, rather than a dynamic.

Rapaport: This will come back in the misunderstandings of Glover in our third year. We will see that this disturbed some people who didn't read carefully enough. There are two or three or four such slips.

Now you see, in spite of that having been mentioned in 1900, the problem is again involved in 1915. Now he brings the topographical point of view in a sharper, clearer form and at the same time goes on breaking it up. The struggle is going on, you understand. This is a most characteristic thing about this man, that things are being molded and worked over. You will soon see the points which are the preparation for

The Problem of Anxiety. But first, is there anything else you want to mention about the course of the mental process?

Lustman: There's a summary of it on p. 204.

"It is a general truth that our mental activity moves in two opposite directions: either it starts from the instincts and passes through the system Ucs. to conscious thought-activity; or, beginning with an instigation from outside, it passes through the system Cs. and Pcs. till it reaches the Ucs. cathexes of the ego and objects."

Rapaport: Okay, that's a fine one. Do you know any others which we should regard before we go on?

Mahl: The whole business about communication between the two systems refers to course.

Rapaport: There is quite a bit of that. Where would be the most characteristic statement about it?

Mahl: I had especially p. 194.

"At the roots of instinctual activity the systems communicate with one another most extensively. One portion of the processes which are there excited passes through the Ucs., as through a preparatory stage, and reaches the highest psychical development in the Cs.; another portion is retained as Ucs. But the Ucs. is also affected by experiences originating from external perception. Normally all the paths from perception to the Ucs. remain open, and only those leading on from the Ucs. are subject to blocking by repression."

Rapaport: While it is not necessarily true that all the paths leading from perception to the Ucs are open, nevertheless in a certain sense it is true. This is the problem to which the Fisher experiments --the Poetzl experiments-- have directed themselves.* But the main thing here is that there are things that can start in the Ucs and things that can start from external perception. In terms of the reflex-arc model you can have the full course or it can start in the middle.

*[See reference footnote, p. 107.]

And indeed, you know that in regressive processes the opposite courses are also possible. So you see the course.

Let's go on to topography. First of all, what is the most general statement?

Mahl: P. 173:

"By accepting the existence of these two (or three) psychical systems, psycho-analysis has departed a step further from the descriptive 'psychology of consciousness' and has raised new problems and acquired a new content. Up till now, it has differed from that psychology mainly by reason of its dynamic view of mental processes; now in addition it seems to take account of psychical topography as well, and to indicate in respect of any given mental act within what system or between what systems it takes place. On account of this attempt, too, it has been given the name of 'depth-psychology'."

Rapaport: So this is the most general statement. Any others we should mention?

Lustman: The precursor of that general statement is the material we talked about already, on p. 172.

Rapaport: That's right. What about it?

Lustman: He talks about the difficulty of the descriptive and the structural, and then at the end of the paragraph, he says,

"Perhaps we may look for some assistance from the proposal to employ, at any rate in writing, the abbreviation Cs. for consciousness and Ucs. for what is unconscious when we are using the two words in the systematic sense."

Rapaport: Yes. Where does he say what it is not?

Mahl: It is not anatomical. P. 175.

Rapaport: That's right.

"Our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy..."

Next there is the antitopographical point on p. 176:

"On superficial consideration this would seem to show that conscious and unconscious ideas are distinct registrations, topographically separated, of the same content. But a moment's reflection shows that the identity of the information given to the patient with his repressed memory is only apparent."

Did you understand that?

Mahl: He's refuting the very thing that he said was support.

Rapaport: Yes. But here is a question: how should we understand that these two things are so different? Did you think about that?

Lustman: Well, they are different experiences. The next sentence--

"To have heard something and to have experienced something are in their psychological nature two quite different things, even though the content of both is the same."

Rapaport: In what sense are they different?

Mahl: In one there are memory-traces.

Sacks: It's a matter of affect.

Rapaport: A matter of affect too. Furthermore--?

Mahl: There's an act of perception; there are whole series--

Rapaport: Act is the central word; that's right. This is Brentano speaking. I have been calling your attention to it throughout and I will be persisting on it. Brentano speaking--that the act of orientation toward an experience is a very different perceptual act than that toward information relayed to one. Experience is infinitely layered. Now the experience of getting the information will be infinitely layered too, but very little of that infinite layering will pertain to the actual content, which is the description of the experience previously had. Here is a whole world of thinking which a psychotherapist must be clearly aware of, because he hears only a very impoverished bit out of which he has to reconstruct. The good therapist listens so that what the patient says arises as images in his own experience. Listening to a patient, a world of the patient arises. You indeed have, if you listen well, a visual image of what goes on. --Not necessarily

a visual one; much of it is tonal---but an image experience of it. That is something that Dr. Knight will tell a new man; you listen so that you get a real picture. -Otherwise you won't see the impossibility, the ludicrousness, the appallingness, the mortification, the elation, the million qualities of what you hear. It's quite a business. This is a whole world, in this one sentence. I just didn't want you to get by without seeing that.

Are you satisfied, or do you have any other general points on topography? There are several general points on topography. Should I suggest one? Well, some of the statements concerning the system Ucs, on p. 187 are on topography.

"...Ucs...pays just as little regard to reality."

Then:

"Unconscious processes only become cognizable by us under the conditions of dreaming and of neurosis---that is to say, when processes of the higher, Pcs., system are set back to an earlier stage by being lowered (by regression)."

So you see a certain topographic condition, what process turns one condition to the other.

"In themselves they cannot be cognized, indeed are even incapable of carrying on their existence; for the system Ucs. is at a very early moment overlaid by the Pcs. which has taken over access to consciousness and to motility. Discharge from the system Ucs. passes into somatic innervation that leads to development of affect; but even this path of discharge is, as we have seen (p. 178), contested by the Pcs. By itself, the system Ucs. would not in normal conditions be able to bring about any expedient muscular acts, with the exception of those already organized as reflexes."

This refers to the autonomy of the unconscious, this last sentence. If we talk about the autonomy of the ego, we can talk about the autonomy of the id also. It is capable of reflex acts without any kind of conscious intervention.

This is what I wanted to call attention to. Do you have anything else on topography in general? Then let's have the topography of drives. What do you have on that?

Sacks: P. 177:

"An instinct can never become an object of consciousness--only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea.. If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it. When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual impulse, the looseness of phraseology is a harmless one. We can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational representative of which is unconscious, for nothing else comes into consideration."

Rapaport: Do you realize that you are not usually taught this way? What do you link this up with in what we have read before?

Lustman: "If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view, an 'instinct' appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body." (p. 121)

Rapaport: You see, these two are consistent with each other.

Mahl: But these are two different things. I thought that was your comment about this, at the time we discussed it. That this "psychical representative of the stimuli" is not to be confused with what he's talking about here.

Rapaport: Not to be confused with, and therefore these two are consistent.

Mahl: In that it maintains the difference.

Rapaport: It maintains it. But you are not usually taught this way. You are taught as though the unconscious or the id were the drives themselves. The drive itself is that which generates

what comes to expression as affect, that which comes to expression as idea, that which generates the cathexes. The drive is a borderline concept. He is maintaining that strenuously.* This is the major point concerning the topography of drives. Did anybody find a second?

Mahl: On p. 186:

"The nucleus of the Ucs. consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses."

Then a little farther down.

"In the Ucs. there are only contents, cathected with greater or lesser strength."

This is again pushing the same point.

Rapaport: I would like to call attention to just one more thing on p. 179, though this is anticipating something which we haven't yet discussed.

"The importance of the system Cs. (Pcs.) as regards access to the release of affect and to action enables us also to understand the part played by substitutive ideas in determining the form taken by illness. It is possible for the development of affect to proceed directly from the system Ucs.; in that case the affect always has the character of anxiety, for which all 'repressed' affects are exchanged. Often, however, the instinctual impulse has to wait until it has found a substitutive idea in the system Cs... The development of affect can then proceed from this conscious substitute..."

The topography of the drive is that it manifests itself, gains discharge, usually by finding a substitute for its

*[There seems to be room for differences of opinion as to Freud's consistency on this score. See, for instance, the Editor's Introduction to "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," S.E., Vol. XIV.]

representation in the Pcs-Cs. And if affect-development starts from there (the Pcs-Cs), then it is affect. Otherwise the affect that will develop will be anxiety. This is the toxic theory, which is not important now. What is important for us now is that usually discharge takes place by finding a substitute for the instinct-representation, which opens the pathway to consciousness. This is the kind of thing that we repeatedly quoted from the Seventh Chapter, when we discussed the need of the drive for day-residues.

Let's go on to the topography of affects. It starts on 177:

Sacks:

"We should expect the answer to the question about unconscious feelings, emotions and affects to be just as easily given. It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e. that it should become known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned."

Rapaport: I want to call to your attention that this sentence--"that it should become known to consciousness"--becomes the cornerstone in a way of the argument in The Problem of Anxiety. Everything in this section is in a way a cornerstone to The Problem of Anxiety. We will get to that next year. Would you go on?

Sacks:

"But in psycho-analytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction, 'unconscious consciousness of guilt,'--

Rapaport: The first appearance, I believe, of this term this way. This point will play a crucial role in establishing the structural point of view.

Could you now jump to where he continues this argument on p. 178?

Mahl:

"...but in comparison with unconscious ideas there is the important difference that unconscious ideas continue to exist after repression as actual structures in the system Ucs., whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing. Strictly

speaking, then and although no fault can be found with the linguistic usage, there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas. But there may very well be in the system Ucs. affective structures which, like others, become conscious. The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes--basically of memory-traces--whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feeling. In the present state of our knowledge of affects and emotions we cannot express this difference more clearly."

I don't understand those "affective structures."

Rapaport: Would you mind reading the footnote?

Mahl: "Affectivity manifests itself essentially in motor (secretory and vasomotor) discharge resulting in an (internal) alteration of the subject's own body without reference to the external world; motility, in actions designed to effect changes in the external world."

Rapaport: Before we go to the point you question, Dr. Mahl, how do you understand why there should be unconscious affects?

Mahl: Affect corresponds to the discharge; the affective state corresponds to the autoplasmic discharge in the body.

Rapaport: Before the reverberation of this discharge into the body--before this autoplasmic process reverberates on consciousness--what is affect? What does it consist of?

Mahl: What he calls quota of affect.

Rapaport: That's right, it is the quota of affect; it is a cathexis. There is nothing else to it. This position would merely mean that as long as there is drive cathexis, there is the potentiality that it might take an affect-discharge channel as a route for discharge--emergency discharge, safety-valve and indicator discharge. Is this clear? This is a point often not grasped. As long as there is drive cathexis and as long as there are the secretory and circulatory channels, there is the potentiality that the drive cathexis will take this channel of discharge.

Mahl: Are we to conceive of that as the entire cathexis?

Rapaport: No. It is only a part of it. That's why it is called quota of affect. If it were all of it, then, those neurotics who are capable of affect-expression, could, through it, channel off the stuff which we know is dammed up and goes into symptoms. It's true that in most neurotics there are defenses against affects also. This is discussed in a great many ways in several of Fenichel's papers. He really specialized in a way in discussing defense against affects.

This is a point about affects which is not very clear to people. When drive-discharge is not possible because there is defense, or because situationally there is no possibility for discharge, these subsidiary channels are used. This is the so-called conflict theory of affects. McCurdy, the finest Anglo-Saxon descriptive psychiatrist--he was English--in his Psychology of Emotions went to this conception, that there is no affect unless a drive is hampered in discharge. This, by the way, is the ancient Spinoza conception of the affects. I reviewed this in Emotions and Memory, and in my paper on "The Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects"

Let's go to Dr. Mahl's point now. How did you others understand it? (P. 178)

"But there may very well be in the system
Ucs. affective structures which, like others,
become conscious."

Sacks: I thought about it as primordia, but I couldn't go any farther.

Rapaport: Well, primordia it could be. It could be that Freud thought at that time that while he can demonstrate that affect-discharge occurs when the drive itself cannot be discharged, it is possible that there are unconscious pockets of cathexes which will be discharged only through affect-discharge channels. Primordia--if I understood your word--is one reasonable explanation of this point.

There is another explanation of it, however, one that becomes crucial in The Problem of Anxiety. It is true that part of what I am saying now you have to infer, since it isn't directly stated--that part of what is called quota of affect becomes segregated from the drive-cathexes and comes under the control of the ego. Then its discharge is no longer directed by the drive-tension which mounts and needs a safety-valve outlet, but by the ego as a signal. This would then be the structuralization of the quota of affects--the structural segregation from the general drive-cathectic amount.

- Mahl: That's the segregation that you were referring to in your paper, "The Conceptual Model of Psychoanalysis"? When you talked about part of the drive-cathexis being segregated?
- Rapaport: Yes.
- Mahl: I took that to be the mechanism for the separation of the quota of affect.
- Rapaport: Yes. That's what I am saying now, too.
- Mahl: But now aren't you saying more than that? When you say that this is taken over by the ego?

Rapaport: Oh, well, there I just didn't discuss it further. This is the argument of The Problem of Anxiety. The term segregation does not come from Freud. When you read the monograph, [The Problem of Anxiety] you will see that that's the consistent carrying through of the point that is made here. And that's the signal conception.

There are two prerequisites, or rather three: one of them is that there be congenitally given discharge-channels of this sort, which are in the meanwhile communication-channels also, because they are used for intraspecies communication. Man communicates with these, and other animals communicate with them. Also we know from ethology now--I must have referred to the 1951 Tinbergen article*--we know from ethology that indeed drive-displacement processes in animals (also called derivative behaviors) become the basis of intraspecies communications. Tinbergen's observations are one of the most remarkable developments of our time. Obviously the argument is an evolutionary one, you understand. It is comparative evolutionary data out of which it is reconstructed.

Sacks: You bait the hook with Tinbergen. Tell us more.

Rapaport: I bait the hook so that you read it. I am trying to indicate that there is something very real to this communication business, about which of the psychoanalysts only Schilder talks. I bait the hook further. In my Schilder memorial address you will find the references where he talks about it.**

*[Tinbergen, H. The Study of Instinct. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.]

**[Rapaport, D. "Paul Schilder's Contribution to the Theory of Thought-Processes." Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 1951, 32, 291-301. Also, Appendix in Schilder, P., Medical Psychology. New York: International Universities Press, 1953. Pp. 340-356.]

Lustman: Could you summarize the three things you started with?

Rapaport: Congenitally given affect-discharge channels; the controls or defenses or situational factors which prevent affect discharge; and finally, a structuralized segregation of the affect-discharge which brings it under the control of the ego, which then can use it for signals and anticipations. Did somebody find a reference to signal here in this paper?

Lustman: P. 183:

"Excitation of any point in this outer structure must inevitably, on account of its connection with the substitutive idea, give rise to a slight development of anxiety; and this is now used as a signal to inhibit, by means of a fresh flight on the part of the (Pcs.) cathexis, the further progress of the development of anxiety."

Rapaport: You note that here again, for the second time--it was there already in the Seventh Chapter, you remember--again there is the signal conception.

Another point concerning the topography of affects we have already discussed before, on p. 180, in connection with the topography of drives. Can we consider it covered, then?

Let's see the topography of ideas. Where do you find the first stuff on it?

Sacks: P. 173:

Rapaport: That's right. We see that there is the major question raised as to whether this is a purely topographic or an economic-topographic problem. Now what is the next point on the topography of ideas?

Sacks: P. 175:

Rapaport: Yes. That's the continuation of this same point, and we have covered it, really. All of pages 175 and 176 is an elaboration of the same point; I am glad that you bring that up. But we have several other things about it. Where do they come? Who noted p. 180?

Mahl: He replaces his topographical--

Rapaport: That's the crucial point where the topography really falls. Can you state it?

Mahl: "We notice, moreover, that we have based these reflections (as it were, without meaning to) on the assumption that the transition from the system Ucs. to the system next to it is not effected through the making of a new registration but through a change in its state, an alteration in its cathexis. The functional hypothesis has here easily defeated the topographical one." (p. 180)

Rapaport: This was the cathectic theory. Now do you mind going down to the next paragraph?

Mahl: "...the withdrawal of libido from it would have to be repeated, and the same performance would go on endlessly; but the outcome would not be repression. So, too, when it comes to describing primal repression, the mechanism just discussed of withdrawal of preconscious cathexis would fail to meet the case; for here we are dealing with an unconscious idea which has as yet received no cathexis from the Pcs. and therefore cannot have that cathexis withdrawn from it." (p. 181)

Rapaport: This could be discussed under repression, to be sure, and we will come back to it there. But first of all we have to discuss it under the topography of ideas. The problem of when an idea is unconscious is not purely a problem of systems. Then what is it? Is it the withdrawal of cathexis alone? No. There remains a problem, why doesn't the idea rise into consciousness? As soon as the dynamic consideration comes up--that it must rise--you are up against the structural problem; what will prevent it from rising? If there is nothing to prevent it from rising, it will rise again and again, and the state you have will not be repression. And there comes the argument about counter-cathexis.

Lustman: It's an economic point too.

Rapaport: It's mainly economic, but it is the beginning of the structural point of view. The point I am bringing up here is simply to try to show you that the topographic consideration, as soon as you take it seriously, and take into account the dynamics, breaks down immediately, and leads to the economic-structural problem, which is not purely an economic problem because the anticathexes have to be stable. Otherwise it is a constant power play.

- Mahl: Why isn't the topographic point of view adequate to explain why it doesn't rise, when he has ascribed to the system Cs properties that would prevent it from rising?
- Rapaport: A very good question, Dr. Mahl. What properties does he ascribe?
- Mahl: Control over motor discharge is one. Control over all paths of discharge.
- Rapaport: Fine.
- Mahl: The secondary process.
- Rapaport: Now the question is to explain how it is done. Gentlemen, Dr. Mahl's question is a crucial one, because otherwise you don't understand what hit you. Sure he describes all that, but that's a descriptive statement. Now the job is to account for this. There are descriptive statements, and Dr. Mahl correctly quotes the descriptive statements. The job is then to account for them metapsychologically. One of the metapsychological accounts would be topography. Topography is tottering. In this case it totters because the dynamic point of view, as soon as you take it into account, breaks it through. The question then is--
- Mahl: That I don't understand. If I understand this correctly, he has given the Cs system a control.
- Rapaport: Descriptively. Now the job is to understand how the control works. Dr. Mahl, realize how important a question you are asking. You are asking us to distinguish between what was descriptive here and what was not simply descriptive. The control over emotions, the control over motility, the control over drive--that's all descriptive business.
- Mahl: I assumed that it was not descriptive.
- Rapaport: That was the mistake. That was the same mistake as was made when you people were not terribly surprised that suddenly censorship was not taken for granted there. Remember? Censorship is a descriptive term. The problem is to make metapsychological sense out of it. If censorship were more than a descriptive term, all our psychologist colleagues who accuse Freud of sheer anthropomorphisms, by creating this little creature censor, would be right. But they are wrong. They have not read it. That's a description.

What we see here is the economics, topography, structure, and dynamics of censorship, of control over drives. He first of all

shows that it is insufficient simply to say that topographically it is accounted for, because the dynamics demand of us that it should rise.

I think what you ought to learn out of Dr. Mahl's question is that when you read this thing the first task is to make the distinction between the descriptive and the metapsychological. Nothing that is not explainable from the three metapsychological points of view was settled theoretically. You recognize the significance of that crucial sentence on p. 181? It follows immediately here.

"...when we have succeeded in describing a physical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a metapsychological presentation."

This is crucial statement, the most important statement for anybody who studies metapsychology. Regrettably it is a very vague and very limited one, but it still remains crucial. It follows immediately here for the very reason I tried to explain to you. I appreciate the question, because it sheds light on the whole meaning why this metapsychology is necessary. Obviously Freud is full of descriptive statements. Clinical statements are descriptive statements. Clinical theory itself goes a step further, but the metapsychological theory is beyond clinical theory. Clinical theory is a special theory. Metapsychology is a general theory. Okay?

Mahl: Does this have anything to do with the dynamic view of consciousness?

Rapaport: Please show us what you have in mind.

Mahl: For instance, on p. 179:

"Conversely, too, we may say that as long as the system Cs. controls affectivity and motility..."

Hasn't he there ascribed a dynamic role to consciousness? Or am I inferring more than a descriptive--?

Rapaport: Sure; he talks about the dynamics. Why is this a dynamic statement? What does dynamics always deal with?

Mahl: Forces.

Rapaport: This is dynamics because it deals with forces, and as a matter of fact with conflict in general. That's what you are talking about. We are already anticipating the dynamics here, but that's all right with me. All you have here is a dynamic discussion of the role of consciousness. You don't have a full discussion of the role of consciousness until much later. You have to have an economic, topographic, and, as a matter of fact, a structural one. This is only the dynamic.

Mahl: All right. But my point is that it is not just descriptive. That's why I was so surprised when you said that things fall apart here on p. 180, because he was being only topographical. I didn't think he was.

Rapaport: But you notice how we had to infer the dynamics there?

Mahl: But not much.

Rapaport: There is a descriptive statement in which the dynamic aspect is quickly establishable. No other aspects are discussed here really; the topography is only touched on. It is not stated what the topographic conditions actually are. Here, as soon as you get to this business on p. 180, the dynamic aspects, you become aware that you have to introduce the economic aspect. Then comes a question of why the counterathesis shouldn't be offset again and again. It has to structuralize sooner and later, and that is the point which comes to expression when he says that the substitutive idea is the antithesis. That's a mistake, obviously. The substitutive idea will take the form of the bound antithesis, will bind the antithesis into structure. Do you remember that? This is what is so difficult. Mind you, it is not certain yet that it is so easy to write metapsychology without such difficulties constantly.

Are you satisfied for the time being with this point? It was a very worth-while excursion, but can we go on? There is one more point I would like to clarify. Note the bottom of p. 189. He now warns:

"Nor will it be out of place here to utter a warning against any over-hasty generalization of what we have brought to light concerning the distribution of the various mental functions between the two systems. We are describing the state of affairs as it appears in the adult human being, in whom the system Ucs. operates, strictly speaking, only as a preliminary stage of the higher organization. The question of

what the content and connections of that system are during the development of the individual, and of what significance it possesses in animals--these are points on which no conclusion can be deduced from our description..."

Do you know what this says?

Mahl: It's a genetic proposition.

Rapaport: This is a genetic proposition, but also it talks about the continuous transition between the unconscious and the conscious. And this point about the significance in the case of animals in the point Hartmann has taken up in his comments on the psychoanalytic theory of instincts.* This point you will hear plenty about next term.

Did you notice any other things about the topography of ideas or should I call attention to one more thing? Did you notice that point where ideas were characterized as conforming neither to the Cs nor to the Ucs? Pp. 190-191.

