

SEMINARS ON ELEMENTARY METAPSYCHOLOGY
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Volume II

Assignment 8

"Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,"
Standard Edition, Volume XII, pp. 218-226.

- 1) What is the reality principle and how is it systematically related to the pleasure principle? [p. 165] How are they practically related? [p. 168]
- 2) What is reality-testing? [p. 174] What are its means [p. 178] and how do they come about? [p. 175] What are its limits? [p. 182]
- 3) What are the definitions of ideation, of thinking, and of their relation? [p. 184]
- 4) What is the relation of ego-instincts and sexual instincts to the principles? [p. 187]
- 5) What early ego-psychological and psychosocial conceptions do we encounter here? [p. 166; also returned to on p. 174, 180, 189]

Assignment 9

"On Narcissism: An Introduction," Standard Edition,
Volume XIV, pp. 73-102.

- 1) What are the basic phenomena to which the term narcissism refers [p. 196] and what are the first two definitions of it? [p. 198]
- 2) What is the conception of the ego and ego-instincts (interest) here discussed? [p. 201; also returned to on p. 215, 216]
- 3) What is the relation between narcissism, health, pathology, and object-love? [p. 203; but also p. 214, 220, 222]
- 4) What is the difference between anaclitic and narcissistic object-choices? [p. 227, p. 240]
- 5) How are the ego [p. 234], ego ideal [p. 236; also p. 207, 243], self-respect [p. 207], sublimation [p. 247], idealization [p. 230], conscience [p. 246], self-observation [p. 244], and censorship [p. 240] defined? What are their origins and functions?
- 6) What are the relations between ego-development, love, and narcissism? [p. 247]

Assignment 10

"Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Standard Edition, Volume XIV, pp. 117-140.

- 1) What is the difference between external and internal stimulations? [p. 255] What is the first method by which they are distinguished by the organism? [p. 252, 265]
- 2) What is the definition of instincts? [p. 269] What is the regulative principle of their function? [p. 271] What are its objects [p. 273], aims [p. 277], sources [p. 278], pressure? [p. 281]
- 3) What instincts do we distinguish and what do we know about them? [p. 283]
- 4) What are the vicissitudes of instinct and how does Freud characterize them? [p.283]
- 5) What are "reversal" and "turning around" and how are they related to each other? In particular: what are the relationships between sadism and masochism, scopophilia-exhibitionism? [p. 287]

Assignment 11

"Repression," Standard Edition, Volume XIV, pp