Sacks: That was fantasy-formation.

Rapaport: That's right. Can you quickly state, without going into it, what is the trouble with these ideas?

Sacks: Well, they seem to be exempt from the general rules that are applicable to the unconscious.

Rapaport: In what sense?

Sacks: They are highly organized, not usually contradictory; they can make use of Cs systems.

Mahl: All secondary process.

Rapaport: Secondary-process organization, highly rationalized, and all that. So why don't they belong to the Cs?

Sacks: That's a good question.

Rapaport: It's a dirty question.

*[Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of Instinctual Drives," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:368-388;1948.]

- Mahl: They are cathected by the unconscious cathexis.
- Rapaport: But how do you know that?
- Mahl: They are derivatives.
- Rapaport: How do you know that? The first way you know it is that they are just not conscious. They just won't get conscious, the God-damned things! Why aren't they part of the Cs? Because they just aren't.
- Sacks: How do we know about them?
- Rapaport: We know about them when you undo the work of repression. You infer them, and when the resistance is analyzed, suddenly you find them in wholesale bulk.
- Mahl: He found them in his dream analyses too.
- Rapaport: Yes, and you remember there is a passage where he talks about dreams which seem to be unconscious fantasies altogether.
- Mahl: The ones that are too well organized.
- Rapaport: Yes.
- Mahl: You ask, why don't these become conscious? Because they don't. But my understanding of this goes back to something that I asked you on the paper on repression. I take this to mean that anything that is cathected from the unconscious ipso facto becomes subject to repression. Right? Unless--and here's how I thought he explained this, on p. 191:

"Substitutive formations, too, are highly organized derivatives of the Ucs. of this kind; but these succeed in breaking through into consciousness--"

--we become conscious of them--and here's where I thought it was crucial--

"--when circumstances are favourable--
for example, if they happen to join
forces with an anticathexis from the
Pcs."

I take that to mean that these derivatives can break through if they will now serve the function of keeping something else

out of consciousness. These fantasy-formations will apparently not serve this function.

Rapaport: Correct. That's the point.

Mahl: So here's a real, functional explanation.

Rapaport: There is a functional difference here clearly.

Sacks: By definition, if fantasy-formations come from the unconscious, why are they not subjected to the vicissitudes?

Rapaport: They were subject to these vicissitudes, but they were not so highly cathected at the time when they were developed that they did not have access to secondary-process stuff. They developed insidiously, never receiving at once the full cathexis. This is the genetic story that you have to assume. It was discussed in the propositions about distance and distortion and intensity.

Okay, we have to push on. Let's go to the topography of consciousness. Did you find some points which state what the topographic problem of the system CS is? Or what the topographic characteristics of it are? Or what the major characteristics of this topographic entity are?

Mahl: One is this business of consciousness being a sense organ, which goes back to p. 171.

Rapaport: Right. Let's bypass that, we are familiar with it. The next suggestion?

Mahl: On p. 172 he elevates consciousness to a system.

Rapaport: Yes. We needn't review that now. How about specific characteristics? Where are they stated? Pp. 186-187.

Mahl: "In the system Pcs. the secondary process is dominant. ...Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs." (p. 187).

The reality principle he introduces here but carries over onto p. 188.

Rapaport: Yes; but we do not really need any more of that. I would like you to go to p. 191.

Mahl: "To consciousness the whole sum of psychical processes presents itself as the realm ~~of the~~

of the preconscious. A very great part of this preconscious originates in the unconscious, has the character of its derivatives and is subjected to a censorship before it can become conscious." (p. 191)

This is clearly another system.

Rapaport: Topographically the major thing is that consciousness does regard all mental processes as though they were preconscious. It can't have any conception about any others, because of this very censorship.

Mahl: Attention is brought in.

Rapaport: I would like to deal with that under economics, if you don't mind. I brought in the secondary process and not that because it is a structural point and I want to link the topographic with the structure, but didn't want to go any further than that.

We have to deal with the whole latter part of this paper, and I would like to deal with it as fast as we can. Did you understand this whole verbal business? Do you know why the whole verbal business? Do you know why the whole issue came up?

Mahl: He says it comes up to explain the verbal peculiarities in schizophrenia.

Rapaport: But he also says that it strikes us now at once that we know what is the difference between conscious and unconscious ideas. That's why I bring it up now. It really comes up in this paper because of Jung. Go to p. 196.

"But in these disorders object-cathexis in general is retained with great energy, and more detailed examination of the process of repression has obliged us to assume that object-cathexis persists in the system Ucs. in spite of--or rather in consequence of--repression."

You understand that this is the opposite statement to the proposition of introversion. It is the continuation of the argument in "Narcissism." But if this is so, then what the hell is happening in the psychoses? Why is it that in the psychoses that which you had to unearth in the neurotic is right on the surface? Do you know where he mentions that? P. 197.

"...struck by the fact that in schizophrenia a great deal is expressed as being conscious which in the transference neuroses can only be shown to be present in the Ucs. by psycho-analysis."

So it can't be just that these schizophrenics have withdrawn all the cathexes, and that in them the cathexis is all narcissitic. There is something wrong. So this answer won't do against Jung. Contrary to Jung and to his own explanation, indeed the drive cathects some kind of ideas. What kind of ideas? The answer to that is on p. 199.

"In schizophrenia words are subjected to the same process as that which makes the dream-images out of latent dream-thoughts--to what we have called the primary psychological process."

So the cathexes are on the words. If this is so, then we have to discover a distinction between the objects and the words. That comes on p. 201. The literalness of the schizophrenic--a hole is a hole--is due to the fact that in schizophrenia the object-cathexis is relinquished, but the cathexis of the ideas of the words corresponding to the object is retained. So the conscious idea can be split up into the idea of the word and the idea of the thing. And now we know what the difference is between the conscious and the unconscious idea, namely that the one is connected with words and the other isn't. The explanation he makes is that in schizophrenia these verbal cathexes are a restitution-phenomenon. Did you find where he said that?

Mahl: Pp. 203-204:

"It turns out that the cathexis of the word-presentation is not part of the act of repression, but represents the first of the attempts at recovery or cure which so conspicuously dominate the clinical picture of schizophrenia."

Rapaport: As a matter of fact, you will find that earlier on p. 197, where he discusses changes of speech and distortions of language in schizophrenia.

"...in such symptoms of schizophrenia as are comparable with the substitutive formations of hysteria or obsessional neurosis..."

That is, symptoms which represent the return of the repressed.

Sacks: I'm trying to think of the difference between this and the concrete speech of the 2-or-3 year-old.

Rapaport: Very good, sir. What do you make of it?

Sacks: I think there are major similarities.

Rapaport: The answer to that is that it is never very wise to formulate one's theories in fighting against other people. "Narcissism" was a fight against Jung; this is to extend the fight, extend the argument in "Narcissism," and yet get by with the explanation of this language. It turns out to be an ex parte theory. He has recognized a number of times that the essence of consciousness lies in the relationships of ideas; if relationships are severed--and this is the job of repression--then things become unconscious, not amenable to consciousness. Instead of operating on that broad line, the argument here is limited to the verbal relationships.

Now in the child it is very easily seen that language is acquired later than object-relationships. For the very young child, relationships in this new acquisition are not thoroughly established, and therefore the more primitive method of organization asserts itself, and so you are clinically right. You see normally in the child what is here called speech disturbance.

Let's hear the topography of repression. Where do you start?

Mahl: On p. 173 he says it takes place between the Ucs and Pcs.

Rapaport: Very good. The next one, please?

Sacks: Pp. 178-179.

"...repression can succeed in inhibiting an instinctual impulse from being turned into a manifestation of affect."

Rapaport: So this is one of the two things it does. About affects it can do two things: it can bar the channel of discharge, or it can allow access to the channel of discharge but prevent the development of feeling. You realize that that's very frequent: somebody can blush without knowing it. A patient will say, "I am sweating but I have no idea what happened." It is one of the very important things clinically about affects.

Also you have to realize that there is the opposite too: the affect-expression in general may be limited or eliminated, for all practical purposes, and yet feeling remains. These are the strangulated, minimal, almost subliminal affects which are so common among obsessional people. That's quite common too. They just suspect that they feel something, but aren't sure whether they do feel something or should be feeling something.

All right, let's have the next.

Mahl: On p. 180 he just repeats the point that repression takes place on the border between the systems Ucs and Pcs.

Rapaport: Very good. Next? Next is the point on p. 182:

"The substitutive idea acts in the one instance as a point at which there is a passage across from the system Ucs. to the system Gs., and, in the other instance, as a self-sufficing source for the release of anxiety."

This is the signal, the substitutive idea. This is structure-formation; this is segregation of affect. Can you see?

Mahl: Yes, I can now, but when I read it I saw it more in terms of his toxic theory.

Rapaport: No, this is the signal business. And it also tells you how the substitutive idea serves a double function.

Mahl: There's another topographic point on p. 180 (one he makes in several other places too). Repression is not really just on the border, but it is something arising from the Pcs, a function of the Pcs.

"Here repression can only consist in withdrawing from the idea the (pre) conscious cathexis which belongs to the system Pcs.

Rapaport: Yes, that belongs here, as well as under economics. Now p. 186 is my next:

"...all this is only introduced by the work of the censorship between the Ucs. and the Pcs."

Now who has the next one?

Mahl: On p. 191-192 he adds another process of repression.

Rapaport: Another process of censorship, anyway. Did you understand this

points? Why does it become necessary to introduce this?

Mahl: For one thing, a point we've already discussed: some of these fantasy-formations become conscious only after some resistance has been overcome. They have already been in the Pcs, because they are secondary-process organized.

Rapaport: Let's read it.

Mahl: "A very great part of this preconscious originates in the unconscious, has the character of its derivatives and is subjected to a censorship before it can become conscious. Another part of the Pcs. is capable of becoming conscious without any censorship. Here we come upon a contradiction of an earlier assumption. In discussing the subject of repression we were obliged to place the censorship which is decisive for becoming conscious between the systems Ucs. and Pcs. Now it becomes probable that there is censorship between the Pcs. and the Cs. Nevertheless we shall do well not to regard this complication as a difficulty, but to assume that to every transition from one system to that immediately above it (that is, every advance to a higher stage of psychical organization) there corresponds a new censorship." (p. 191-192).

Rapaport: Here you are faced with a new example of the whole issue of hierarchy, the sequence of instances; you are faced with the structure-formation in hierarchy and defensive depths, which is clinically so very familiar--I must have mentioned the example of homosexuality, paranoia, and aggression. This is already a structural conception, the advance to a higher stage of mental organization. You understand that the topographic distinctions are outlined by censorship. Now anything else? Or can we go on to dynamics?

Mahl: The most general dynamic statement is the one where he says that psychoanalysis adds a dimension of depth to the dynamic. P. 173.

Rapaport: Yes. We have read it. Take another look so that we can go on. Now to what does he refer when he says that until now we have discussed the dynamic conception? Do you know what he refers to? It's what Dr. Mahl quoted--what I called a descriptive statement. You find one on the top of p. 173 like

that; and in "Repression" he discussed it that way. Forces can clash with each other or can cooperate with each other and make compromise-formations.

How about the dynamics of drives?

Mahl: The clearest statement is on p. 186.

"The nucleus of the Ucs. consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses. These instinctual impulses are co-ordinate with one another, exist side by side without being influenced by one another, and are exempt from mutual contradiction."

Rapaport: You see, coordinate here means coequal. You have a coexistence. "Coordinate" is really not the right expression,

"exist...without being influenced by one another."

They are not coordinate. Go on.

Mahl: "When two wishful impulses whose aims must appear to us incompatible become simultaneously active, the two impulses do not diminish each other or cancel each other out, but combine to form an intermediate aim, a compromise." (p. 186)

Rapaport: Yes. And when such an intermediate aim is formed, the condition is characterized by what?

Mahl: One thing is greater intensity.

Rapaport: Yes, but also by ambivalence. Now this does not exhaust the whole issue; you will see in The Problem of Anxiety and "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" that there are also fusions and defusions of instinctual drives. And there is a famous debate which attaches itself to the opposition of the ego-instincts to the libidinal instincts, which was an instinctual conflict.

When you talk about fusion and defusion you have to realize that in a sexual activity, for instance, the aggressive and libidinal instincts are fused. If there is defusion, the result is that the aggressive component appears alone as free aggression. That has to be inhibited, and thereby the whole sexual impulse and its execution becomes impaired. This is an activity-passivity

problem also. Here again libido and aggression and activity and passivity come very close to each other. It is a very complex problem, which we can't discuss now.

I want to say a word about instinctual conflict. It is very clear that the explanation of repression, at the time of "On Narcissism" and also at the time of the Three Essays, was that repression was done with the energy of the ego-instincts. Now here you have a very different picture, in "Repression" and "The Unconscious." This is a sharp transition from that earlier conception. We have systems here, and we have a beginning of structure here. We don't talk about the ego-instincts being the ones which inhibit, which repress; but you remember that in "Narcissism" we have demonstrated that very sharply. Do you recall the passages? When he says that until now we had dynamics in the main--remember, we quoted that--this is what he is talking about, the view we saw in "Narcissism." Some people, for instance Alexander, still talk about instinctual conflict. We don't talk about instinctual conflict; we talk about intersystemic conflict, structural conflict. The id and ego clash, or other combinations of the structures are clashing. Still there is a cloudy area--there is still a problem of instinctual conflict, of conflict between two instincts. Wherever ambivalence comes up, that is a problem, and it is by no means certain how we could settle all those issues simply by structural considerations. Don't imagine that that's all settled.

Now let's go on to the dynamics of affects. Who has the page?

Mahl:

R. 178:

"In general, the use of the terms 'unconscious affect' and 'unconscious emotion' has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor--"

--That's economics.

"We know that three such vicissitudes are possible: either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed, i.e. it is prevented from developing at all. ...We know, too, that to suppress

the development of affect is the true aim of repression and that its work is incomplete if this aim is not achieved." (p. 178)

Rapaport: This is a dynamic proposition--that repression is pitted against affects--not just a proposition of repression. Let me mention that there is another dynamic problem about affects which you don't encounter here, namely that certain affects, particularly when they are structurally segregated, serve as motives. For instance, people can do things because of guilt. Or people can do something because of anxiety. These are some of the reasons why we talk about structural segregation.

All right, let's have the dynamics of ideas. Where do you have the first reference?

Mahl: Well, the first one really is at the beginning of this paper, on p. 166. He says that an idea, when repressed, can continue and that it can produce effects--that's a dynamic statement.

Rapaport: It is not really the idea which produces the effects, but let's leave it that way. The next is on p. 175:

"Above all, it does not remove the repression nor undo its effects--"

--If you communicate the idea to the patient--

"...as might perhaps be expected from the fact that the previously unconscious idea has now become conscious. On the contrary, all that we shall achieve at first will be a fresh rejection of the repressed idea."

In other words, the communication of an idea, consciously, becomes a renewed substitute reinforcing the repression. The next point is on p. 177, that the idea is an instinct-representation. We read that before, but we should note it here, because it's the basic dynamic proposition about ideas. The idea is an instinct-representative, and therefore there is a propelling of it upward. That propelling of it upward is stated in an economic form on p. 186:

"...Ucs. consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses." (p. 186)

That implies the propelling too. The ideas seek to be propelled to consciousness. So that's the basic one.

The next point about the dynamics of ideas is in connection with the substitute idea.

Mahl: He mentions this first on p. 179.

"The importance of the system Cs. (Pcs.) as regards access to the release of affect and to action enables us also to understand the part played by substitutive ideas in determining the form taken by illness."

Rapaport: And this is spelled out further on p. 183. We have already discussed the two-way function of the substitutive idea. It can become the point from which the affect is elicited, but in turn it can also become the place from which it is inhibited. You notice that protective rampart? Pp. 183-184:

"With each increase of instinctual excitation the protecting rampart round the substitutive idea must be shifted a little further outwards. ...The system Cs. now protects itself against the activation of the substitutive idea by an anticathexis of its environment, just as previously it had secured itself against the emergence of the repressed idea by a cathexis of the substitutive idea."

Obviously in addition to the dynamics of ideas, this involves the economic point of view. The third basic dynamic proposition comes on pp. 194-195. It's an important proposition. Would you please read it?

Mahl:

"Co-operation between a preconscious and an unconscious impulse, even when the latter is intensely repressed, may come about if there is a situation in which the unconscious impulse can act in the same sense as one of the dominant trends. The repression is removed in this instance, and the repressed activity is admitted as a reinforcement of the one intended by the ego. The unconscious becomes ego-syntonic in respect of this single conjunction without any change taking place in its repression apart from this. In this co-operation the influence of the Ucs. is unmistakable: the reinforced tendencies reveal themselves

as being nevertheless different from the normal; they make specially perfect functioning possible, and they manifest a resistance in the face of opposition which is similar to that offered, for instance, by obsessional symptoms."

Rapaport: Did you understand what this is about? What is this "specially perfect functioning"?

Sacks: Artistic, creative--

Rapaport: Artistic creations; we had such an example in "Repression". Do you remember what it was?

Mahl: The one on humor.

Rapaport: That's right. Where was that?

Mahl: P. 151.

Rapaport: That's right. And there is a similar statement in this paper. P. 186:

"...where a primary process is allowed to take its course in connection with elements belonging to the system Pcs. it appears 'comic' and excites laughter."

This whole process which is described there is regression in the service of the ego, though it is usually not quoted by Kris, who coined this concept. Notable about this passage is that it talks about the mutual reinforcement of an ego tendency with an unconscious tendency--the artistic, conscious or pre-conscious creative intent reinforced with a more primitive one. You may want to read my discussion of that in the seventh part of Organization and Pathology of Thought.

Mahl: Another example of this, that we haven't mentioned, is the aggression during war.

Rapaport: Yes, but the "specially perfect functioning" is missing. I am not quite fair, because what is popularly called heroism is in a certain sense, in its own category, "specially perfect."

Lustman: There are also dynamic considerations in his discussion of derivatives too, aren't there? On p. 190.

"In brief, it must be said that the Ucs. is continued into what are known as derivatives,

that it is accessible to the impressions of life, that it constantly influences the Pcs..."

and then:

"Among the derivatives of the Ucs. instinctual impulses, of the sort we have described--"

Rapaport: Yes. Today we would call them "derivative motivations"--we wouldn't talk only about derivative ideas.. Let me call to your attention--now that we are on p. 190, and it is so late--that on this page there is an adaptive proposition.

"On the contrary, the Ucs. is alive and capable of development and maintains a number of other relations to the Pcs., amongst them that of co-operation."

Capable of development"--has relationships. Then farther down:

"...and is even, for its part, subjected to influences from the Pcs."

This is contrary to the sternly maintained intangibility of the unconscious. Though as Freud points out, therapy would not be possible if the unconscious were uninfluenceable. This adaptive proposition is also stated on p. 194, when he makes the argument that the unconscious is not so intractable as has been said. These sentences should also be put together with what we read on p. 189, where he warned against making too hasty generalizations about the relations between the two systems.

[The recording ends here. I have tried to indicate in the syllabus some of the pages in this transcript in which answers may be found to question 4.]

"The Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams"

[As was noted in the introduction to Volume I of this transcript, the original seminar ran out of time before getting to this paper and the next one. Hence the change in the participants. Participating in these last two were Paul E. Emery, M. D., Stuart C. Miller, M. D., Jean Schimek, Ph. D., David Shapiro, Ph. D., Eugene Talbot, Ph. D., Eugene E. Trunnell, M. D., Ess A. White, Jr., M. D., Robert B. White, M. D., and of course, David Rapaport, Ph. D.]

Rapaport: In contrast particularly to "Repression" and "The Unconscious," these two papers have suffered much with the passing of time-- "The Metapsychological Supplement" more than "Mourning and Melancholia." Therefore, in addition to trying to understand their content, we will have to exercise a more critical view than we usually do in literature seminars.

Let's go to the first question. In what sense is this paper, "A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams," an attempt to introduce the concept of narcissism into the theory of dreams? Do I hear a suggestion?

Trunnell: Simply by using the theory of narcissism to explain some of the phenomena of dreams.

Rapaport: For instance?

Trunnell: First, that in sleep primitive narcissism is restored. The he specifies two things--the fact that dreams are concerned only with the dreamer, and the diagnostic capacity of dreams.

Rapaport: Would you give us the passages?

Trunnell: They are on pp. 222-223.

"In investigating psychoneurotic states, we find ourselves led to emphasize in each of them what are known as temporal regressions, i.e. the amount of developmental recession peculiar to it. We distinguish two such regressions--one affecting the development of the ego and the other that of the libido. In the state of sleep, the latter is carried to the point of restoring primitive narcissism, while the former goes back to the state of hallucinatory satisfaction of wishes."

Rapaport: Dr. Trunnell suggested that there are two phenomena referred to here, which indicate to us that there is such a narcissistic regression. Let's have those two phenomena.

E. White: One is on p. 223:

"The 'diagnostic' capacity of dreams--a phenomenon which is generally acknowledged but regarded as puzzling--becomes equally comprehensible, too. In dreams, incipient

physical disease is often detected earlier and more clearly than in waking life, and all the current bodily sensations assume gigantic proportions. This magnification is hypochondriacal in character; it is conditional upon the withdrawal of all psychical cathexes from the external world back on to the ego, and it makes possible early recognition of bodily changes which in waking life would still for a time have remained unobserved."

Rapaport: Fine. Keep this in mind, and now let's have the other one. What did you call it, Dr. Trunnell?

Trunnell: It starts right above that.

"...we know that dreams are completely egoistic and that the person who plays the chief part in their scenes is always to be recognized as the dreamer. This is now easily to be accounted for by the narcissism of the state of sleep. Narcissism and egoism, indeed, coincide; the word 'narcissism' is only intended to emphasize the fact that egoism is a libidinal phenomenon as well; or, to put it in another way, narcissism may be described as the libidinal complement of egoism." (p. 223)

Rapaport: We are familiar with this as one of the many definitions of narcissism. We see that Freud does state in the first passage quoted--that the dream is to be understood as a narcissistic phenomenon. We are then given two examples, references to two phenomena, to make it plausible.

A new conception is discussed here, by means of which he makes the theory of dreams part and parcel of narcissism--or, if you like, narcissism part and parcel of the theory of dreams. What is the new conceptual invention that links the theory of narcissism to the theory of dreams, or vice versa? Dr. Emery?

Emery: The withdrawal of cathexis.

Rapaport: Right. Would you point to that line again?

Emery: "...it is conditional upon the withdrawal of all psychical cathexes from the external world back on to the ego, and it makes possible early recognition--" (p. 223)

Rapaport: Yes, this is the process. Let's have further references to this process.

Trunnell: There are two; one on p. 222, which says,

"The psychical state of a sleeping person is characterized by an almost complete withdrawal from the surrounding world and a cessation of all interest in it."

Rapaport: This is the phenomenological description.

Trunnell: Yes. Then he goes further, on p. 224:

"The narcissism of the state of sleep implies a withdrawal of cathexis from all ideas of objects, from both the unconscious and the preconscious portions of those ideas."

Rapaport: All right. Now we have the statement of the process. Will anybody give us a passage which will show us more clearly what is meant by this? How is this concept defined--the withdrawal of cathexes?

Miller: It is spoken of as a surrendering of cathexes to the ego--whatever that is. That is, whatever the ego is in this context. And that's elaborated a little more on p. 225.

Rapaport: Right. Now you notice that we are going to the second point. Let's have it.

Miller: On p. 225:

"The wish to sleep endeavours to draw in all the cathexes sent out by the ego and to establish an absolute narcissism."

And then immediately comes one of the limitations.

Rapaport: How does this formulation differ from the earlier one that Dr. Emery just read?

"...it is conditional upon the withdrawal of all psychical cathexes from the external world back on to the ego..." (p. 223)

"The wish to sleep endeavours to draw in all the cathexes sent out by the ego..." (p. 225)

Any difference there?

Miller: I think the second passage doesn't refer only a relation to the outer world, but includes the internal too.

Rapaport: Partly; partly it also says what? It also says that all the cathexes have been put forth by the ego; so that gets a little bit clearer there. Any further reference which clarifies to us what kind of withdrawal is meant here? A much more general proposition.

Energy: You mean the necessary condition of dreams? (p. 234)

"...all the essential characteristics of dreams are determined by the conditioning factor of sleep."

Rapaport: Yes; but that doesn't state what the conditions of sleep are. Look, here you have

"The narcissism of the state of sleep implies a withdrawal of cathexis from all ideas of objects, from both the unconscious and the preconscious portions of those ideas." (p. 224)

But he claims a much greater generality for this withdrawal.

Trunnell: I think it's mentioned twice. Once on p. 234 and once on p. 235.

Rapaport: P. 234, please.

Trunnell: "The state of sleep does not wish to know anything of the external world; it takes no interest in reality, or only so far as abandoning the state of sleep--waking up--is concerned. Hence it withdraws cathexis from the system Cs. as well as from the other systems, the Pcs. and the Ucs., in so far as the cathexes in them obey the wish to sleep." (p. 234)

Rapaport: Yes; that last is the reservation. Let's have the final, general statement.

Trunnell: P. 235:

"In dreams the withdrawal of cathexis (libido or interest) affects all systems equally..."

Rapaport: So now you have before you a general statement of what this narcissism of the dream is like. Dr. Emery started on something which I believe is very important at this point.

"...all the essential characteristics of dreams are determined by the conditioning factor of sleep." (p. 234)

Now do you recall what Freud had to say in this paper, and more clearly in the Seventh Chapter, about these conditions? What does Freud say here about sleep and its relation to dreaming?

E. White: Sleep would be essentially a state of primitive narcissism, and the dream is an interference with sleep. The mental activity of dreaming represents an incomplete process.

Rapaport: That's one way of putting it, that the dream is always an interference with sleep. But--

Shapiro: It's a protection.

Rapaport: It is also a protection. Where is the passage on this?

Shapiro: "A dream tells us that something was going on which tended to interrupt sleep, and it enables us to understand in what way it has been possible to fend off this interruption. The final--" (p. 223)

Rapaport: But there is another thing implied in another passage, that calls attention to this double role of the dream.

Emery: P. 225?

Rapaport: Which is that?

Emery: I was thinking of the end of the paragraph--

"...where it renounces sleep because of its fear of its dreams."

Rapaport: It does imply it. Read the beginning of the sentence.

Emery: "We are acquainted, too, with the extreme case where the ego gives up the wish to sleep, because it--" (p. 225)

Rapaport: Now you can stop there. What is the ego's wish? To maintain sleep. According to this conception, the ego's wish to sleep is the primary thing. In this particular sentence it is not stated outright, but here and in the Seventh Chapter the wish for sleep again and again emerges. Dr. White correctly said that the dream indicates that there is an interference with this. But we see too that there is not only an interference which causes the dream, but something else also. What is it? The dream is a compromise formation. On the one hand it is caused by--?

E. White: The interference.

Rapaport: Interference with sleep. On the other hand, it is--?

Several: The desire to preserve it.

Rapaport: In the Seventh Chapter, the wish to sleep is the fundamental wish. That's where everything starts. The unconscious wish, the dream-wish itself, is enlisted to prolong sleep. This is clearly put in the very first section of the Seventh Chapter, when he shows with the dream of the burning child how the wish of the father to see the child alive for a moment combats the interference which was caused by sensory impressions--namely the light, the real, physical burning. In that case the interference was external. What is usually the primary interference with the state of sleep? If it is not an external perception?

Miller: A day-residue--

Rapaport: Obviously. Period. It is the day-residue.

R. White: But only insofar as it gets connected up with an unconscious wish.

Rapaport: According to the Seventh Chapter, that connecting is for the purpose of not disturbing sleep. The external perception or the internal perception of the day-residue links up with the unconscious wish-impulses, because wish-fulfillment becomes the price at which--in accordance with the pleasure-principle--

the primary disturbance can be tolerated and sleep can go on. This primacy of the wish to sleep is perfectly clear in the Seventh Chapter. It is not so clear here. What would be the equivalent in this paper of that primacy of this wish to sleep?

E. White: Are you referring to this passage right at the beginning?
(p. 222)

"Somatically, sleep is a reactivation of
intrauterine existence..."

Again primitive narcissism--

Rapaport: The primitive narcissism. This is the whole point. The primacy that was given in the Seventh Chapter to the wish to sleep is translated here into the primacy of narcissism.

R. White: He brings the two together in saying that the desire for sleep endeavours to call in all the cathexes, and establish an absolute narcissism.

Rapaport: That's right. Do you see the translation now? I didn't want to go on to the next point because this had to be clear, and you will see once more how important and indispensable it is after we have read what Dr. Shapiro started to read on p. 223. Would you mind continuing, Dr. Shapiro?

Shapiro: "A dream tells us that something was going on which tended to interrupt sleep, and it enables us to understand in what way it has been possible to fend off this interruption. The final outcome is that the sleeper has dreamt and is able to go on sleeping..."
(p. 223)

Rapaport: Do you see how this restates what I tried to say? Only it restates it without the paraphernalia--the conceptual apparatus--which I tried to quote with your help from the Seventh Chapter. Go ahead.

Shapiro: "The final outcome is that the sleeper has dreamt and is able to go on sleeping; the internal demand which was striving to occupy him has been replaced by an external experience, whose demand has been disposed of. A dream is, therefore, among other things, a projection: an externalization of an internal process." (p. 223)

- Rapaport: Gentlemen, do you notice how it is achieved here that sleep is not disturbed? What is it?
- Shapiro: Externalization.
- Rapaport: Externalization, projection. What was the explanation in the Seventh Chapter?
- Several: Wish-fulfillment.
- Rapaport: No. That's what brought it in keeping with the pleasure-principle. But that wasn't what achieved it. It is something we haven't mentioned here; only memory can help.
- Trunnell: The partial discharge, according to the pleasure-principle.
- Rapaport: That's getting warm; but not hot enough. Because there is something highly specific about it in the Seventh Chapter. Remember, here are mobile cathexes. We are now talking already--the unconscious wish-impulse has been enlisted, recruited. But now you have mobile cathexis. That surely ought to disrupt sleep. What does the dream do with it?
- Trunnell: Binds it.
- Rapaport: Right. That's the expression used. Whether that's so correct conceptually or not, whether this is so in keeping with the definition of binding, that's another question; there are many doubts about that. The whole concept of binding has to be clarified. But it is a fact. Do you recall the passage which clearly and specifically says what Dr. Trunnell said?* Here is a radical change now. It is not simply a binding that occurs. Whether the projection involves a binding or not is a further question. But it is projection that occurs. Now I wish, Dr. Shapiro, that you would continue now, and read the next sentence, because that will shed some light on how it comes about that this change in conception is introduced.
- Shapiro: "We may recall that we have already met with projection elsewhere among the means adopted for defence. The mechanism of a hysterical phobia, too, culminates in the fact that the subject is able to protect himself by attempts at flight against an external danger which has taken the place of an internal instinctual claim." (pp. 223-224)

*[The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 578.]

Rapaport: Gentlemen, do you in your present reading notice another passage where projection gets involved?

Miller: The business about the testing of reality.

Rapaport: Right. Would you please give it to us?

Schimek: It's on pp. 232-233:

"In an earlier passage we ascribed to the still helpless organism a capacity for making a first orientation in the world by means of its perceptions, distinguishing 'external' and 'internal' according to their relation to its muscular action. A perception which is made to disappear by an action is recognized as external, as reality; where such an action makes no difference, the perception originates within the subject's own body--it is not real. It is of value to the individual to possess a means such as this of recognizing reality, which at the same time helps him to deal with it, and he would be glad to be equipped with a similar power against the often merciless claims of his instincts. That is why he takes such pains to transpose outwards what becomes troublesome to him from within --that is, to project it."

Rapaport: Do you see what this passage says about our first question?

Emery: In the state of primary narcissism there is no differentiation between outer and inner stimuli.

Rapaport: And? How do the outer and inner get established in that state?

Emery: By motor action.

Rapaport: And? Even before motor action?

Miller: By projection.

Rapaport: By projection and introjection. When motor action is just beginning to make the real differentiation, projections and introjections are freely possible. But without the projection and introjection, the motor action itself would not lead to the differentiation. Do you see why this comes in when we discuss our first question?

- Trunnell: It refers to what Freud earlier called the pleasure ego--what is good is considered the self, and what is bad is considered not the self.*
- Rapaport: Right. That means what? The conceptions pleasure ego and purified pleasure ego both refer to the condition which later is called narcissism.** These are two of the three ad hoc ego theories Freud created in the early 1910's. The problem of the ego became more and more burning, and Freud tried three ways to cope with it. What was the third? What represented it the ego throughout this period?
- E. White: Are you referring to censorship?
- Rapaport: No, that conception existed through the coming and going of these ad hoc ones, though it was not recognized as an ego-conception all this time. Only in "Repression" and "The Unconscious" does it begin to be seen that censorship is an ego-conception. That's the continuous ego-conception, not the ad hoc one. That was there and is here now--in changed forms. But what was the major ad hoc theory of the ego in the early 1910's? The "Narcissism" paper is full of it.
- Emery: Ego-instincts?
- Rapaport: Obviously. Self-preservative or ego-instincts. That's the ad hoc theory that was supposed to settle it. It was indeed, at that point, taking over censorship, because it was the force that exercised censorship. The pleasure ego came in in 1911 in "The Two Principles." Narcissism comes in in 1914. These are the three tentative and abortive attempts to create an ego-theory. So Dr. Trunnell is right: there is no clear distinction between the pleasure ego on the one hand and narcissism on the other.

But how does this concept projection come into our business? It's obvious. The explanation of the dream by projection is

*[See, of course, "Two Principles" and "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes."]

**[Later, at any rate, in relation to the "pleasure ego" mentioned in "Two Principles." The "purified pleasure ego" of "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" came a year or so after "On Narcissism."]

an attempt to explain the dream in terms of narcissism. This is why Dr. Shapiro's point was so appropriate. He went straight to the point, actually, because this projection issue links the dream precisely to the narcissism issue. Is this clear? It is one of the mechanisms by which internal tensions are settled in this state of primitive narcissism. The first point that we pursued was the cathexis-withdrawal point. But this passage quoted by Dr. Shapiro brings in the other point, the conception of projection. These are the two pivots of the attempt to introduce narcissism into the theory of dreams or vice versa. Are you now getting the anatomy of this paper a little bit clear?

Now we are ready to entertain complicated things, since the simpler ones are out of the way. Dr. Schimek?

Schimek: I've always been bothered by the use of "projection" in this sense about dreams. Projection upon what? In the animal phobia the fear from an instinctual danger is projected onto, say, a horse. But when he says (p. 223)

"A dream is, therefore, among other things, a projection: an externalization of an internal process."

my question is, projection upon what? It's clear: projection of what.

R. White: It's taken care of pretty well in the department of day-residue and the matter of representability, it seems to me; you borrow something from the day events on which to project, which is analogous to borrowing the horse for Little Hans.

Rapaport: Yes; this would be taking Dr. Schimek at his word and taking his ground, and answering on it. Would Dr. Schimek be satisfied?

Schimek: No; because it's only analogous. In the case of a horse it's obvious what's there to project onto; in the case of day-residues, day-residues are not external processes by any possible stretch of the imagination.

E. White: The only way I can think of to try to answer this, although I'm not sure I believe in it, is in terms of the idea of hallucination as a special kind of projection, and in terms of the point made in this paper of the distinction between believing that as a reality and testing it as a reality, the testing function being lost in sleep.

Rapaport: May I go one step further on Dr. White's line? Dr. White actually questions whether you have the right to take the phobic projection, in which there is something that is being projected and something

onto which it is being projected, as the prototype of projection.

Schimek: But Freud does just that in this paragraph.

Rapaport: Would you show how he does?

Schimek: P. 223-224:

"We may recall that we have already met with projection elsewhere among the means adopted for defence. The mechanism of a hysterical phobia, too, culminates--"

and so on.

Rapaport: Yes. Now demolish yourself, sir. Demolish your argument. Why shouldn't you? You know the counterargument, for God's sake. Someone else?

Shapiro: He apparently has different meanings for this term.

Rapaport: They are different examples. This does not say that phobic projection is the prototype of projection. He just says we encountered it there too. But there is no warrant that in all projections there will be something projected onto something. In certain hallucinations something is projected on nothing in particular. In a negative hallucination, particularly so. That's one of the many reasons that he would want to take the negative hallucination as the prototype in any thorough investigation of hallucinations.

You know, clinically, the hallucination which is not projected onto something appears to us very dangerous. Conversely, where the projection is plainly made onto something that is there, we see it as relatively benign. We studied an amnesic patient in Topeka, a man who was possessed with the idea that he had to find a job. He was in an amnesic fugue, the slogan of which was "I am out to find a job," and everything that happened--whatever he did and whatever happened around him--had some relation to this. So he was brought to Menninger's, where he was convinced that he was working in the office of a factory, and he acted that way. On what did he hang his conviction that he was in a factory? Very simple. The buzzing of the heating system was considered by him as the buzzing of machines downstairs. He was absolutely sure he was in a factory. Here the projection was onto something. Actually it was a relatively benign one, for this very reason. Altogether, those hallucinatory projections--or those delusional projections, to keep the example of that patient--which use material to project onto are peculiarly characterized by two things: either they are simply benign, or they are malignant

in a peculiar sense, namely that they employ a warped but a very thorough testing of reality. For instance, those extremely rare cases which are called paranoia never come into a clash with actual reality. There you see a distinct difference between those projections which go into thin air, as it were, and those projections which use a particular object to project on. Either they are relatively benign, as in phobias or as in this amnesia case, or else they are extremely malignant precisely because they infallibly project onto something and form a closed system where there are no possible contradictions, as in paranoia. Am I making my point? Quite a difference. Externalizations and projections are complex problems. I have discussed once some of the differences--not these--in a paper on "Projective Techniques and the Theory of Thinking."* I enumerated a number of variables there and tried to indicate what they are.

Dr. Trunnell, you were about to make another argument?

- Trunnell: What I was going to say in answer included something of what you've said. It's taking it a little too literally, I think, to say that a phobia is a projection onto a horse; it's really a projection onto an image of a horse. The difference between that kind of projection and a dream is simply the amount of reality-testing involved--testing of whether there are currently present in the environment such things as horses that correspond to this image of them.
- Rapaport: Yes. Dr. Trunnell is going into the subtle shadings of difference in projections--and you may be interested to find that I tried to make very similar distinctions in that paper I just referred to. Dr. Schimek, do you want to make a comeback?
- Schimek: No; I think I agree from the beginning with what Dr. White had to say. This is what I was trying to highlight, that the kind of projection involved in hallucinatory wish-fulfillment is quite different from the type of projection involved in phobia.
- Rapaport: Yet quite similar.
- Schimek: Quite similar in certain ways and different in other ways.
- E. White: I just want to comment that the framework around the projection in the dream is always in terms of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment. I agree with Dr. Schimek that it could be stated more specifically than projection, if Freud wanted to put it that way.
- Rapaport: Dr. Shapiro?

*[Journal of Projective Techniques, 16:269-275;1952].

- Shapiro: I was just going to go back to The Interpretation of Dreams, the dream of the burning child, because it seems to me that's something in between. There is something that it is projected upon; the light from the candle actually does form some external nucleus for the--
- Rapaport: Yes. This is like the argument involving the day-residue, but this creates the continuity. Obviously the external stimulation, as in the dream about the burning child, or the internal perception of the day-residue, serves as something to be projected upon. But it need not, and many a time you find in the dream many elements which are additional to the day-residues themselves, and there you have more the pattern Dr. White was talking about to begin with, that of a straight hallucination. Yet to Dr. E. White's point, your point is particularly important here, because we ought to realize that instead of the simple theory of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment by regression, the narcissistic point comes in through the specific conception of projection. This is precisely the point of the paper. It is a more general framework--the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment.
- E. White: More specific.
- Rapaport: Well, I would say more general. I see what you mean, however, that that is always also projection, and therefore it is more specific. Yes. Let me say why I said that hallucinatory wish-fulfillment is the more general: the framework of the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment does not by itself require the conception of projection. One could get along without any conception of projection whatever, if one did not try to introduce into the theory the problem of reality. How did Freud avoid the concept of projection to begin with? He avoided it because in the Seventh Chapter this was all a problem of psychological reality. There was no problem of external reality really discussed there. (Well, hardly any--when he discusses the secondary process it comes in a little bit, but that's a very few passages, actually.) In that framework, the intrapsychic experience is always observed in terms of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment. In that case, those special forms which would be called particular projections would be a special case.
- This is really a relative conception--which is the general and which is the specific. As long as you remain in that framework in which we are not interested in anything but intrapsychic experience, the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment is the general conception. If we are in this present framework, where there is reality and reality-testing, you are absolutely right, the projection is the general framework, the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment in the dream is a special case of it. The other such wish-fulfillments are other special cases. The hysterical is a special case; the schizophrenic delusion is a special case, etc. Dr. White?

R. White: I would still maintain that Dr. Schimek was right in pointing out the thing about the phobic projections, and I would still think you could argue that there is always something from the outside on which such projections are hung, even when it's a psychotic projection that doesn't seem to have anything in the immediate reality situation that is congruent or fitting to the projection. Then that simply means that the reality object has been taken from some point much farther back in time, something very primitive, like an ancient image of the father's voice or the mother's voice--

Rapaport: Dr. White, I would say yes, but in that case your original answer is the answer. Then you take Dr. Schimek at the face-value of his words, and say yes, but then in that realm the day-residue is the thing to project on, and, as Dr. Shapiro said, the sensory impression is the thing to project on. Either you take that frame of reference, then generalize that way and push it to the point Dr. Schimek pushed it to, or else you don't take it to that far-reaching point but rather ask yourself whether the general sense in which we are talking about projecting onto something applies at all in the dream. You could say no, it doesn't, and there are others to which it doesn't apply either.

This is a terminological question, in the main. One has to be careful that once one is in one frame of reference one sticks to it. That's why I said from the first that if you take Dr. Schimek's point, then you have to take it, you have to answer it within its frame of reference. This is really what science is about. You choose a frame of reference and stick to it. You have to know also that sometimes you have to work within one frame of reference and sometimes in another, because it is not so terribly easy to demonstrate, for instance, that the hallucination of a patient is a projection onto something. In a specific case you could take the material, when you have all of it, and push it farther and show that there is always something that is projected onto. But you can treat it the other way just as well. And then you have all these varieties, more and less hooks to hang the internal wish upon. It is important, I think, to see that this is a purely conceptual problem.

R. White: Let's introduce one more thing from this paper, namely his comments about the spoken word, that words spoken in a dream invariably come from the day-residue.

Rapaport: Yes; but you often see dreams with no spoken words.

R. White: So?

- Rapaport: So that means that it is not always necessary to have that hook to hang on. Look, the farther you push it, the more clear it will become that you can treat it from one angle or treat it from the other angle. Both the frameworks will have to make allowances to accommodate the other things. It is really a terminological question. I don't mind discussing it because it is good to see how you can treat it from both angles. I see that you are not satisfied. Something is getting stuck in you? Dr. Miller, maybe you will help us out of this.
- Miller: I'm not sure whether this will help, but it seems to me the point that Dr. Trunnell made a while ago deserves a lot more emphasis--that it's not a question whether there is something in the external world upon which one can project, but rather a question of whether there is something from the external world, because if you think of this in terms of the psychic apparatus, it's all an inside job. Projections are a form of representation, just as libidinal--
- Rapaport: That's the point on "which is the more general."
- Miller: --just as a libidinal investment is on a representation of an object and not on that actual person.
- Rapaport: This is the same framework problem.
- E. White: It seems to me that all this could be thought of in terms of what would be felt or perceived as external in a state of sleep, because if the cathexes are withdrawn from all systems, as is postulated here, anything that interferes is in a sense external to that process.
- Rapaport: We really get a little bit more in the mire than we usually allow ourselves to get, because there are here now three different double frames of reference with which we can treat this. Something to project on, nothing to project on; the generality of projection or the generality of the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment; the withdrawn cathexes and everything from which they cannot be withdrawn, therefore in a sense external. Three double frames of reference. So one gets into endless terminological problems. Dr. Emery?
- Emery: Can I go back to what was happening just before this? In the introduction of projection as an issue in the narcissistic view of the theory of dreams, how much is the projection essentially a mechanism which leads to some kind of binding which wasn't discussed in the Seventh Chapter? In terms of the development of the structural point of view.

Rapaport: I would rather bypass going into the murky realm of it, because the concept binding would have to be rigorously defined, and my purpose today was only to show you that there is a second factor besides the withdrawal that makes it a narcissistic theory, or a narcissism-theory, of dreams. The problem Dr. Emery poses is one that ought to be investigated, but I don't believe that we have the wherewithal to do it here.

I suggest that, unless you have any objections, you go to the second part of the second question. What limitations of the cathexis-withdrawal theory does Freud point out?

R. White: He makes the point that it's that part of those unconscious wishes which are under repression from which the cathexes cannot be called back.

Rapaport: Because if he didn't assume that the theory would lead to a self-contradiction. Let's have the passage where that happens.

Emery: P. 225:

"But there is another doubt, which we must not pass over in silence. If the narcissistic state of sleep has resulted in a drawing-in of all the cathexes of the systems Ucs. and Pcs., then there can no longer be any possibility of the preconscious day's residues being reinforced by unconscious instinctual impulses, seeing that these themselves have surrendered their cathexes to the ego. Here the theory of dream-formation ends up in a contradiction, unless we can rescue it by introducing a modification into our assumption about the narcissism of sleep."

And what Dr. White says is in the next paragraph.

Rapaport: Yes, but this was necessary as an introduction. Go ahead.

Emery: "A restrictive modification of this kind is, as we shall discover later, necessary in the theory of dementia praecox as well. This must be to the effect that the repressed portion of the system Ucs. does not comply with the wish to sleep that comes from the ego, that it retains its cathexis in whole or in part, and that in general, in consequence of repression, it has acquired a

certain measure of independence of the ego. Accordingly, too, some amount of the expenditure on repression (anticathexis) would have to be maintained throughout the night, in order to meet the instinctual danger---though the inaccessibility of all paths leading to a release of affect and to motility may considerably diminish the height of the anticathexis that is necessary."
(p. 225)

- Rapaport: Gentlemen, do you see how he rescues his theory of narcissism? Then with the rescue of the theory of narcissism he has to assume that two kinds of cathexes are not withdrawn. Which are they?
- E. White: The cathexis of the repressed impulse and the anticathexis.
- Rapaport: Tell me, where does that leave narcissism? And the narcissistic regression?
- Schimek: In a mess. I would say that if one wanted to answer in a word your question about what limitations of the cathexis-withdrawal theory Freud points out, one could say "dreams." I'm not just trying to make a paradox, because the cathexis-withdrawal theory applies first of all to the state of sleep. But then he has to explain why we dream in sleep, and then he has to withdraw---I mean---
- Rapaport: The withdrawal of the withdrawal theory.
- Emery: It applies to dreams, not to sleep.
- Rapaport: No, it applies to sleep but not to dreams.
- Miller: It applies to sleep; and as far as it doesn't altogether apply to sleep, it applies to dreams.
- Rapaport: You see, your question was justified both ways. But let me say that this is not so outlandish as Dr. Schimek tries to show it. It is very important, to be sure, that we show its outlandish, paradoxical character. Still, it is not so outlandish---you have elementary clinical experience which bespeaks the same thing. Do you know what I am referring to? Any time you investigate a regression, what do you notice? What is the most salient thing about it? What is the puzzling and remarkable thing about it?
- Trunnell: Its irrational component?

Rapaport: How would it be if you reversed your statement? And then look at it, and see if it's good?

Trunnell: The rational component?

Rapaport: The remarkable thing is that you always notice rational components. That's the biggest puzzle of all regression, that there is never full withdrawal to a regressive position. The regressive position revives the original state only with reservations; it is always different from the original one. In other words, this business is not so outlandish clinically. In some respects, though, it is outlandish; and I hope that we will attack it on more than one score, but I have to show you in the meanwhile that it is not completely absurd. Are you following my comparison? Dr. Shapiro?

Shapiro: Although I agree with Dr. Schimek's formulation essentially, I think what Dr. Emery said is correct too--that the narcissistic assumption does help to explain the nature of the dream. That's just the point of externalization.

Rapaport: Sure, because the point concerning projection brings it into line with other similar phenomena beyond the point that the phenomenon of wish-fulfillment itself could do. Remember that since 1911 we are no longer in the purely intrapsychic realm; we have a reality and reality-testing, and there the projection becomes indispensable in a way. So the Emery-Shapiro point is valid--here something new has been brought in. The question is, did he need narcissism for that? Was that trip necessary? We have dwelt on the second question for quite a while, but we are still getting some pay dirt anyway. The point Dr. Shapiro and Dr. Emery made just a minute ago is one of the crucial points of the paper, really. The cathexis-withdrawal theory may have all the difficulties to which we will come in a minute, but the point about projection is valid. The question is, how closely are they tied to each other? Dr. Schimek?

Schimek: I think the basic tying point between the cathexis-withdrawal theory and dream-formation is the concept of regression. Regression, state of sleep, withdrawal of cathexis, and dream-formation--there definitely is a fundamental link there...

Rapaport: Yes; the question is only whether or not for that regression the conception of narcissism is altogether necessary.

Now let us finish up this second point. What is self-contradictory about the withdrawal theory itself?

- E. White: The fact that not everything can be withdrawn is a kind of contradiction, I suppose. It seems to me that the withdrawal theory would postulate no dream; since there are dreams you also have to postulate that withdrawal cannot be complete.
- Rapaport: Yes. This is the limitation, and he introduces a rather self-consistent conception of this limitation, which Dr. Shapiro characterized as a paradox; but I think that we all could go along with Freud in that, particularly mindful of what we see in other regressions in this respect. But there is a flagrant internal contradiction which Freud does not even treat. Which is that? Dr. Miller?
- Miller: At this point in his theory-building, he has divided all psyche into three parts--Unconscious, Preconscious, and Conscious--and that's it. That's the whole thing; that's all there is. And he's talking about a withdrawal of cathexis from all of those into an ego which is somehow completely apart from all of these systems.
- Rapaport: So here you have the patent internal self-contradiction which is bolstered, if you remember some other readings we have had together, by several things he has to say later. Remember what he had to say about this topic in The Ego and the Id? In that famous footnote?*
- Schimek: In the footnote, he said essentially that he no longer agreed with the assumption made in the paper "On Narcissism," that all cathexes were originally contained in the ego.
- Rapaport: He had said that the original reservoir of cathexes was the ego, and now [1923] it is obvious that this was a mistake and the reservoir is what?
- Miller: The id.
- Rapaport: It is the id. That's what the famous footnote says. And the topic is taken up again in An Outline of Psychoanalysis. So there is the real rub. a) The ego has no conceptual status here, as Dr. Miller pointed out earlier; and b) We do not understand how one can withdraw something from all the other conceptual systems into something which is not a conceptual system. In the meanwhile we have to realize that in several places in this paper the ego is supposed to be somehow the controller of the unconscious impulses. We read those passages. That it is the thing that gets interfered with by the unconscious impulses.

*[p. 38].

Remember? The wish to sleep of the ego gets interfered with. Now if it is the total personality that is interfered with in its total wish to sleep, then it makes no sense that all cathexes are withdrawn, because how could they be withdrawn from the whole? Now there you run into the internal contradictions.

If you assume, however, that the reservoir is the id--meaning, if you take this on the 1923 basis--you have not rescued the theory of cathexis-withdrawal, because then the unconscious impulses, not only the repressed ones but all the others, would also have cathexes, since it would be the id to which cathexes would be withdrawn. Are we now clear about what difficulties this theory is running into? There is no rescue: if the ego is the whole personality, or if the ego is the controller (meaning Pcs-Cs), or if the ego is replaced by the reservoir as we understand it today, namely the id--none of these paths leads to a solution. This theory is really in a mess, as Dr. Schimek said.

Emery: Does something become of this in his later papers?

Rapaport: This theory is never pursued any further. You will notice, if you go to his summary of the theory of dreams in New Introductory Lectures, that there are several references to this, without his noticing any contradiction. This theory is relegated to a relatively minor role, and not straightened out. This is a very important thing to see, that here there is just no rescue possible. And you know that my inclination is to rescue everything that is possible, because our job is essentially to understand, not to criticize. Here is one of the points where there is no possibility of simply understanding without criticizing. There is just no possibility of rescue. Still, Dr. Shapiro's point indicates one of the reasons that this is still a very important paper. We will see before we finish that this is a paper which has other great importances and advantages too.

I would like now to go to the third question. How is this theory tied to the topographic point of view, and how does it consequently clash with the beginnings of the structural point of view which invalidate the topographic point of view?

Trunnell: I think that has been answered in part already. It's tied to the topographic point of view because he uses the topographical terminology to explain it, and yet even with that he begins to give structure to the topographic systems.

Rapaport: Be specific.

Trunnell: One example of the terminology he uses is in the middle of p. 226.

"...the preconscious dream-wish is formed, which gives expression to the unconscious impulse in the material of the preconscious day's residues."

Yet on p. 225 he has already given some structure to the system Ucs. in the assumptions that he has to make, that part of the system Ucs. has some structure and that part of it does not become decathected at all, even in sleep.

Rapaport: All right, the finger is on the issue. But how do we get clear the clash with the beginnings of the structural point of view in the preceding paper, "The Unconscious"? Would anybody care to suggest what passages there are the relevant ones?*

Miller: There is one on p. 172:

"This [disregarding the qualities conscious and unconscious], however, is for various reasons impracticable, so that we cannot escape the ambiguity of using the words 'conscious' and 'unconscious' sometimes in a descriptive and sometimes in a systematic sense, in which latter they signify inclusion in particular systems and possession of certain characteristics."

Rapaport: Who will phrase what this is? This ain't the structural point of view. Do you know it from the Seventh Chapter? Or should we read the whole passage? Maybe we should. Let's read it from the beginning of the section.

E. White: "Before going any further, let us state the important, though inconvenient, fact that the attribute of being unconscious is only one feature that is found in the psychical and is by no means sufficient fully to characterize it. There are psychical acts of very varying value which yet agree in possessing the characteristic of being unconscious. The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent, temporarily un-

*[Although much of what follows repeats material from the earlier seminar on "The Unconscious," it is included here because of its close relation to the discussion of the present paper.]

conscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the other hand, processes such as repressed ones, which if they were to become conscious would be bound to stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious processes." (p. 172)

- Rapaport: What does he call these two things in the Seventh Chapter? Obviously two things are described so far. What does he call them?
- Miller: Things that are descriptively unconscious and those that are dynamically unconscious.
- Rapaport: Yes. So here we have first the descriptive vs. dynamic, the difficulty that is discussed here. Here the dynamic considerations lead to a distinction that has to be made. Let's go on.
- E. White: "It would put an end to all misunderstandings if, from now on, in describing the various kinds of psychical acts we were to disregard the question of whether they were conscious or unconscious, and were to classify and correlate them only according to their relation to instincts and aims, according to their composition and according to which of the hierarchy of psychical systems they belong to. This, however, is for various reasons impracticable, so that we cannot escape the ambiguity of using the words 'conscious' and 'unconscious' sometimes in a descriptive and sometimes in a systematic sense, in which--" (p. 172)
- Rapaport: Notice, please, he uses here the word systematic, instead of dynamic. The dynamic constellation is the cause; the result is that a systematic conception is introduced in contrast to the descriptive conception. Is this clear so far? Let's hear the rest.
- E. White: "...in which latter they signify inclusion in particular systems and possession of certain characteristics. We might attempt to avoid confusion by giving the psychical systems which we have distinguished certain arbitrarily chosen names which have no reference to the attribute of being conscious.* Only

*[One might suggest--on the basis of his present-day inventiveness--the concepts ego, superego, and id.]

we should first have to specify what the grounds are on which we distinguish the systems, and in doing this we should not be able to evade the attribute of being conscious, seeing that it forms the point of departure for all our investigations. Perhaps we may look for some assistance from the proposal to employ, at any rate in writing, the abbreviation Cs. for consciousness and Ucs. for what is unconscious, when we are using the two words in the systematic sense." (p. 172)

Rapaport: I would like you to go on and read the next paragraph, because there he introduces a third such system. You see, these are systems, clearly. What kind of systems do we call them? What is the proper term for them?

Miller: Topographic.

Rapaport: Topographic systems. This is a belated systematic introduction of the concept of topography. Do you see? I had hoped that my wish and request that you look at my "Survey of the History of Psychoanalytic Ego-Psychology" would have made this totally clear. If you now look back at the survey, you will see that the page references given there include these, which we will now quickly go over. We might as well refresh ourselves on it.

E. White: "Proceeding now to an account of the positive findings of psycho-analysis, we may say that in general a psychical act goes through two phases as regards its state, between which is interposed a kind of testing (censorship). In the first phase the psychical act is unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs.; if, on testing, it is rejected by the censorship, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be 'repressed' and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this testing, it enters the second phase and thenceforth belongs to the second system, which we will call the system Cs. But the fact that it belongs to that system does not yet unequivocally determine its relation to conscious." (p. 173)

Rapaport: Excuse me for interrupting, but now we are coming to the point which he discussed in the beginning of what we have been reading, namely, that there is a descriptive and a systematic or dynamic sense in which something can be unconscious. Go ahead.

E. White: "It is not yet conscious, but it is certainly capable of becoming conscious (to use Breuer's expression)--that is, it can now, given certain conditions, become an object of consciousness without any special resistance. In consideration of this capacity for becoming conscious we also call the system Cs. the 'preconscious.'" (p. 173)

Rapaport: I think that that is enough. You see, now we have three systems. Later he will not say that we call the system Cs. preconscious also. But he is quite inconsistent. This is still the early phase of topography where he is not sure what the hell he is doing. Sometimes he equates the two, sometimes he joins the two, sometimes he disjoins the two. This is then clearly a topographic statement. Where is the difficulty with the topographic statement most clearly pointed up? What is the rock on which it shipwrecks first?

Miller: On transition from one system to another.

Rapaport: That's right. More specifically? What is the question Freud asks?

Miller: If something which was repressed then becomes conscious, is it then present in both systems, or has it moved from one to the other?

Rapaport: That's right. And what is the conclusion he comes to? Where is that conclusion?

Miller: "The functional hypothesis."

Rapaport: That's right. P. 180. Let's read it.

Miller: "The repressed idea remains capable of action in the Ucs., and it must therefore have retained its cathexis. What has been withdrawn must be something else. Let us take the case of repression proper...as it affects an idea which is preconscious or even actually conscious. Here repression can only consist in withdrawing from the idea the (pre)conscious cathexis which belongs to the system Pcs. The idea then either remains uncathexed, or receives cathexis from the Ucs., or retains the Ucs. cathexis which it already had."

Rapaport: Are you following? Note that here the withdrawal is treated systematically. The introduction of the narcissistic withdrawal into the topographic point of view, so that everything can be withdrawn into the ego, confuses that. Notice that there are no contradictions here, while the "Supplement" is full of them, even within the topographic point of view. Let's follow now to the wreckage of the topographic. Go ahead.

Miller: "Thus there is a withdrawal of the pre-conscious cathexis, retention of the unconscious cathexis, or replacement of the preconscious cathexis by an unconscious one. We notice, moreover, that we have based these reflections (as it were, without meaning to) on the assumption that the transition from the system Ucs. to the system next to it is not effected through the making of a new registration but through a change in its state, an alteration in its cathexis. The functional hypothesis has here easily defeated the topographical one."
(p. 180)

Rapaport: What does "functional" mean here?

Miller: Economic.

Rapaport: Obviously. To begin with, the topographic point of view was introduced because of dynamic considerations; the confusion between the dynamic and the descriptive introduction of topographic systems. That was a dynamic consideration. Now, an economic consideration forces abandoning part of the topographic conception. Localization doesn't make any sense. That's the beginning of the wreckage. But where does the real wreckage come? P. 192.

Trunnell: "The reason for all these difficulties is to be found in the circumstance that the attribute of being conscious, which is the only characteristic of psychical processes that is directly presented to us, is in no way suited to serve as a criterion for the differentiation of systems."

Rapaport: You hear him? The systems were just erected, but now they are becoming flaccid.

Trunnell: "Apart from the fact that the conscious is not always conscious but also at times latent, observation has shown that much

that shares the characteristics of the system Pcs. does not become conscious; and we learn in addition that the act of becoming conscious is dependent on the attention of the Pcs. being turned in certain directions. Hence consciousness stands in no simple relation either to the different systems or to repression. The truth is that it is not only the psychically repressed that remains alien to consciousness, but also some of the impulses which dominate our ego--something, therefore, that forms the strongest functional antithesis to the repressed. The more we seek to win our way to a metapsychological view of mental life, the more we must learn to emancipate ourselves from the importance of the symptom of 'being conscious.'" (pp. 192-193)

Rapaport: Do you notice that there are two points made here? One of them is the point which serves as the basis of the structural point of view in The Ego and the Id.

R. White: The unconscious part of the ego.

Rapaport: That's correct. You remember, that's the foundation on which The Ego and the Id is erected. But there is still another implication which is not so clear, though it is crucially important.

E. White: Do you mean the distinction between the Pcs and Ucs systems?

Rapaport: Yes, but in a most specific way.

"Apart from the fact that the conscious is not always conscious but also at times latent, observation has shown that much that shares the characteristics of the system Pcs. does not become conscious..." (p. 192)

What are those preconscious contents which don't become conscious? People, I am sorry. I thought that we knew all this and that it would take us no time. Let's go back to p. 190 and read the paragraph.

R. White: "Among the derivatives of the Ucs. instinctual impulses, of the sort we have described, there are some which unite in themselves characters of an opposite kind. On the one hand, they are highly organized, free from self-contradiction,

have made use of every acquisition of the system Cs. and would hardly be distinguished in our judgement from the formations of that system."

Rapaport: How do you call these?

Miller: Call them fantasy-formations--

Rapaport: All right. Please go ahead.

R. White: "On the other hand they are unconscious and are incapable of becoming conscious. Thus qualitatively they belong to the system Pcs.---" (pp. 190-191)

Rapaport: "Qualitatively"--this means that they are just like the descriptively unconscious ones. Yet they can't become conscious because they belong in actual fact to the Ucs.

R. White: "--but factually to the Ucs. Their origin is what decides their fate. We may compare them with individuals of mixed race who, taken all round, resemble white men, but who betray their coloured descent by some striking feature or other, and on that account are excluded from society and enjoy none of the privileges of white people. Of such a nature are those phantasies of normal people as well as of neurotics which we have recognized as preliminary stages in the formation both of dreams and of symptoms and which, in spite of their high degree of organization, remain repressed and therefore cannot become conscious." (p. 191)

Rapaport: Who recognizes where Freud ran into them first? And didn't make real sense of them at that time?

Miller: The seduction fantasy?

Rapaport: Correct. See, the rock on which the topographic point of view founders is the same as the one on which it was built.

Miller: Didn't get very far, did it?

Rapaport: Oh yes, it lasted exactly 17 years. It got very far, carried us very far. But then its internal contradiction was discovered.

Now let's go back and see what bearing this has on the "Metapsychological Supplement." Anybody see the bearing?

E. White: I suppose one bearing would be the partial withdrawal of cathexis of these censoring boundaries between the systems, and yet postulating a bridge and an easy flow during the state of dreaming. There's something there that doesn't quite add up to me. And then he goes on to make the point about regression back to perception.

Rapaport: It doesn't add up. I suggest that we read together again that misgiving he has and the reservation he makes. (p. 225)

E. White: "A restrictive modification of this kind is, as we shall discover later, necessary in the theory of dementia praecox as well. This must be to the effect that the repressed portion of the system Ucs. does not comply with the wish to sleep that comes from the ego, that it retains its cathexis in whole or in part, and that in general, in consequence of repression, it has acquired a certain measure of independence of the ego. Accordingly, too, some amount of the expenditure on repression (anticathexis) would have to be maintained throughout the night--"

Rapaport: Some anticathexis would have to be maintained. In order that this topographically conceived withdrawal-theory should remain workable, he has to impose a limitation. That limitation, however, is not a topographic limitation; it is structural--steadily maintained anticathexis. That anticathexis cannot be limited to that functional realm called the repressed, because the repressing forces themselves cannot be emptied. So there are two difficulties that that very point poses. To rescue a topographically conceived cathexis--withdrawal theory of dreams he has to introduce a structural conception, namely the maintained anticathexis. The second difficulty is that now we have to conceive of cathexes maintained in two different systems--in the Ucs. insofar as repression is concerned, and in something else, where these anticathexes are. So the link to the topographic theory, which is the only way this business can be sustained, is itself very weak.

Let's take up the fourth question. What is the belief in reality and how is this related to reality-testing? What quotation am I offered? Let's start on p. 229.

- E. White: "The completion of the dream-process consists in the thought-content--regressively transformed and worked over into a wishful phantasy--becoming conscious as a sense-perception; while this is happening it undergoes secondary revision, to which every perceptual concept is subject. The dream-wish, as we say, is hallucinated, and, as a hallucination, meets with belief in the reality of its fulfillment. It is precisely round this concluding piece in the formation of dreams that the gravest uncertainties centre, and it is in order to clear them up that we are proposing to compare dreams with pathological states akin to them."
- Rapaport: Does somebody find something earlier about belief in reality?
- R. White: Well, by implication, the reference is to the primitive level of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment--
- Rapaport: Yes, by implication. And by implication that problem was there from the Seventh Chapter on, but it was never dealt with. Now it is correct that we have encountered in this quotation for the first time the question of belief in reality, and in this passage it is related to belief in the reality of the fulfillment of the dream-wish in the form of an hallucination. Now what implications does that remind you of?
- Emery: That belief in reality comes about through projection and perception.
- Rapaport: Yes. We have already discussed the fact that there were two different avenues for Freud--the hallucination proper, which was introduced with no stated relation to projection; and the projection. The projection was in a way the new thing--connected with the theory of narcissism. Now we are in trouble, because he is trying to explore what the implication of these hallucinations really is. And together with that, he is faced with the question of what this has to do with narcissism. Now let's stop for a moment. What was one of the major implications of the conception of narcissism, up to here in the paper? What was the main implication metapsychologically?
- R. White: It was the genetic one.
- Rapaport: Correct. Why?
- R. White: Because it was a return to an early--

Rapaport: Technically?

Schimek: Regression.

Rapaport: A regression. And what kind of regression?

Several: Temporal.

Rapaport: A temporal one. What kind of regression does hallucination imply, insofar as we studied it in the Seventh Chapter?

Emery: Topographical.

Rapaport: Topographical. Now note please, there is a trouble with temporal-genetic and topographic regression. You remember the passage where Freud touches on these here?

Schimek: P. 227:

"We call this kind of regression a topographical one, to distinguish it from the previously mentioned temporal or developmental regression. The two do not necessarily always coincide, but they do so in the particular example before us. The reversal of the course of the excitation from the Pcs. through the Ucs. perception is at the same time a return to the early stage of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment."

R. White: There's something I would like to inquire about, which seems to be another kind of contradiction in which the "Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams" ends in a theoretical quandary. That is the point made on p. 222, where he distinguishes two such regressions, one in the development of the ego and the other in that of the libido. That has always been a perplexing point to me, and that's a theoretical dead end too--

Rapaport: Tell me, where did Freud mention this distinction first? As long as we are at it you might as well nail it down. It's a very important passage.

R. White: It sounds like something that could have come from "The Two Principles," but that's just a guess.

Rapaport: Yes, Dr. White. Very good. It is on pp. 224-225.

R. White: "While the ego goes through its transformation from a pleasure-ego into a

reality-ego, the sexual instincts undergo the changes that lead them from their original auto-erotism through various intermediate phases to object-love in the service of procreation. If we are right in thinking that each step in these two courses of development may become the site of a disposition to later neurotic illness, it is plausible to suppose that the form taken by the subsequent illness (the choice of neurosis) will depend on the particular phase of the development of the ego and of the libido in which the dispositional inhibition of development has occurred. Thus unexpected significance attaches to the chronological features of the two developments (which have not yet been studied), and to possible variations in their synchronization."

Rapaport: Doesn't it sound ultramodern? Still, if one knows the historical context of this passage, where the ancestors are, it becomes perfectly clear that it ain't so up to date as all that. By the way, on the telephone I heard from Dr. Gill about a conversation with Anna Freud. Gill recently published a paper in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology on the present status of psychoanalytic theory,* where he again and again said that there are new developments in psychoanalysis. While Anna Freud is very appreciative of the paper, she points out to him that his emphasis on "new developments" really is misleading, because all that is going on in present-day ego-psychology is the explication of things that have been implied in psychoanalysis. You understand, this statement from her is a fairly great advance, because it means acceptance of what is happening in ego-psychology. At any rate, there are two sides to this issue.

Dr. White, won't you please make clear what your own point was? Or have I just snatched it out of your hands?

R. White: If libido is an energy-concept, how can one talk about regression in the sense that it's usually, at least by implication, talked about? How can there be regression of an energy? You might talk about the regressions in the ego which give different forms to the energy-expenditure--I think that would make sense. You could say the water in a pot boils, but that's quite a different form in which that energy comes out than if it's hitched to a steam engine, for example. The steam engine and the pot in which the water boils would be analogous to the ego-structure at a more

*["The Present State of Psychoanalytic Theory," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1959.]

advanced and at a more primitive level, giving different forms to the energy-expenditure.

- Rapaport: What would be one form or another form of this expenditure of libido? What kind of expenditures of libido do you want to explain in the way you just finished explaining? Dr. White points to a passage where libido-development and ego-development, libido-regression and ego-regression, are both mentioned. Dr. White protests that libido is energy. How can it progress or regress? If there is progress or regress, it is in the ego. That is Dr. White's assertion. How about it?
- E. White: I think I know how this is usually talked about, although I'm not sure I can understand it in the sense he means. That would be, say, the difference between libidinal zones and the kind of ego-modes that Erikson talks about. For instance, people do talk about instinct developing in the sense of what kind of aim it seeks--
- Rapaport: What kind of zone it originates from. Dr. Ess White is absolutely right, but he puts it too tentatively. It is not just that "people talk about," but this is the theory of libido-development, which is the core of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and the core of Abraham's theory. This is what is called libido-development. Now that such development and such regression takes place is undoubted. I am not saying "is beyond doubt," but that it is undoubted; it is part and parcel of the theory as we have it. Whether it has to be revised or not is another question.
- R. White: At the same time there is always the statement that the id is the repository of the instincts, and it is timeless and unchanging, undifferentiated and so on, though then others argue that there is structure in the id, which ends in the same--
- Rapaport: Obviously those of you who have been with me through "The Unconscious" have seen that Freud questioned that proposition there repeatedly and spoke about the changes of the instinctual impulse under the influence of what he called the preconscious. But the major point that Dr. Robert White raises is simple. One has to say that in the history of psychoanalysis these developments have been first studied from the point of view of the libido. What the ego has to do with such phases was not understood clearly, though as you see, we have passages showing that Freud has not been unmindful of it. That these transformations of the libido may have something to do also with ego-development seems very probable to us. Dr. Ess White reminds us, for instance, of what we have learned from Erikson. Still, it is possible that the

alteration of zones in the course of development is a constitutionally prescribed epigenetic phenomenon, in which case it would have to be studied from the id's side and could not simply be explained away by the ego side. I do not know which in the long run will prove to be the theory that will be adequate. I do not know that there is evidence to show it. But history shows that it can be studied from both sides fruitfully.

This takes us off our main topic, however, and we have to return. The point then is simply that this temporal-genetic regression vs. the topographic regression poses a problem for Freud, because he thinks that in this case the two coincide. Why does he have to think so? Because of the concept of narcissism. But they don't always coincide, and there he has a problem on his hands. One way of resolving that problem would be to assume that every thought goes through a development from the instinctual roots up to the secondary-process form every moment. That's the conception of microgenesis. From our present point of view this proposition would clash sharply with the conception of autonomy. Any conception which would totally equate temporal regression, genetic regression, and topographic regression would immediately eliminate any autonomy. Now Freud doesn't quite do it, because he points out that there are situations where there is only a topographic regression. Would you mind quoting that passage? ... P. 231.

Schimek: "If the secret of hallucination is nothing else than that of regression, every regression of sufficient intensity would produce hallucination with belief in its reality. But we are quite familiar with situations in which a process of regressive reflection brings to consciousness very clear visual mnemonic images, though we do not on that account for a single moment take them for real perceptions."

Rapaport: Do you see now what topographic regression he has in mind? Do you recognize where he spoke about this before?

Schimek: The Seventh Chapter.

Rapaport: Yes. In the section on regression this is discussed in some more detail. So you see what he has in mind when he says that there need not necessarily be temporal regression--though even that could be argued, obviously, in this case. We see now the background of the problem and the difficulties the topographic conception causes. It is not our job here to resolve this difficulty, the resolution of which is connected with the introduction of the structural point of view, and in a way connected

with the point Dr. R. White mentioned about the indivisibility, in a sense, of the ego-regression and libido-regression.

But we can't go into that; our job is to take a closer look at the belief in reality. Let us see where the major proposition concerning this belief in reality comes up.

E. White: The first mention is on p. 229.

"The dream-wish, as we say, is hallucinated, and, as a hallucination, meets with belief in the reality of its fulfillment."

Then on p. 230:

"Let us be clear that the hallucinatory wishful psychosis--in dreams or elsewhere--achieves two by no means identical results. It not only brings hidden or repressed wishes into consciousness; it also represents them, with the subject's entire belief, as fulfilled. The concurrence of these two results calls for explanation. It is quite impossible to maintain that unconscious wishes must necessarily be taken for realities when once they have become conscious; for, as we know, our judgement is very well able to distinguish realities from ideas and wishes, however intense they may be."

Rapaport: Do you remember what he had to say about judgment in "The Two Principles"?

Emery: P. 221?

"The place of repression, which excluded from cathexis as productive of unpleasure some of the emerging ideas, was taken by an impartial passing of judgement, which had to decide whether a given idea was true or false--that is, whether it was in agreement with reality or not--the decision being determined by making a comparison with the memory-traces of reality."

Rapaport: Yes. Who remembers what Freud has to say in "Repression" about a related issue? Look at the first paragraph in "Repression"

"Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation..."

"At some later period, rejection based on judgement (condemnation) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual impulse." (p. 146)

Or take the second sentence:

"Under certain conditions, which we shall presently investigate more closely, the impulse then passes into the state of 'repression.' ...with an instinct, flight is of no avail, for the ego cannot escape from itself."

This is the beginning.

"At some later period, rejection based on judgement (condemnation) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual impulse." (p. 146)

Now if you compare this with "The Two Principles," then repression is replaced by an impartial passing of judgment, without eliminating the content from consciousness. You remember where else you encounter this same conception?

E. White: It's very much in "Negation."

Rapaport: Correct. All I am trying to show is what he is saying, so that we see the passage clearly. Would you mind reading the passage again, Dr. White?

E. White: "...for, as we know, our judgement is very well able to distinguish realities from ideas and wishes, however intense they may be. On the other hand, it seems justifiable to assume that belief in reality is bound up with perception through the senses. When once a thought has followed the path to regression as far back as to the unconscious memory-traces of objects and thence to perception, we accept the perception of it as real. So hallucination brings belief in reality with it." (p. 230)

Rapaport: This is so far the perceptual route. If the thing comes to us from external reality in the form of sense-perception, its reality is not doubted. The question remains what pitfalls there lie in it. He indicates that if the thought regresses so far that it comes to us in the form of perception, perception itself can cheat us. Let's go on.

E. White: "We now have to ask ourselves what determines the coming into being of a hallucination. The first answer would be regression, and this would replace the problem of the origin of hallucination by that of the mechanism of regression."

Rapaport: He is now trying to convince you that narcissism is important here. Its implication, projection, is important too, because when that is achieved by a regression that goes far enough, then the difference between outside and inside disappears. The perception will be accepted as a reality, whether it originates inside or outside. That's the function of the narcissistic projective stuff. This is what is between the lines. Now his question is how do we get out of that. Let's go on.

E. White: "As regards dreams, this latter problem need not remain long unanswered. Regression of Pcs. dream-thoughts to mnemic images of things is clearly the result of the attraction which the Ucs. instinctual representatives--e.g. repressed memories of experiences--exercise upon the thoughts which have been put into words." (p. 231)

Rapaport: You do remember the issue centered around this attraction? This phrase, "the attraction which the Ucs. instinctual representatives...exercise," is Freud's purely pictorial talk, and as soon as you begin to analyze it it becomes perfectly clear that it is not that these unconscious impulses attract anything, but that on their path towards the sluices of motility and towards consciousness they make new connections, and these new connections, since they connect new ideas, new representations, with the instinctual impulse, become liable to repression. Remember, this metaphoric talk comes already from the Seventh Chapter in that footnote about how one gets up the great pyramid. Would you continue?

E. White: "But we soon perceive that we are on a false scent. If the secret of hallucination is nothing else than that of regression, every regression of sufficient intensity would produce hallucination with

belief in its reality." (p. 231)

Rapaport: Now notice, this proposition would say that the narcissistic conception with the projective implication would be the full answer to this problem. And he sees that that won't work. He gives this example which we have already read. Skip it then, and go on.

E. White: "Again, we could very well imagine the dream-work penetrating to mnemic images of this kind, making conscious to us what was previously unconscious, and holding up to us a wishful phantasy which rouses our longing, but which we should not regard as a real fulfillment of the wish."
(p. 231)

Rapaport: Which is actually something like what you have in your day-dreams. You remain aware that the wishes are not fulfilled.

E. White: "Hallucination must therefore be something more than the regressive revival of mnemic images that are in themselves Ucs." (p. 231)

Rapaport: So you see, he is not satisfied with this explanation, and you will see now emerging from this contradiction the very rudimentary, very fragmentary roots of the new conception. Let's have the next passage. Somebody else, so that Dr. White doesn't get hoarse.

Talbot: "Let us, furthermore, bear in mind the great practical importance of distinguishing perceptions from ideas, however intensely recalled. Our whole relation to the external world, to reality, depends on our ability to do so. We have put forward the fiction that we did not always possess this ability and that at the beginning of our mental life we did in fact hallucinate the satisfying object when we felt the need for it. But in such a situation satisfaction did not occur, and this failure must very soon have moved us to create some contrivance with the help of which it was possible to distinguish such wishful perceptions from a real fulfillment and to avoid them for the future." (p. 231)

Rapaport: You realize that that's a restatement in the same form of what was said in "The Two Principles," and it's a restatement in a slightly changed form of what was already present in the Seventh Chapter. Go ahead.

Talbot: "In other words, we gave up hallucinatory satisfaction of our wishes at a very early period and set up a kind of 'reality-testing.' The question now arises in what this reality-testing consisted, and how the hallucinatory wishful psychosis of dreams and amentia and similar conditions succeeds in abolishing it and in re-establishing the old mode of satisfaction." (p. 231)

R. White: I have a question that goes back to a comment he made about the regressive pathways, on p. 226, that links with this.

"Reflection tells us that this wishful impulse may be dealt with along three different paths. It may follow the path that would be normal in waking life, by pressing from the Pcs. to consciousness... In the first case, it would become a delusion having as content the fulfillment of the wish..."

There is confusion here between the wish and the wish fulfilled as a delusion. Do you see my point? Strictly speaking, if you took what he says literally, it would come into consciousness in waking life as an intense, perhaps abhorrent wish.

Rapaport: In waking life, in the schizophrenic, you can have that--

R. White: He says it would be normal in waking life.

"It may follow the path that would be normal in waking life, by pressing from the Pcs. to consciousness..." (p. 226)

Rapaport: Yes, this is the direction the process would go normally. Why isn't it normal? Because?

R. White: But he says,

"In the first case, it would become a delusion..."

It seems to me it would become an abhorrent wish that breaks into consciousness.

Rapaport: I'm sorry, no. Who has the answer for this point?

Schimek: It links to what we are getting into here. It wouldn't be normal because of reality-testing.

Rapaport: Because of reality-testing, but not only because of reality-testing. What is the other factor? The other factor is detour. Detour and secondary elaboration. The rationalizing, synthesizing process of detour. The path is the same; it goes from the Ucs to the Pcs to consciousness. But there is the usual detour of elaboration, and therefore it is acceptable to reality-testing. The big problem in delusions is that this detour is not taken, and yet it becomes acceptable to reality-testing, meaning that this apparatus, reality-testing, is somehow put out of commission.

R. White: But wait; listen carefully to the two sentences, because I think we have here another contradiction.

"Reflection tells us that this wishful impulse may be dealt with along three different paths. It may follow the path that would be normal in waking life, by pressing from the Pcs. to consciousness; or it may by-pass the Cs. and find direct motor discharge; or it may take the unexpected path--"

Those are the three ways. The first one is normal to waking life, and he says about that,

"In the first case, it would become a delusion having as content the fulfillment of the wish..."

My point is, it seems to me it would at least at first become the awareness of a wish, not come into consciousness as a delusion of the wish fulfilled.

Rapaport: No, no. As we know from the dream, the only way the unconscious can represent things is hic et nunc. Here and now. If it comes directly into consciousness, the only possible representation is by the memory of the gratification situation. The wish itself cannot be represented. In our discussions of the Seventh Chapter we had a series of definitions of wish; look those definitions over and it becomes perfectly clear why that is so. If this is your issue, it is peripheral to our point, and it is settled there. But you remember that we have been through that.

Gentlemen, where are we?

Talbot: P. 232.

"The answer can be given if we now proceed to define more precisely the third of our psychological systems, the system Cs., which

hitherto we have not sharply distinguished from the Pcs."

Rapaport: So do you see so far what the answer is? He can't get along without a conception which we would nowadays call a structural one. It won't work otherwise. Let me show you in another way what this means. In the conception of a seething cauldron, where everything is created ad hoc, it won't work. You have to have a structural, constantly existing something which will pass this judgment. Otherwise, the reliability of our distinction would be altogether incomprehensible, and any sufficient regression would be able to penetrate this way. Are you clear what I mean by the seething cauldron conception? It is the opposite of the autonomy conception. In order for a little mouse to be born, the mountains go into birth pangs. This is what is being discussed. What we have here is an example of that. Because that kind of conception will not supply sufficient explanations for the discriminatory character of the belief in reality, something else has to be postulated, namely, testing of reality. That this testing of reality indeed has the characteristics of ego and structure we will hear in a minute. So really, the issue of narcissism comes through as the very texture of the problems on which structure and ego-psychology grow. This is the great merit of this paper, in spite of all those negative things I said about it earlier. Go ahead, Dr. Talbot.

Talbot:

"In The Interpretation of Dreams we were already led to a decision to regard conscious perception as the function of a special system, to which we ascribed certain curious properties, and to which we shall now have good grounds for attributing other characteristics as well. We may regard this system, which is there called the Pcpt., as coinciding with the system Cs., on whose activity becoming conscious usually depends. Nevertheless, even so, the fact of a thing's becoming conscious still does not wholly coincide with its belonging to a system, for we have learnt that it is possible to be aware of sensory mnemonic images to which we cannot possibly allow a psychical location in the systems Cs. or Pcpt.

We must however, put off discussing this difficulty till we can focus our interest upon the system Cs. itself. In the present connection we may be allowed to assume that

hallucination consists in a cathexis of the system Cs. (Pept.), which, however, is not effected--as normally--from without, but from within, and that a necessary condition for the occurrence of hallucination is that regression shall be carried far enough to reach this system itself and in so doing be able to pass over reality-testing." (p. 232)

Rapaport: Okay. Now you know that he goes on to restate that point about projection which we read before; so we don't have to read that. We just anticipated this so that we understand this whole issue. You see now that we were not just so all wet when we tried to interpret this as all pivoting around narcissism-projection vs. hallucination. Then he comes to this last passage, which I would like you to read.

E. White: "This function of orientating the individual in the world by discrimination between what is internal and what is external must now, after detailed dissection of the mental apparatus, be ascribed to the system Cs. (Pept.) alone. The Cs. must have at its disposal a motor innervation which determines whether the perception can be made to disappear or whether it proves resistant. Reality-testing need be nothing more than this contrivance." (p. 233)

Rapaport: Originally, at any rate.

E. White: "We can say nothing more precise on this point, for we know too little as yet of the nature and mode of operation of the system Cs. We shall place reality-testing among the major institutions of the ego, alongside the censorships which we have come to recognize between the psychical systems, and we shall expect that the analysis of the narcissistic disorders will help to bring other similar institutions to light." (p. 233)

Rapaport: Do you know what similar institution he will postulate in the next paper?

Shapiro: Conscience.

Rapaport: Yes. You see, it is clearly stated that there are great institutions of the ego so the ego is not just "self" or "person" here, but is the core of the structural conception. Is this clear now? It does not tell us how this reality-testing works, but tells us only about its ancestor, the motor discrimination. The sequence is flight, where it is only motor, repression, where it is mental but totally eliminative, and condemnation or judgment, where it is reality-testing proper. This is the genetics that is indicated to us. You have to keep together this passage, the beginning of "Repression," "The Two Principles," and "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" in order to get a clear picture.

Let's have very briefly one after another the quotations concerning metapsychology. The first?

Schimek: P. 222: the footnote.

"This paper and the following one are derived from a collection which I originally intended to publish in book form under the title 'Zur Vorbereitung einer Metapsychologie' ['Preliminaries to a Metapsychology']. They follow on some papers which were printed in Volume III of the Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse ('Instincts and their Vicissitudes', 'Repression' and 'The Unconscious'). The intention of the series is to clarify and carry deeper the theoretical assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could be founded." (p. 222)

Rapaport: This is the definition of metapsychology.

"...[the study of] the theoretical assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could be founded." (p. 222)

Metapsychology is not a system. Metapsychology is the set of assumptions, or as a working, heuristic discipline, the study of the theoretical assumptions on which psychoanalysis is based. Obviously from that point of view these papers are just a beginning, because they still have a lot to do with the phenomena and still a lot to do with building the theory itself, and only here and there do you see the assumptions emerging. But this is the definition. There is another comment on metapsychology on p. 227.

Schimek: "With our scanty knowledge of the metapsychological conditions of mental processes, we may perhaps take this fact as a hint that a complete emptying of a system renders it little susceptible to instigation."

Rapaport: The point is first of all that the discussion of cathexes is here implicitly suggested to be one of the metapsychological issues. This kind of reference by Freud, in which he mentions that issues of cathexis are maybe metapsychological issues has had a very deleterious consequence. That is that 60% to 70% of the papers which title themselves metapsychology or indicate that they consider what they do metapsychological, deal with cathexes. It is obviously a misunderstanding of the whole thing. The assumptions concerning the cathexes are only the economic point of view of metapsychology, no more. The question is raised here, and in the last quotation which refers directly to this, namely on p. 234 in the footnote, which is the same proposition.

"Here the principle of the insusceptibility to excitation of uncathected systems appears to be invalidated in the case of the system Cs. (Pept.). But it may be a question of only the partial removal of cathexis; and for the perceptual system in especial we must assume many conditions for excitation which are widely divergent from those of other systems. --We are not, of course, intending to disguise or gloss over the uncertain and tentative character of these metapsychological discussions. Only deeper investigation can lead to the achievement of a certain degree of probability."

The significance of this passage is partly that it restates the issue on p. 227, partly that it indicates that the issues are not finished and psychoanalysis is not a finished system. Third, both of these passages involve this assumption that a system which has no cathexes is insusceptible to excitation. One can consider this a redundant proposition, meaning that since every excitation is a mobilization of cathexes, then a system which is by definition without cathexis can have no such excitation. Or one can consider it self-contradictory, because a system which has no cathexis can, by the very fact that an excitation spreads to it, become actually excited. So this whole proposition is pretty shaky and unclear---it seems like an ad hoc assumption.

"Mourning and Melancholia"

1

Rapaport: What are the similarities and differences between mourning and melancholia?

E. White: P. 244:

"The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment. ...The disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; but otherwise the features are the same."

Rapaport: So this indicates that the crucial distinguishing characteristic is the fall in self-esteem. Other passages?

R. White: On p. 243; etiologically both seem due to a loss.

"Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on. In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition."

Rapaport: Here something that is present in mourning is absent in melancholia. What is it?

Emery: The reality of the loss.

Rapaport: Yes. But it also predicates something that is present in melancholia and absent in mourning.

R. White: The pathological disposition.

Rapaport: So we have three things so far to remember: fall of self-regard, real loss vs. something else--what?--and third, predisposition.

Shapiro: But I thought that he says that melancholia also may be a response to a real loss.

Rapaport: Yes. Would you show us?

Shapiro: In what Dr. White just read:

"In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning..." (p. 243)

R. White: He explains that on p. 245.

"This would suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious."

The assumption would be that if there was a real loss--a death, say--in both instances, that only in melancholia would that involve the loss of an unconscious love-object.

Rapaport: But still, this distinction also would have to be explained.

Schimek: The top of this paragraph (p. 245);

"In one set of cases it is evident that melancholia too may be the reaction to the loss of a loved object. Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that there is a loss of a more ideal kind."

Rapaport: So we have two terms, unconscious loss and ideal loss.

Schimek: "The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love (e.g. in the case of a betrothed girl who has been jilted). In yet other cases one feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss of this kind has occurred, but one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either." (p. 245)

Rapaport: Now there is a passage here somewhere where Freud describes the various precipitating conditions of melancholia. Who has that? Where he describes that it is not limited to loss by death.

Schimek: P. 251:

"In melancholia, the occasions which give rise to the illness extend for the most part beyond the clear case of a loss by death, and include all those situations of being slighted, neglected or disappointed, which can import opposed feelings of love and hate into the relationship or reinforce an already existing ambivalence."

Rapaport: Right. You see then that we have a whole set of shadings: actual loss of object; loss of an object as a love-object; a situation of "being slighted, neglected or disappointed"; and the purely unconscious losses, where none of these as precipitations are present in consciousness. You notice also that this washes away to some extent the distinction between mourning and depression, because mourning is not limited to the loss of object by death. We saw that in what Dr. White read on p. 243. Who offers a further reference to the distinctions between these two?

Emery: A continuation of the last point Dr. R. White made? P. 246:

"In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself."

Rapaport: Yes. So here we have a major distinction indeed; the world empty and the ego empty.

Talbot: There's a peripheral kind of distinction that I don't know whether it fits in here or not, on p. 243, which has sort of a social aspect to it, where he says,

"...although mourning involves grave departures from the normal attitude to life, it never occurs to us to regard it as a pathological condition..."

Rapaport: Yes, it is a distinction, but it is, as you put it, a descriptive, peripheral one. Still, it is very interesting, and I wish we could discuss it. We will probably bypass it because we have to center on this paper and not on the theory of depression. I wish Dr. Talbot would keep it in mind, because that is a central part of the problem when we get to the theory of depression. All right, what other references will you offer about the distinction?

R. White: P. 247, where he points out that it is the worthy woman who is most likely--

Rapaport: How is that a distinction between mourning and depression?

R. White: I'm sorry.

Rapaport: Well, Dr. White, don't give up so soon, for God's sake, if you hit on a crucial passage. This is to my mind one of the crucial passages, just like Dr. Talbot's, for the theory of depression at large. Freud doesn't make much of it, but-- What about it?

E. White: I was just going to say that the implication, if you turn it around, is that a worthless woman can very well feel mourning, but perhaps not melancholia.

Rapaport: That's just the question I would ask. Maybe it's clearer if we talk about grief for the moment, rather than about mourning. Would that person feel grief?

R. White: Aggrieved, but not necessarily grief.

Rapaport: Meaning she would be called querulous, would be said to have a grievance. But not aggrieved. You see? To have a grievance and to be aggrieved are two different things. To be aggrieved doesn't externalize. To have a grievance externalizes. Am I understanding my English clearly enough so that I convey to you what I mean? There is a point made here by Freud where that comes out pretty clearly.

Shapiro: P. 248:

"The woman who loudly pities her husband for being tied to such an incapable wife as herself is really accusing her husband of being incapable, in whatever sense she may mean this. There is no need to be greatly surprised that a few genuine self-reproaches are scattered among those that have been transposed back. These are allowed to obtrude themselves, since they help to mask the others and make recognition of the true state of affairs impossible. ...The behavior of the patients, too, now becomes much more intelligible. Their complaints are really 'plaints' in the old sense of the word. They are not ashamed and do not hide themselves, since everything derogatory that they say about themselves is at bottom said about someone else."

Rapaport: That's really the point. If you connect these two things, the one quoted by Dr. R. White and this one, then you see that in one of them this is not externalized, in the other it is externalized. Here you have another very important characteristic.

R. White: These two states of affairs depending on the presence or absence of a worthy superego.

Rapaport: So the difference between the good woman and the bad woman, "of whom we too should have nothing good to say," is again a continuum. The bad one will blatantly externalize. The good woman is going to hide it. The grieving or mourning person will to a great extent to able to keep it to himself or herself.

So you have here an important distinction, actually. Is it clear, Dr. White, that you dropped this point prematurely, that your sense was far better than your interpretive readiness at this moment?

R. White: I trust that Dr. Miller in editing will fix that.

Rapaport: No, he will have this down as it happened, I hope, so that it be clear how people reading carefully get an impression, and that impression in the cold light of analysis may either not be true or they may not be able to bring it out. This is the process you are faced with when you are listening to your patient. A consideration like this is one of the reasons why we don't interpret right away, one of the reasons why we persist in interpreting in the long run. Otherwise we would drop it this way, as you did, and we certainly would do an injustice to our understanding and the patient's understanding.

R. White: Can I say something in this regard? In a recent supervision session with Dr. Knight I had a hunch that a certain course of action was indicated, but I couldn't say why. He wouldn't buy that, made me look at it, and when it was all put together then deliberately and searchingly it seemed to both of us that the course of action I had in mind was in fact the right one.

Rapaport: Now we didn't give you enough chance because we don't have time here for the do-it-yourself process, but we did it for you--or to you.

So here we have another important distinction, and please note that if you see these distinctions clearly, you have a theory of depression broader than what is suggested here. And keep thinking about it for our fourth question. Now who has any further references? We have to have at least two more.

R. White: P. 247:

"Finally, it must strike us that after all the melancholic does not behave in quite the same way as a person who is

crushed by remorse and self-reproach in a normal fashion. Feelings of shame in front of other people, which would more than anything characterize this latter condition, are lacking in the melancholic, or at least they are not prominent in him. One might emphasize the presence in him of an almost opposite trait of insistent communicativeness which finds satisfaction in self-exposure."

Rapaport: We have here an additional point. The implication is that the shame is suppressed together with the grievance. In various forms of grief--though not in all grief--there is shame also. Suppose that I made an ass of myself in a conference. I will be aggrieved, but I will also be ashamed. There will be a double-take about it. When you have the feeling of any kind of loss, and you grieve over it, mourn it, it does also bring up something else--in contradistinction to what Freud will explain later. It will also always bring up your misdemeanors in connection with that person. If you have suffered a real loss, without becoming depressed, you will also remember those things which you did wrong. Obviously we vary greatly in this respect. Many of us suppress it, and insofar as we suppress it we come closer to a depressive kind of experience instead of a real grief. But when he talks about remorse and self-reproach, we can see that this abstraction that the loss of self-respect is limited purely to the depression and not present in the grief at all, is actually contradicted here by Freud. It was asserted earlier, in the passage we read on p. 244, and here he contradicts it.

Schimek: Which passage contradicts it?

Rapaport: P. 247. The passage I referred to:

"...who is crushed by remorse and self-reproach in a normal fashion."

Self-reproach is part of loss of self-esteem. If you want to convince yourself of that, you go back to p. 246, where you will see

"...an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. ...represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished."

I was trying to juxtapose these two so that we see that Freud contradicts himself in a way and shows that there is no such sharp distinction. This does not mean that this distinction doesn't exist, but it isn't so damned simple or so sharp, and all these characteristics which we discussed have to be taken into account.

You also see the Freudian method. It meanders, traces, it does not systematize. Just as we go along here, taking the quotations as we marked them out, we have a number of things which we could very well now present systematically. Fall of self-esteem, no fall of self-esteem; real loss vs. unconscious loss (and the continuity to which these two belong); predisposition, no predisposition (or a continuity in predisposition); the world empty, the ego empty; aggrieved and plaintive--suppressed plaint (again the continuity to which it belongs); no shame, shame (again the continuity between loss of self-esteem, no loss of self-esteem to which it belongs). So we get a systematics of this phenomenology, and at a few points this phenomenology shades into what is not overt phenomenology but has to be inferred by interpretation. But that's systematics. This is alien to him. Very rarely does he get into it. He does not systematize as a rule, but rather goes on to bring out what can be brought out at this point.

Shapiro: It's a small point, but I had the impression that there is another point here, that he was in effect introducing a third factor for comparison. There is mourning and there is melancholia, and now he is saying that melancholia, while different from mourning on the one hand, is different also from normal remorse or normal self-reproach.

Rapaport: It will come up in connection with the obsessionals. Yes. I think that you are absolutely right, and this is the transition, really, to that point. It also says that none of us is quite free of these obsessional self-reproaches. We will see how the obsessional kind of thing differs from the others. Dr. Shapiro has a good point here, but before we make the transition, there is one more point where there is a distinction stated.

R. White: Pp. 250-251.

"The conclusion which our theory would require --namely, that the disposition to fall ill of melancholia (or some part of that disposition) lies in the predominance of the narcissistic type of object-choice--has unfortunately not yet been confirmed by observation. In the opening remarks of this paper, I admitted that the empirical material upon which this study is founded is insufficient for our needs. If we could assume an agreement between the results of observation and what we have inferred, we

should not hesitate to include this regression from object-cathexis to the still narcissistic oral phase of the libido in our characterization of melancholia. Identifications with the object are by no means rare in the transference neuroses either; indeed, they are a well-known mechanism of symptom-formation, especially in hysteria. The difference, however, between narcissistic and hysterical identification may be seen in this: that, whereas in the former the object-cathexis is abandoned, in the latter it persists and manifests its influence, though this is usually confined to certain isolated actions and innervations. In any case, in the transference neuroses, too, identification is the expression of there being something in common, which may signify love. Narcissistic identification is the older of the two and it paves the way to an understanding of hysterical identification, which has been less thoroughly studied.

"Melancholia, therefore, borrows some of its features from mourning, and the others from the process of regression from narcissistic object-choice to narcissism. It is on the one hand, like mourning, a reaction to the real loss of a loved object; but over and above this, it is marked by a determinant which is absent in normal mourning or which, if it is present, transforms the latter into pathological mourning. The loss of a love-object is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself effective and come into the open."

Rapaport: Let's stop here.

Schimek: Isn't the next sentence very relevant to what we have been discussing?

Rapaport: Yes, but that's why I want to stop here. This passage should create the transition to the discussion of the second question. It should be the preface to it, on the one hand; on the other hand it is also a transition, as Dr. Schimek points out, to what we still owe under the first question--namely, the relation of obsessive self-reproaches to mourning and melancholia. So let's go on now.

R. White: "Where there is a disposition to obsessional neurosis the conflict due to ambivalence gives a pathological cast to mourning and forces it

to express itself in the form of self-reproaches to the effect that the mourner himself is to blame for the loss of the loved object, i.e. that he has willed it. These obsessional states of depression following upon the death of a loved person show us what the conflict due to ambivalence can achieve by itself when there is no regressive drawing-in of libido as well." (p. 251)

Rapaport: You notice the two distinctions he makes here. What is the first one, the phenomenological distinction?

R. White: The ambivalence can itself give a certain shading without the pathological regression.

Rapaport: Yes, but what is the clinical condition?

Shapiro: The obsessional depression.

Rapaport: The obsessional state of depression is distinguished from melancholia.

R. White: And he describes an obsessional type of mourning.

Rapaport: That's right. Usually when people read this paper the point about the obsessional is submerged and not noticed in the central interest people usually focus on ambivalence itself. Ambivalence is obviously a crucial issue here; I don't need to explain that to you. But that usually obscures the fact that from the study of obsessional conditions in general, or specific obsessional depressions which are not melancholias, we get a new light on the theory of depression. This was not exploited by Freud. We won't be able to pursue this point here, but an up-to-date theory of depression would pursue it to the bitter end. Now let's go on.

R. White: "In melancholia, the occasions which give rise to the illness extend for the most part beyond the clear case of a loss by death, and include all those situations of being slighted, neglected, or disappointed, which can import opposed feelings of love and hate into the relationship or reinforce an already existing ambivalence. This conflict due to ambivalence, which sometimes arises more from real experiences, sometimes more from constitutional factors, must not be overlooked among the preconditions of melancholia. If the love for the object--a

love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up--takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering." (p. 251)

Rapaport: Now we come to the explanation proper. Already the ambivalence is an explanation, but still, we get here the first whiff of the difference between obsessional self-reproaches and depression. What is it?

E. White: The narcissistic substitute-object.

Rapaport: How would you put this difference phenomenologically?

E. White: Turning on the self.

Rapaport: But that's explanatory. And after all, the obsessional accuses himself too. What is the difference between the obsessively depressed and the melancholic?

Shapiro: The obsessional doesn't, for instance, lose interest in the world.

Rapaport: As a matter of fact, if anything, he will get more alert, searching memory and all that. Fine. The second difference is that he will show a lot of shame. There will be a great deal of shame and guilt. On the other hand, when you are dealing with a real depressive, you don't see the guilt directly. There will be self-accusations, to be sure, and protestations of worthlessness; as a matter of fact, you may even find actual statements that the person is guilty of this and that; but real feelings of guilt remain unconscious in the real depressions. In the obsessional conditions, the feeling of guilt, even though it will usually be isolated, will be patent. The affect of guilt will be there, while in depression there is only one affect, and that is whatever the depressive affect is. This is a complex matter.

R. White: It's not just shame and guilt; it's the absence of shame over the guilt, if one could make such a distinction.

Rapaport: The absence of shame over the guilt in depression?

R. White: Yes.

Rapaport: That higher-order thing is also there. Now let's see the next reference on obsessive self-reproaches.

Schimek: P. 251:

"The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies, just like the corresponding phenomenon in obsessional neurosis, a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an object, and which have been turned round upon the subject's own self in the ways we have been discussing."

Rapaport: Yes. This is a very complex explanation, and we can't really explore it now. Now let's see the last one. Pp. 256-257.

Schimek: "As we have seen, however, melancholia contains something more than normal mourning. In melancholia the relation to the object is no simple one; it is complicated by the conflict due to ambivalence. ...For this reason the exciting causes of melancholia have a much wider range than those of mourning, which is for the most part occasioned only by a real loss of the object, by its death. In melancholia, accordingly, countless separate struggles are carried on over the object, in which hate and love contend with each other... In mourning, too, the efforts to detach the libido are made in this same system; but in it nothing hinders these processes from proceeding along the normal path through the Pcs. to consciousness. This path is blocked for the work of melancholia, owing perhaps to a number of causes or a combination of them. Constitutional ambivalence belongs by its nature to the repressed; traumatic experiences in connection with the object may have activated other repressed material. Thus everything to do with these struggles due to ambivalence remains withdrawn from consciousness, until the outcome characteristic of melancholia has set in."

Rapaport: Here is the crucial thing, which we have seen repeatedly: that in melancholia we do not have this conflict of ambivalence showing up in consciousness; in the obsessives, this is precisely what does come to consciousness. Now let's have the last point.

Emery: P. 258:

"Of the three preconditions of melancholia--loss of the object, ambivalence, and regression of libido into the ego--the first two are also found in the obsessional self-reproaches arising after a death has occurred."

Rapaport: So the regression--that was the narcissistic point which we had already--is missing in the obsessional. Now I would like to ask only a last question: who found something similar in obsessions and melancholia and mourning? What is the salient common characteristic?

Emery: I would say the loss of the object.

Rapaport: It's true that that's a common precipitation. But in the processes, what is the common characteristic? That takes good reading of this paper, because Freud doesn't say directly.

E. White: The work involved in trying to settle the problem is similar in all of them.

Rapaport: Precisely! Try to spell it out further.

E. White: It seems to me that in this paper he talks most about the work of mourning, the hypercathexis of memories associated with the object, and the eventual separation; but that process is essentially the same in all three, except it can't have the same outcome.

Rapaport: The point is precisely that in this paper Freud overlooks what he implies. The description of the work of mourning is a description of a process we are very familiar with from the situations in which we are aggrieved, not only those in which we mourn. After a conference where you felt you didn't make your point or came out second-best or worse than that, you get into the process of going over and over and over and over it. I don't mean to say that you do that, but I don't mind admitting that I do it. Even the simple feelings of aggrievedness bring with them, in an obsessional person, the constant going over and over. In mourning we see the same process, with some modifications; and in depression we see the same process, with some modifications. Indeed, it is justified to assume that the understanding of some of the economics of this whole process --a process that remains quite obscure to Freud, and obscure to me too--may be found by studying the mechanism of obsession, by studying the ambivalence which is common to depression and obsessional conditions. This is fundamental in the present existing theory. That makes it possible to say that the study of the work of the obsessional may provide the crucial clues to the economics of mourning in general. We are still in the very beginning of the study of depression here, because those things which have been studied will be those which we will discuss under the second question. Those issues on which we centered here, and called attention to besides the common description, have not been studied very much.

R. White: Could you say that the obsessional is faced with the steady task of detaching affect from thought, which is possibly the same as the work of mourning to detach the affect from the memory-images of the lost person?

Rapaport: It could be said that way. I would say that there are other ways of saying this which would open the road for economic considerations more readily. But I am not sure. Maybe your way of starting would lead just as well to the possible conclusions, or better.

Now we come to the second question. What are the several ways in which Freud's explanation of depression and of its differences from mourning is an application of that abortive attempt at building an ego psychology which we call the theory of narcissism? We first have to see what is Freud's explanation of depression. What is the explanation?

Schimek: I would start on p. 246.

"The melancholic displays something else besides which is lacking in mourning-- an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself."

Rapaport: This is indeed the phenomenon from which the explanation starts out. What other terms does he use as equivalents for diminution of self-regard?

Miller: There is one in the quotation just read: "impoverishment of his ego."

Rapaport: Yes; but then come several other terms.

Shapiro: Heightened self-criticism.

Rapaport: That's right. Next?

E. White: Moral inferiority.

Miller: Self-reproaches.

E. White: Self-accusation.

Talbot: Self-abasement.

Rapaport: Yes. Here is a series of terms which you ought to note are not differentiated from each other. And that is a remarkable

thing, because it is clear that, for instance in the extreme, self-accusation and diminution in self-regard have a different character. We do experience fall in self-esteem very frequently without any self-accusation. Not only when you project it and make others responsible for it, but even when it is not projected at all. You note the phenomenology of this? I will also remind you of what we have already noted--that his assertion that in mourning there is no loss of self-esteem doesn't really hold up. It is true that self-accusations in mourning are not ubiquitous. But it is not true that there is no loss of self-regard. In anybody really bereaved, you will find that not only the world is worthless but there is also an internal emptiness. Obviously one ought to take him at his own word, that there are such differences, but with the reservation that these differences are not absolute. If one manages, as he did, to lump together all these terms, ranging from fall of self-regard to self-abasement--if they are all lumped together, then it looks much clearer that this sort of thing is characteristic for melancholia, and that it has nothing to do with mourning. If you begin to separate them, to put self-accusation and self-abasement on one end and diminished self-regard on the other, you begin to notice that some of these apply to mourning too. For instance, impoverishment of the ego--how do you distinguish that so clearly from one of the characteristics which is common to grief and melancholia? Which is it?

E. White: Inhibition?

Rapaport: Inhibition. How are you to distinguish inhibition so sharply from impoverishment of the ego? There is inhibition of the ego, impoverishment of the ego, fall in self-esteem, feeling of worthlessness, self-accusation, self-abasement--it ain't so sharp and clear as all that. This is what ought to be noticed phenomenologically.

By the way, one should say that a new attack on phenomenology, a new restudy of just precisely what the lay of the land is in this respect, is strongly called for. Not a phenomenology which forgets about the dynamics and the economics, etc., that ought to be studied in connection with this, but a general phenomenological re-evaluation. It is one of the most simple and most important phenomenological jobs--and there are many such in psychoanalysis, phenomenology that ought to be looked at again, after what we have learned of late.

Now let's hear what is the explanation of this impoverishment. A quotation? What is the explanation of this self-accusation, self-abasement, impoverishment?

Emery: P. 245?

"This would suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious."

Rapaport: Sure it's related, but we have already covered that. Now the question is how is that unconscious loss explained?

Trunnell: The final explanation is on pp. 248-249, but I think there is one other thing before that.

Rapaport: Yes, there is.

Trunnell: P. 248:

"[The melancholics'] complaints are really 'plaints' in the old sense of the word. They are not ashamed and do not hide themselves, since everything derogatory that they say about themselves is at bottom said someone else."

Rapaport: Yes. There is another one before that that we should see.

Talbot: At the end of the previous paragraph:

"So we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's own ego." (p. 248)

Rapaport: Shifted onto the patient's own ego. Dr. Trunnell, what is the explanation of this shift?

Trunnell: Pp. 248-249:

"There is no difficulty in reconstructing this process. An object-choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the object-relationship was shattered. The result was not the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something different, for whose coming-about various conditions seem to be necessary.

The object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end."

Rapaport: Excuse me; just note this phrase, "little power of resistance"; we will come back to it later in another connection. Please go on.

Trunnell: "But the free libido was not displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification."
(p. 249)

Rapaport: Fine. Now people, before we discuss the whole paragraph, what does this last passage mean?

"...transformed...into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification."

Schimek: The external loss was replaced by an internal conflict within different systems, or different--

Rapaport: What systems?

Schimek: Ego and--Freud doesn't say "superego," he says a special "critical activity of the ego..."

Rapaport: What faculty is it?

Schimek: Well, it later becomes the superego.

Rapaport: What does he call it here?

Schimek: "Conscience," I think,

Rapaport: That's right. Let's read the passage where he introduces "conscience," so that we pin down what the hell can he mean by this "transformation."

E. White: P. 247:

"Before going into this contradiction--"

Rapaport: Which is the contradiction?

E. White: "The analogy with mourning led us to conclude that he had suffered a loss in regard to an object; what he tells us points to a loss in regard to his ego." (p. 247)

Rapaport: This refers to the point Dr. Emery quoted earlier. There is the contradiction; the melancholic says something different than what we would conclude. Go ahead.

E. White: "Before going into this contradiction, let us dwell for a moment on the view which the melancholic's disorder affords of the constitution of the human ego."

Rapaport: Did you notice? Now we are told that this is a view melancholia offers of the constitution of the ego. In a minute this will explain melancholia. The circularity here should be noted. All science, if it is good science, is circular, but it starts somewhere in a primitive definition. The question is, is there anywhere here such a primitive base, or is this really viciously circular? Am I making the point? You will find circularity in any science, and we have run into it in other propositions of Freud before, in earlier seminars--I don't want to stop on that. A circularity can be really productive, with a point where you start, a primitive proposition or definition, to which you can return, because you have chosen to make that the cornerstone of your system. Everything about the pleasure principle is like that. The definition of instinct in Freud is a conceptual invention full of such circularity, but it is a productive circularity. The question is then, can you find something that will make this productive? What Horney and the other neo-Freudians found was this self-reproach or self-esteem or loss of self-esteem, and all the variations of that. There is a question: is that necessary? Are those basic explanatory terms? Or is this proposition not circular as we have it here? Or are there other ways to get out of its circularity?

I know that this can be confusing, but this is what you ought to notice when you read this paper. After all, these papers are metapsychological in intent; that means that you want to clarify the basic concepts. Therefore this is the point where you ought not to accept anything at face value. Am I conveying my point?

Shapiro: Yes; but I for one don't feel really convinced that this is circular.

- Rapaport: Why don't you speak up then? That's why I'm stopping so long.
- Shapiro: It seems to me that what he says is that the phenomenon of melancholia calls for this kind of picture of a divided ego, divided between a criticizing faculty and something that is criticized, and that's that.
- Rapaport: Fine. If that were the reason for which the criticizing faculty was introduced, then there would be no doubt about it. Then it would be a straightforward thing. But then you would not use this concept. Look: here is melancholia; you outline its phenomenology. Then you indicate, here is a concept; with this these phenomena can be explained. You would construct out of these phenomenological characteristics the concept that will account for them. If you do not do that, but instead bring in a concept from elsewhere, then you can't say that these things in melancholia demand it. There are two different patterns. If you already have a concept, then you are to define melancholia from it. Right? Then the explanation of the self-accusations follows directly from these concepts of the superego or conscience. If you construct the concept of conscience from these phenomena --from self-abasement, self-respect, loss of self-respect--then it ought to be totally circular there. Is this clear?
- Shapiro: If I understand, you are saying that the concept already resides in the observations of self-abasement.
- Rapaport: It has to reside there if he says, "...the view which the melancholic's disorder affords of the constitution of the human ego." You know where he introduced that constitution of the ego.
- Schimek: "On Narcissism."
- Rapaport: Yes. But here he acts as though he were introducing it anew. And this is the danger I am trying to call your attention to. We have to watch whether these two introductions of it are consonant. If he hadn't already introduced it, this would be a circularity, which may be all right. But we have to try to see whether these two introductions are right, whether they introduce a basic concept which does not have to be justified, to which one can circularly refer. Do we have a productive circularity or a vicious circularity in what he does here? I am trying to alert you to a lot of issues. In a few minutes you will see, I hope, why I do it.
- Schimek: To my mind, what really closes the circle, so to speak, is what comes after, specifically The Ego and the Id, where the process of identification, replacing the lost object, which here is used as a specific explanation of melancholia, is made the main basis for the concepts of ego, superego, and the whole business.

Rapaport: You see, that's why I asked you to read it. This is what I would like to expose. This is why I stopped on this. It is confusing now; I hope that we will clear it up before we get through with this.

Dr. White, if you don't mind continuing after this obstacle course--

E. White: "We see how in him one part of the ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object. Our suspicion that the critical agency which is here split off from the ego might also show its independence in other circumstances will be confirmed by every further observation. We shall really find grounds for distinguishing this agency from the rest of the ego. What we are here becoming acquainted with is the agency commonly called 'conscience'; we shall count it, along with the censorship of consciousness and reality-testing, among the major institutions of the ego..." (p. 247)

Rapaport: You notice that it is introduced as a suborganization of the ego. He will later call it, particularly in "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," advancing step--is that the term?

Miller: "A differentiating grade."

Rapaport: Then in The Ego and the Id he calls it "an advancing step"? Some term like that. Go ahead.

E. White: "...and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can become diseased on its own account."

Rapaport: Very good. Now for a moment let's consider; what did we have here? We had this clinical picture where the self-reproaches are reproaches against the object. Now the object is introjected; an identification is made. But why then does the superego criticize the ego which is altered by the identification?

E. White: Well, on pp. 251-252 there is a discussion of ambivalence and sadism, which is an explanation.

Rapaport: That's right. What is the explanation there?

E. White: It goes on for quite a bit, actually; there's one sentence on pp. 250-251 that sort of sets it up:

"The loss of a love-object is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself effective and come into the open." (pp. 250-251)

Then it goes on about obsessional neurosis--

Rapaport: As long as we read that passage, do you know the writer, Isak Dinneson? She has a book, "Winter's Tales," of which the story before last is "Peter and" a girl's name, I don't recall, and in this story more beautifully than anywhere else there is an illustration of how object-loss or threatened object-loss brings the ambivalence sharply to the fore. It is a beautiful one, and I recommend it... Go on.

E. White: Skipping now:

"This conflict due to ambivalence, which sometimes arises more from real experiences, sometimes more from constitutional factors, must not be overlooked among the preconditions of melancholia. If the love for the object-- a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up--takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making--" (p. 251)

Rapaport: What does it mean, "hate comes into operation" on it? What is this hate?

E. White: This hate is one half of the ambivalence, according to this explanation.

Rapaport: What would be its root? Where does it come from?

Miller: From the original relation of the ego to the external world, according to "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes."

Rapaport: That's right. But I want to call to your attention that psychoanalysts reading this nowadays would totally forget the definitions of love and hate in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," relegating it to the ego's relation to objects. They would assume that they are dealing here with the fate of the aggressive drive. I know that this is all very confusing--too much has to be seen at once. But you have to be aware of it that today's reading --tell me, people, honestly, as you read it did you realize that this is the hate that was defined in 1914?

Schimek: He says it--

Miller: And there are two footnotes on this page and the next that call attention to it.

Shapiro: "We have elsewhere shown that identification is a preliminary stage of object-choice, that it is the first way--and one that is expressed in an ambivalent fashion--in which the ego picks out an object. The ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development in which it is, it wants to do so by devouring it."
(pp. 249-250)

Rapaport: Yes, but that's even more seductive to assume that this is oral aggression. This is how the present-day theory of depression treats it, that this is oral aggressive incorporation. Okay, I realized that there is a footnote here, but my experience is that people disregard the footnote, don't look back, and simply consider this in the light of present-day theory. We are indebted to Dr. Shapiro for the quote, because that indeed is what you are taught. This was an oral aggressive incorporation. And here is your answer, really, in this theory: it is for this oral aggressive incorporation that the superego punishes. You don't see this here clearly; the explanation was made out of this text later, partly by Abraham, partly by Fenichel, and partly by others. Are you now getting some whiff of it? It is not because of the identification that the ego gets punished. It is for the aggressive cannibalistic act that it is punished. Is this clear?

Miller: You don't mean exclusively, do you?

Rapaport: I don't mean exclusively; I mean only that this is what Freud implies here. Anyway, it's the way he was understood later. Dr. White?

E. White: I was thinking of the need to relinquish the object, which we talked about earlier. I think he refers to this very strongly too--the pain that follows on relinquishing the object.

Rapaport: That's the economic problem. As long as you bring it up--we are dealing here with what kind of problem?

Emery: The structural.

Rapaport: In what respect?

Emery: In respect of the constitution of the ego.

- Rapaport: Yes; and identifications. But we are dealing with what kind of problem in this last passage which Dr. Shapiro quoted? What kind of problem is that?
- Miller: Dynamic.
- Rapaport: It's a dynamic problem. That's the core of the depression theory, post-Freud. The whole depression theory, for people who don't read "Mourning and Melancholia" carefully but read Abraham and the others, becomes a dynamic problem. The oral-aggressive drive resulting in an oral incorporation, a destruction; and then it had certain structural consequences in that sense as the superego was a structure.
- Schimek: I would like to come back to Dr. Miller's question about "exclusively." The second explanation does not seem contained here or at least does not seem to be the main one here.
- Rapaport: Which is the second one?
- Schimek: The first one would be that the hatred which was a part of the ambivalence toward the external love-object is now turned inward and is now expressed in the conflict between the criticizing faculty of the ego and the ego as modified by the identification.
- Rapaport: What is the ambivalence--whose ambivalence is it? Is it the superego's ambivalence?
- Schimek: No.
- Rapaport: What is ambivalence anyway? You see, there's no use reading this without clarifying. What is ambivalence?
- Emery: It's an ego state.
- Rapaport: Well, if you assume for the moment that when he talks about ego in these papers he means the kind of ego we mean nowadays, then Dr. Emery is right--the ambivalence is the ego's. But this is not the common assumption in psychoanalysis. What is the ambivalence?
- Miller: The common assumption is that it belongs more to id.
- Rapaport: That the impulses themselves go in pairs, or as it was pointed out by Dr. White, that there are always fusions of instincts, and the possibility of defusion is always there. But how does he define ambivalence here?
- Trunnell: Here, from a phenomenological point of view, it's an existing side by side of a tendency to maintain the object-cathexis and

a tendency to abandon it.

Rapaport: How does he express it?

Trunnell: P. 256:

"In melancholia...countless separate struggles are carried on over the object, in which hate and love contend with each other; the one seeks to detach the libido from the object, the other to maintain this position of the libido against the assault. The location of these separate struggles cannot be assigned to any system but the Ucs...."

Rapaport: You notice that here the topographic point of view leads to the inclusion of ambivalence in the id, while it was considered to be the ego-attitude, the ego's relation. You notice the contradiction here. I know I am confusing you, but you have to get confused to get unconfused.

Miller: It's not really a contradiction, as long as you bear in mind that at this point ego has never yet been defined.

Rapaport: Sure, you can say that; but there is a contradiction if you assume that the ego of "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" has to do with this ego, and that unconscious is indeed here the system Ucs., which is the ancestor of the id. That there is here a confusion is clear; whether it is simply a contradiction or not is another question.

Let's see there where Dr. White was, on p. 251, to cap off this point.

E. White: "If the love for the object--a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up--takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering." (p. 251)

Rapaport: Just stop for a moment and see whether you understand the sentence.

"If the love for the object--a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up--takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation--"

This hate is supposed to come into operation now, according to the sentence on p. 249, by the superego. Until now it was a question of whether it is Ucs. or the ego's relation to the object. Now "comes into operation on this substitutive object," which is in the ego--by definition, since it is a narcissistic identification--"abusing it, debasing it..." But it would be the superego--the conscience here--which would do that, "making it suffer..." Making what suffer?

E. White: The ego.

Rapaport: Making the ego suffer, "...deriving sadistic satisfaction..." who derives the sadistic satisfaction?

Miller: Superego.

Rapaport: We have never heard about that before, have we--that the superego derives gratifications?

E. White: We haven't even heard about superego yet.

Rapaport: But notice the circularity now. This critical agency was just introduced from the necessities of the melancholia, and now it is already something which can derive gratification. You know, I am not enjoying what appears to be trying to make a fool out of the old man, but you see the confusion that results from this introduction of an ad hoc explanation. Let's have the next sentence.

E. White: "The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies, just like the corresponding phenomenon in obsessional neurosis, a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an object--" (p. 251)

Rapaport: Now you notice that there is a double-take here. Both of them, sadistic tendencies and hate, are gratified. Further confusion. Go ahead.

E. White: "...which relate to an object, and which have been turned round upon the subject's own self in the ways we have been discussing." (p. 251)

Rapaport: They have been turned around upon the self. They were directed toward the object; it must be the unconscious which does it. What does the superego have to do with this? Turning around upon the self is an instinctual vicissitude, you remember. In "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" there was no talk about hate being turned around upon anything else. Only sadistic impulses were turned around. The hate and the love were discussed there as turning into the opposite--another vicissitude.

Do you see what complications we are getting into?

Now I would like to go back to "On Narcissism" and see how that superego or conscience was introduced. It is absolutely necessary. It will be further confusing, but we have to see the lay of the land. Do you mind if I quickly show a few of these? On p. 93:

"Repression, we have said, proceeds from the ego; we might say with greater precision that it proceeds from the self-respect of the ego."

The first sentence of the same paragraph:

"We have learnt that libidinal instinctual impulses undergo the vicissitude of pathogenic repression if they come into conflict with the subject's cultural and ethical ideas. By this we never mean that the individual in question has a merely intellectual knowledge of the existence of such ideas; we always mean that he recognizes them as a standard for himself and submits to the claims they make on him." (p. 93)

That's the first point. The next one is on p. 94:

"We can say that the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no such ideal. For the ego the formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression."

You realize that this ideal is equated here with censorship. This is the theory in which the anxiety is the result of repression, which in turn is exercised by the censor, the ancestor of the superego. It will be only in 1926 that the superego anxiety will be one class of anxieties and no more. That is much later. In this theory, all repression proceeds from the superego and all anxiety is superego anxiety. Now the ideal ego--who will read the next paragraph, because that's crucial, really.

Miller:

"This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile

ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value." (p. 94)

Rapaport: What two things are asserted here?

Miller: One is that the ego ideal is a recreation of that original pleasure ego, in a sense.

Rapaport: No, no.

Trunnell: As attached to it, the narcissism that was attached to the original pleasure ego.

Rapaport: No, people.

"This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego." (p. 94)

E. White: It asserts a primal narcissism.

Rapaport: It does assert the primal narcissism.

Talbot: A genetic history, too. The development of one later than the other.

Rapaport: Well, okay; let's go on. We will see it more clearly in a minute.

"The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego--"

Which is perfect. Meaning it is like the parents. It is not only perfect the way the infantile ego was but it is perfect also like the parents. Go ahead.

Miller: "As always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed. He is not willing to forego the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the awakening of his own critical judgement, so that he can no longer retain that perfection, how seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal." (p. 94)

Rapaport: Yes. Now where do you find what I tried to say about the parents? Do you have that?

Miller: There are some parents on p. 96; I'm not sure that's the...

Rapaport: Yes it is.

Miller: "For what prompted the subject to form an ego ideal, on whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his environment--his fellow-men--and public opinion."

Rapaport: You notice then that this superego is on the one hand the heir of the parental authority--the criticizing authority; on the other, the heir of the infantile narcissistic perfection. It's double.

Miller: Where was I so far off base with that reference to the pleasure ego?

Rapaport: To my mind you were far off base with the pleasure ego because here it is not the pleasure ego but the perfection. The emphasis here is not on pleasure. The reason I was kicking over it was that if we put it that way, it would make sensible that later statement of gratification. Remember that statement, that it derives gratification? That's why I kicked, if you want to know.

Miller: But I also remember that a very important point about that infantile pleasure ego had to do with perfection, although I don't think it was necessarily put in those terms.

Rapaport: No question about it. You understand, I am not fair. I am just trying to kick where I get the feeling that we will think we understand this infantile pleasure ego as an explanation of that gratification, which it ain't. There is no explanation for that. But the main thing that you have to realize is that there is a double parentage to this. I can't let you go by without reading p. 95, because that ought to confuse you totally.

Miller: "It would not surprise us if we were to find a special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured--"

Rapaport: You notice? Another institution, which allows for narcissistic gratification to be derived from the ego-ideal. Go ahead.

Miller: "--and which, with this end in view, constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal. If such an agency does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a discovery--we can only recognize it; for we may reflect that what we call our 'conscience' has the required characteristics." (p. 95)

Rapaport: What does that agency do? It measures the ego by this ego-ideal. Now you understand, when people criticize psychoanalysis as anthropomorphic, this is the kind of thing that gives them a handle to grab--if they had read carefully enough to find the handle. Here you have not two processes or two structures, the dynamic relations of which result in something, but an institution which compares the ego and the ego ideal and sees to it that a narcissistic gratification is derived out of the ego ideal--meaning that one lives up to it, just as one lived up to the demands of the parents, and therefore a gratification comes as praise. This is how confused this is. This conscience, which here he wanted simply to derive out of the requirements of the phenomenal characteristics of melancholia, has been introduced already, indeed introduced just a few years before in a most confusing fashion. We do not know whether it is an ego ideal or a judging conscience. Moreover, this was so confusing that Rado, for instance, tried to get out of the difficulty which we encounter here-- The difficulty I have in mind now is that point that

"...conflict between the ego and the loved person [is transformed] into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification."
(p. 249)

Rado says that the introjection takes place partly into the ego and partly into the superego. Different aspects of the object are differently introjected, says Rado. That would be all right if it could be understood how that can be done. That would mean that one aspect of the ambivalence is introjected in the ego and the other aspect of the ambivalence is introjected in the superego, and the two are fighting now. That was Rado's attempt to explain. It would make some kind of sense--I would think a screwy kind. But that's how confusing that has been.

Now we have to go ahead. What was Freud's explanation of depression?

E. White: Well, let me see if I can start. First of all, there is real or symbolic loss of an object. The object-choice was originally made along narcissistic lines, with regression to a narcissistic state and identification of the ego with the lost object, and then subsequent conflict between the ego and the superego. Those I think are the main steps.

Rapaport: One thing is missing. Which is that?

Shapiro: The ambivalence.

Rapaport: The ambivalence--narcissistic object-choice of an ambivalently held object, and then the identification is somehow understated. What is the identification?

Shapiro: Incorporation.

Rapaport: An oral, ambivalent, if you please sadistic, incorporation. And it is this for which the punishment is meted out by the superego. This is an essential part of the theory.

Shapiro: But that isn't what it says here.

Rapaport: But it is implied. Read that passage.

Shapiro: The passage referred to the ambivalence of the object-relationship. On pp. 249-250:

"We have elsewhere shown that identification is a preliminary stage of object-choice, that it is the first way--and one that is expressed in an ambivalent fashion--in which the ego picks out an object. The ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development in which it is, it wants to do so by devouring it."

But I don't see--

Talbot: The next sentence says it.

Shapiro: "Abraham is undoubtedly right in attributing to this connection the refusal of nourishment met with in severe forms of melancholia."

Rapaport: If you just take a look at what Abraham has been saying--this is an indispensable part of the theory of depression as we have it today, and here is the root of that theory. You pointed right to the heart of it, Dr. Shapiro, and you are familiar with it from everyday clinical experience, the talk about it, to know that this is the theory.

Now let's get a second summary. Where did narcissism come into this story? This was my question, actually.

Miller: Through the narcissistic object-choice.

Rapaport: Yes. As the explanation of that contradiction. What was the contradiction there?

Emery: Strong attachment and little power of resistance.

Rapaport: Note that while on the one hand he says little resistance, on the other, in the very next paragraph, he says

"...a strong fixation to the loved object must have been present..." (p. 249)

How do you square that off?

Miller: He squares it with the narcissistic object-choice.

Rapaport: But why is it then so little resisted? How is that explained? Do you have the passage?

"The object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end. ...On the [other] hand, [there is] a strong fixation to the loved object..." (p. 249)

How do you understand that?

Schimek: He seems to be aware of the contradiction.

Miller: He calls it one.

Shapiro: He says "This contradiction seems to imply..."

Rapaport: But do you understand it? Dr. Shapiro, read the passage concerning the contradiction.

Shapiro: "On the one hand, a strong fixation to the loved object must have been present; on the other hand, in contradiction to this,

the object-cathexis must have had little power of resistance. As Otto Rank has aptly remarked, this contradiction seems to imply that the object-choice has been effected on a narcissistic basis, so that the object-cathexis, when obstacles come in its way, can regress to narcissism." (p. 249)

- Rapaport: So you notice that this peculiar contradiction is explained by a new gimmick--narcissism--which can make a sow's ear out of a silk purse. Notice: if the object-cathexis is intense, as he calls it--"strong fixation"--there is a strong fixation to the object--the only way to explain the looseness, the little resistance of it is to say that this is what we call a narcissistic object-cathexis, meaning that this object was always the self, if you please, from the very beginning; and therefore qua object there is no strong attachment to it. The reason I drag this contradiction in is that this all points back to the introduction of narcissism. What is the second phase where narcissism comes in?
- E. White: Regression to the state of narcissism.
- Rapaport: Yes; that's the narcissistic object-choice and the resolution of the contradiction by regression, meaning that the regression is what makes it appear so fickle, so unstable a cathexis. That's the explanation. But there are several other points where narcissism comes into this story. Where does it come?
- Shapiro: Again ambivalence.
- Rapaport: The ambivalence is part of the narcissism, because there is a fusion as it is expressed later; a fusion which is defused in the narcissistic state.
- Trunnell: The identification is another place where the narcissism comes in.
- Rapaport: How?
- Trunnell: He doesn't say it in just that way, but because it is the narcissistic way of handling the conflict; withdrawing the libido to the ego.
- Rapaport: The identification is used here as a tool of the narcissism, as a means by which the narcissistic withdrawal is effected. Okay. Now come on, there are several other points where narcissism comes in.

E. White: Well, in a sense, the one we left off with just before: the narcissistic parent of the superego.

Rapaport: That's right. The ego ideal as the heir of infantile narcissism. That is then the fourth point where narcissism comes into this game. There is one more.

Miller: There is one more that we haven't gotten to yet: the relation to mania.

Rapaport: Yes; but let's skip that if possible. Let's consider Dr. Miller's point as having been covered, because we have so much to do that I would like to cover it just this briefly. We know what he means, that there is a reinstatement of that narcissism in mania. There is one more point.

Shapiro: There's an earlier point, simply consisting of withdrawal of interest from the outside.

Rapaport: You mean the phenomenological base itself?

Shapiro: Yes.

Rapaport: Correct. We should have started with that. But the point I've been fishing for is the turning of aggression on the self, which is also a narcissistic thing. Not only the libido, but the aggression is turned inward. That is a narcissistic thing too. So here you have a whole series of conceptions which link this theory so closely to narcissism. You get the answer to the question as I have raised it? The whole theory is shot through with this concept of narcissism, and you realize that the core of the conception of narcissism is all rotten. Why? Because it is not defined what that ego is upon which the cathexes are withdrawn. It is characterized in "On Narcissism" as the original reservoir of libido. Freud in The Ego and the Id--you remember the big footnote--withdraws that, saying that the id is the original reservoir. And Freud himself often talks in these papers not about the ego, but the self onto which this withdrawal is made.

Schimek: Also in the turning around against the self.

Rapaport: Against the self, or the subject; and not the ego. So the concept of narcissism has at its core a shaky concept of self, ego, or subject which makes the whole conception wobbly.

Now at this point I would like to go to the point Dr. Shapiro made, and take a look at those passages in The Ego and the Id where this issue of identification is reconsidered. Who has the passages?

Miller: P. 36, I think, is the first one.

Rapaport: Well, you could have one there; the major ones come later. But let's have that one. I take it that that's one of the definitions of the ego.

Miller: "When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues a modification in his ego which can only be described as a reinstatement of the object within the ego, as it occurs in melancholia; the exact nature of this substitution is as yet unknown to us. It may be that, by undertaking this introjection, which is a kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for an object to be given up or renders that process possible. It may even be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects. At any rate the process, especially in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it points to the conclusion that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains a record of past object-choices."

Rapaport: This is the proposition from which issues the later conception, that the ego is a precipitate of identifications. Now who knows the famous passage which is like Erikson's propositions? It is the ancestor of Erikson's propositions.

Miller: Pp. 38-39.

Rapaport: Right.

Miller: "Although it is a digression from our theme, we cannot avoid giving our attention for a moment longer to the ego's object-identifications. If they obtain the upper hand and become too numerous, unduly intense and incompatible with one another, a pathological outcome will not be far off. It may come to a disruption of the ego in consequence of the individual identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances; perhaps the secret of the cases of so-called multiple personality is that the various identifications seize possession of consciousness in turn. Even when things do not go so far as this, there remains the question of conflicts between the different identifications into which the ego is split up, conflicts which

cannot after all be described as purely pathological."

Rapaport: This is the whole issue of identity as the integrate of all the identifications, which is not pathological. The integrate can be looser, stronger, crises can come in it-- So here so far, these two quotations show that to take melancholia to be simply a product of such an identification is a very peculiar kind of explanation of melancholia, because it is the explanation, as Dr. Schimek put it earlier, of ego-structure building in general. By the way, there is another trouble with this identification conception. Remember, we were told that narcissistic object-choice was the basis for the pre-disposition for melancholia. When an object is lost, if it was a narcissistic object-choice, then it corresponded anyway to something like an identification. In other words, the identification was not made just then and there when the loss took place. The identification existed from earlier, by definition, if it was a narcissistic object-choice. So there is a hole there too. But before we go on, I would like very much to get another passage about these identifications and their role in the ego. Who has that?

E. White: You don't mean the one about the superego?

Rapaport: Well, let's take that, yes.

E. White: Pp. 39-40:

"But, whatever the character's capacity for resisting the influences of abandoned object-cathexes may turn out to be in after years, the effects of the first identifications in earliest childhood will be profound and lasting. This leads us back to the origin of the ego-ideal; for behind the latter there lies hidden the first and most important identification of all, the identification with the father, which takes place in the prehistory of every person. This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis. But the object-choices belonging to the earliest sexual period and relating to the father and mother seem normally to find their outcome in an identification of the kind discussed, which would thus reinforce the primary one."

Rapaport: Fine. You see the complication with the introduction of this primal identification. That primal identification, however, does seem as if it were something from the narcissistic phase itself, because it is prior to object-choices. You see how

the confusion gets denser and denser? I would like, however, to go to the point of the ego offering itself as an object to the id.

Miller: P. 37:

"From another point of view it may be said that this transformation of an erotic object-choice into a modification of the ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id and deepen its relations with it--at the cost, it is true, of acquiescing to a large extent in the id's experiences. When the ego assumes the features of the object, it forces itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying, 'Look, I am so like the object, you can as well love me'."

Rapaport: So you understand that narcissism--which this is--is connected with the ego's basic method for getting hold of cathexes from the id.

Now starting on p. 61 there are several pages one should look at to see what this has to do with the whole issue of neutralization. He talks about a neutral, displaceable energy; you see that on pp. 62-63:

"...which is probably active alike in the ego and in the id, proceeds from the narcissistic reservoir of libido, i.e. that it is desexualized Eros."

Let's go to p. 64.

Miller:

"If this displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it might also be described as sublimated energy; for it would still retain the main purpose of Eros--that of uniting and binding--in so far as it helped towards establishing that unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of the ego. If the intellectual processes in the wider sense are to be classed among these displacements, then the energy for the work of thought itself must be supplied from sublimated erotic sources.

"Here we arrive again at the possibility which

has already been discussed that sublimation may take place regularly through the mediation of the ego."

Rapaport: You remember where he touched on this. In what we have just read, about the only way in which the ego gets hold of energies from the id. Go ahead.

Miller: "The other case will be recollected, in which the ego deals with the first object-cathexes of the id (and certainly with later ones too) by taking over the libido from them into itself and binding it to the ego-modification produced by means of identification." (p. 64-65)

Rapaport: Do you see how the circle closes?

Miller: "The transformation of erotic libido into ego-libido of course involves an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization. In any case this throws light upon an important function of the ego in its relation to Eros. By thus obtaining possession of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the opposing instinctual trends. It has to acquiesce in some of the other object-cathexes of the id; it has to go hand in hand with them, so to speak." (p. 65)

Rapaport: At this point, since the confusion has reached the top, I would like to talk a little bit. There is one more way to make this still more complicated and confusing: by taking in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and trying to show the solution Freud attempted there, which is reflected in The Ego and the Id. But everybody has to draw the line somewhere. I will draw the line here; I won't involve all that complication for the moment.

I would like to try to say in a few words what way one can find to avoid these contradictions, to try to show that these contradictions are not absolutely necessary, and that they are due to two things. The first is the building of this theory on the conception of narcissism. The second is that it is subject to the confusion of the transition from the

topographic to the structural point of view. These two transitional papers are the preparation for the structural point of view, or are in the period where the preparation was being made for the transition. You remember we read a long passage from "The Unconscious" trying to show how the structural point of view was already at the doorstep. We did that in connection with the "Metapsychological Supplement." Now remember that it is our job to understand, not to judge or to replace. We have tried to establish what the theory was here and the continuity of it is to the present-day theory of depression. We tried to establish the points where narcissism was involved so that we see that this is a theory based on the conception of narcissism. Up to that point we tried to understand. It is very important that we don't simply use such a paper as a springboard for criticism or for new theories without understanding, without seeing why it became what it is.

Yet in these papers the situation gets so complicated and dense that it is worth-while to offer an outside vantage-point which allows these things to fall into place to some extent. That's why I would like to take a few minutes, provided that now we see clearly what Freud's theory of depression is--at least what it is dynamically and structurally, and to some extent genetically. (The economics we haven't discussed yet.) And provided that we see its theoretical linkage to the theory of narcissism. It is my premise that we see those points. Don't forget those things, because that was our job to learn. Let us assume for the moment that what Freud says in The Ego and the Id is correct: that both the ego and the superego are built out of identifications. That would mean that the process of identification is structure-building. That would be one of the implications. That shouldn't be any surprise to us, because we have heard of it, and we read that when he talked about hysterical identification, saying that it is a defense. Identification is in general also considered a defense. Defenses are structures, ego-structures. It is no surprise for us. Now if these structures are built out of identifications, any of them, as any structure can, will serve as a defense also. In certain circumstances, some structures serve as controls, others always serve as defenses.

- Miller: The way he talks about them here, they serve as defenses from the very beginning.
- Rapaport: Which ones? The superego ones, he talks about as if they were defenses from the very beginning.
- Miller: Yes.
- Rapaport: But we don't have to tie ourselves to that. Think with me in

general about defenses and controls. You see identification is structure-building; defenses are structures; any structure can, at one time or another, serve either as a defense or as a control. What does it mean that a structure serves as a control or as a defense? It means that it slows down, it modifies the mobility of drive-discharge. Every structure does that, even if it is not defensive, even if it doesn't dam up that drive-energy. Is this clear? The question then would be, how is this structure-building which we call identification different when we speak about a superego-identification and how is it different when we talk about an ego-identification? You realize that it used to be assumed --it certainly is assumed in The Ego and the Id--that the identifications connected with the Oedipal phase, with the passing of the Oedipus complex, are the major superego-identifications. But you also notice that he said that the oldest identifications with the father are the superego-identifications. That passage was not known for a long while; it was Melanie Klein who called attention to it forcefully, discovering that the identifications which build the superego are very ancient, that there are many pre-Oedipal ones among them. You have heard about this controversy. The psychoanalytic literature converged on this assertion, and it was not left to Melanie Klein alone to say this. Indeed, it is fair to interpret the literature this way: that the earliest identifications are those which we find in the study of the superego. It is not true that the earliest ones are simply ego-identifications.

Today, from the vantage-point of Hartmann's conception of the undifferentiated phase, one could say that we can't classify the earliest identifications as to whether they are superego- or ego-identifications. Any early structure-building serves to dam up or to control drive-discharge. There is no differentiation as yet. Where does the differentiation come in? We will see how it comes in if we consider for a moment the following: what is the difference between controls and defenses? The defenses are inflexible; the controls are flexible. The thought-processes and discharge-processes connected with the defenses are primary-process like. You know the defenses are like primary processes in their operation. You know it out of your everyday clinical practice. You know it from that passage which we read from "The Unconscious," that some of the most important, crucial functions of the ego, meaning the defensive ones, are unconscious. Remember? That's the basic proposition in The Ego and the Id also. The distinction between controls and defenses is that the defenses are archaic structures, inflexible structures, not like those ego-structures which guarantee our secondary-process functioning.

From another point of view, you will get a new light on this when you read carefully once more the New Introductory Lectures, where the issue of the corrupt superego and the collusion of the superego with the id is discussed. In defenses which are really fundamental and archaic and hard to tackle therapeutically, the situation you are confronted with is always a vise: these defenses, which are supposed to be superego-dictated (the superego unholding standards, ideals)--these defenses and their strengthening and overtime work always depend on the intensity of the id's drives. When, on the other hand, you have a high-level control, that depends on ego-interests--for instance, will you fool around with this girl or will you not--it is in your hands to do it or not to do it, it is deliberate. You can take it or leave it. When you cannot help but not fool around--because you are shy, because you are scared, because you have obsessions about it, because you feel hated--these feelings get the stronger the more intense the instinctual impulse is. Far from being controlled by the superego, they are controlled by the intensity of the id-striving. The stronger the striving, the greater the defense against it. The stronger the anxiety signal. There is the meaning of the collusion between the superego and the id. The superego does not independently control this defense; it really does the bidding of the id. The reverse of this happens when it really gets totally corrupted. The ego is caught doubly. Both the superego and the id force it into extremely intense defensive activities through which the repressed returns. If you follow clearly, then you get a new meaning to the return of the repressed, to the defensive activities turning into substitutive drive-discharge activities, and you get a new light on what the corruptness of the superego actually means.

You could also put it this way, if you don't mind my injecting my own terms: the defenses, if they are real, archaic defenses, are passive in relation to the id, and the superego also is passive in relation to it--to these impulses. When the defense is control-like or a high-level defense, it is the ego which elicits it. This is nothing new: if you read The Problem of Anxiety you will see that I am giving you nothing more than the interpretation of that--indeed in words that Freud uses there; the activity-passivity he talks about, particularly in connection with turning something which was originally passively experienced into active ego-manipulation.

E. White: I am just trying to understand what you meant by superego and ego. It sounded as if you were talking about archaic and later. Should those be equated somehow?

Rapaport: I will equate them, yes. I first tried to describe the situation clinically. True, it is not pure phenomenology, because I am

describing the clinical picture, and I have already used concepts. But it is not yet theory. I would like to indicate what theory would account for this.

Assume that from the very beginning, when structure is built, at first there is no differentiation between ego and id, or for that matter between superego and ego. There is an impulse, and it encounters a threshold. Assume for the moment that this threshold is always an obstacle in the way of drive-discharge. The object is not present; the threshold is heightened. The consequence of that is damming up of the impulse, a derived motivation deriving out of the countercaustic energy-distribution which heightened the threshold; you have return of the repressed as a secondary motivation, and you have the generalization of this countercaustic energy-distribution to other impulses. Those are the controls, because they don't prevent impulses from discharge; they modulate that discharge. Assume that such countercaustic energy-distributions are established on many fronts, with the same generalization. And assume that the integrate of these is a control system. To begin with, this control system is unitary. There is no distinction between superego and ego. Note that this energy-distribution itself represents the absence of the object. Structure-building is an identification already; it represents the absent object.

Now as development proceeds there come in higher level motivations. Over those again the same kind of thing happens--generalization, synthesis--and it goes on this way in an ever-growing hierarchy. In the course of this a differentiation take place. What is that differentiation? The oldest, archaic defense always gets reinforced when the impulse becomes strong. The ancient defenses are functions of the drive-intensity. The higher you rise, the more the controlling system as an integrate independently can reinforce a defense. The defense then is not dictated by the rising intensity of the impulse. If you assume that, then you will find a good reason for the differentiation of that control-system which is called the ego and that control-system which is called the superego. The archaic one, which is always controlled by the rising id-impulse, will be related to the superego. As development comes along, the ego-system, as against the superego-system, is closely connected with reality, and is modified by it, while the superego reaches its culmination around the passing of the Oedipus complex (not that it does not get modified afterwards; it does, but the major crystallization of it remains on that primitive Oedipal level). This is the kind of image you would get, and you would have to keep in mind that we understand that this structure-building is identification.

This is a lot of time spent on ego and superego, but let's try to see, what is the consequence of this for the theory of depression?

The consequence is multiple. First of all, this does away with any necessity of a conception of narcissism, because the original state is not a narcissistic state in the sense that there is a self-love. It is undifferentiated; the drive-impulses are not directed toward an existing ego or an existing outer world; there is no such differentiation. Whatever narcissistic perfection is being talked about is a late product, exists only after the establishment of the superego and the ego. The whole concept of narcissism becomes superfluous. What is there from the very beginning? Is there a control-system which is helpless in relation to the rising drive-tension, or is there already a control-system which is not helpless when the tension is rising? I mean "helpless" in the sense of The Problem of Anxiety, in which helplessness is that basic situation where the object is not present and the instinctual intensity is high. Freud described two different outcomes then, two different situations. When the object is absent, helplessness ensues. The object's absence and this helplessness is the traumatic situation. The anticipation of such a helplessness is the danger situation. It is not yet a traumatic situation; it is a danger situation--is the situation of anxiety. When the traumatic situation can be anticipated, then there is only a danger situation; when it cannot be anticipated, then there is a traumatic situation, when this control-system is overwhelmed by the instinctual impulse.

Bibring adds a third situation.* If the situation of helplessness is repeated, persistent, and continuous, an ego-state is established, a condition of that whole controlling organization, which is then characterized for keeps by helplessness. It is this ego-state which is revived later in certain conditions as an affective state--depression. The depression is not created de novo by oral introjection of the lost object, as in this theory. A primal ego-state is revived by regression, and is thus in a sense more adequately accounted for on genetic grounds than on dynamic ones. This formulation brings the theory of depression into line with the theory of anxiety.

In order to have such a theory, it is necessary to do away with narcissism as a genetically important conception; and it is necessary to introduce a genetic conception of the affective ego-state, depression, just as Freud introduced, in 1926, a genetic conception of the structural character of the anxiety-signal instead of the traumatic-toxic theory of anxiety. It is also necessary to make the assumption that the commonly accepted theory and the role in it of identification--that is, of introjection, of oral aggressiveness, of aggression turned against the ego or against the self or against the subject--

*[Bibring, Edward, "The Mechanism of Depression," in Affective Disorders, Phyllis Greenacre ed., International Universities Press, New York, 1953.]

are all only peripheral to the depression, are no more than complicating or precipitating conditions of it. They are not the basic condition. The basic condition is a genetically early-established such ego-state which is reactivated as a whole.

I still would like to bring up one more issue. If one reads Bibring carefully, one finds a peculiar passage. He says that in the classic theory, the accepted theory, the turning of aggression round upon the subject is the cause of the helplessness, of the depressive impoverishment of the ego. He says that clinical experience, however, seems to show that it is the helplessness which causes the turning round of the impulse on the subject. And if you take a look there, you will see what is meant by this. That is that the impulse itself is the active prompting of the id toward an object--to master it, let's suppose, in sadism. When the ego cannot execute that id-impulse, because it has not developed the means for executing such, what will happen? It will happen that perforce the only way to cope with that impulse will be to mass up counter-cathexes against it. If counter-cathexes are massed up against it, then (these counter-cathexes being ego-structures) the dammed-up impulse is going to press against that ego-structure; so the helplessness has become the cause of the damming up of this impulse, working against the defenses of the ego. Turning round upon the subject is one of the indications of the passivity of the ego. This obviously would also become the core of the explanation of masochism. This kind of conception makes it unnecessary to enter on all the complications that we have discussed.

Obviously, for the execution of this kind of conception, one would have to know clinically far more about what Freud meant when he spoke in The Problem of Anxiety about activity and passivity. One would have to know far more about activity and passivity in general. This kind of consideration in a way forces, and lies behind, my own interest in the whole problem of activity and passivity.

The turning round upon the subject has another significance also. Do not forget that the reverse of this turning around upon the subject was the conception lying at the bottom of the whole theory of the death instinct. The death instinct, according to Freud, is indwelling to begin with, and then is projected outward. That is the opposite procedure from turning around upon the subject. The death instinct was given rise to by the very same considerations and difficulties that we are discussing here. If the activity-passivity issue is going to be understood, then that whole magnificent tour de force, that way of dealing with aggression which Freud used in Beyond the Pleasure Principle in introducing the death instinct, is going to be understood in a new way. Then it will also become perfectly clear why it was done and perfectly clear that it is superfluous.

I know that I am leaving many points obscure. In such a short time the best I can do is to give you a glimpse of the indications that these complications are not necessary, that they come from the conception of narcissism, which is incompatible with the conception of the undifferentiated phase, and that in this theory itself the whole conception of what identifications are can become the foundation of a very different conception of development of structures, of the differentiation of superego and ego, and stuff like that.

Now I believe that this is about all we can possibly do. We have to drop the economic considerations. We did discuss the fourth question in a way--I should add to it only this, that once such an ego-state is established, early--the affective ego-state of depression--in the later course of development this ego-state can be modified, amplified, attenuated--in a way that's analogous to Erikson's conception of how the solutions of later developmental crises can make up for malsolutions of earlier developmental crises. Mourning, then, would not be so closely juxtaposed as Freud tries to juxtapose it to depression, but would be rather on the same continuum with it. (His using it as an analogon to understand depression would anyway indicate that.) It would then be an attenuated form of that ego-state existing from the first on. The whole continuity from sadness through mourning to profound melancholia would be nothing more than the various forms of attenuation of this original ego-state, and the various forms of regression in the service of the ego, in recovering or reviving various degrees of modification of this state.

By the way, the connection between this regression in the service of the ego and the conception of activity-passivity is also clear, because in regression in the service of the ego, the ego indeed can allow itself--if you don't mind my anthropomorphism*--to become passive without the danger that it won't be able to recover its controlling, active role.

It may seem to you that I am quickly whipping up a view which has not much basis. But if you keep in mind the connection to activity-passivity; the connection to our changed view of the origins of the superego-identifications, which is relatively independent of Melanie Klein's; if you keep in mind the parallel thus created between the signal theory of anxiety and this

*[I do. But much less than when the anthropomorphizing is done--as it usually is in psychoanalytic writings--with no evident recognition that that's what it is. If Freud had more consistently labeled his personifications of the psychic agencies (or structures) as only literary devices, his literary progeny might not so often appear to be chroniclers of homunculi.]

(Bibring's) theory of depression; if you keep in mind that in this way a new avenue for the understanding of aggression may be found--then you begin to see that this is nothing new. It is simply an attempt to use the uncontradictory features of the theory to make a consistent theory out of them.

Obviously I am not deluding myself that in these thirty minutes I have described a theory of depression, because that would require much more work. I can suggest now only the rudiments of it, the foundations on which the theory could be built up. The present theory is a very powerful theory, not only because it has been ingrained, but also because it works clinically so often. It shows us how to attack certain modifications and precipitating conditions, and thereby it becomes very helpful. Nor is it true that it cannot be seen in the depressions. It is present. But it does not form the essence of the depressions.

Are there any questions?

E. White: I have a question that isn't directly on this point. I'm puzzled a bit by this explanation of superego, since it still seems to me that your point is about what is archaic, and what is archaic may take different forms. Now I would think you could also take a view that this influences all subsequent development, including ego-development, and that you could still postulate something specific--some specific cast to the superego as an important part of the theory of depression.

Rapaport: That the superego would have to be very stern.

E. White: Yes. That the archaic part of it somehow has this cast.

Rapaport: There is no question about it. But take a look: fundamentally the superego, unless it is modified in the course of the development Erikson talks about, is always archaic, because it can only say yes or no. And its no means the piling up of all the dammed-up impulse. You see, severe superego means rigidity, inflexibility, lack of modification in keeping with reality experience. Now true, it is not necessary that there be this sharp cleavage. In the course of experience, while the core of the superego will always remain this kind of archaic thing, its superficialities, or its later ramifications, may blend into the ego very clearly. Let's talk about human experience for a moment, and not about theory, to make this clear. From the theory you know that religious feelings have to do with the superego, and you know very well that these religious feelings are connected with the famous proposition "credo quia absurdum est" --I believe it because it is impossible. There is no religious feeling which is independent of that. Now take a look at what happens in the course of your own life, whether you have come

to understand yourself in analysis or have simply mellowed with the years. The peculiar thing that happens is not that the whole world becomes reasonable for you, and therefore you become a rational human being. This is not what happens. What happens is that you accept the irrational, and you don't kick any more against the peculiar feelings of morality. Morality is not a rational thing, is it? The table is laden with candy; there is nobody around and I come in and take a piece; who is going to know it? The delinquent's conscience will say, "As long as I don't get caught at it, it's all right." How did he achieve such a conscience? We know very well--he pays for it in an unconscious sense of guilt. That's the only way to be fully pragmatic and rational. What we learn as we mature, or in analysis, is not that the whole world is rational and anything you can get by with is all right. What we learn is to accept that there is within us something utterly irrational. One comes to accept that there is something in us which requires such things, and one yields to it to a great extent, and generally one feels happy to yield to it.

In other words, the very archaic character of this superego will forever remain. The question is, is there a blending at higher levels, or is there such an isolation that one either becomes the slave of moral imperatives and the corresponding inhibitions or attempts to make it all into rational stuff, in which case what always happens is the piling up of unconscious guilt. Many people's analyses are known to have resulted in that kind of stuff.

- E. White: My point, I think, was not about that, which I certainly can follow, but was about whether you can really build a theory of depression simply with the concept of helplessness, without its being helplessness in relation to a specific archaic structure which has that peculiar cast.
- Rapaport: That will complicate it; that's a later product. At this point, when this state of helplessness is established, according to Bibring, there is no such differentiated thing as could be called a superego, not even an archaic one.
- Shapiro: Could I add one point to Dr. White's question? How much of what you describe in connection with depression could be extended to neurotic states in general?
- Rapaport: I would say that you certainly are right to raise this question; but then we have to ask whether we could consistently go on from this kind of theory to establish the differences, as I think Bibring succeeded in doing with anxiety and depression. Don't forget, depression is an affective state. After all, tell me, aren't all of us depressed at times? We are obsessional people

without exception; I mean, this is what the profession gathers. What other mixtures of other stuff you have in you I do not know, because I am glad to say I haven't looked into your innards. You have all kinds of mixtures--more impulse, less impulsive, more schizy, less schizy--we all have those; but depression all of us know. The obsessional is characterized by his inability to use the anxiety signal freely. That means that he has not established a good anticipation of the danger situation, and that reawakening of that affective state of helplessness is usually his major substitute for anxiety. I don't mean that many of us don't have anxieties; but the less fortunate ones of us have very little of it, and it is all the black depression that comes. So you know it, and it is an affective state. Whatever else it is. Sure all these other things play a role. They play a role in how easily the reactivation of this state can follow.

Just one last thing: I would say that the crystallization of such states of helplessness has a lot to do with the simultaneous establishment of the archaic superego. So there they are indivisible. If I am to yield to your point, where I would yield is that the establishment of this ego-state and the establishment of the superego are parallel processes; and the attenuation of this ego-state in the course of development goes with the modulation of the severity of the superego. I mean the modulation of the severity and rigidity of the whole defense system into control systems which are flexible. This is the kind of explanation I would give, if I were to give one. But I am not saying that we have a theory of depression. We have good beginnings from several points to overcome some of these difficulties. We wouldn't have gotten to it without these Freudian conceptions, by the way; let's not kid ourselves.

Well, we have done as much as we could. I hope the papers are clearer now.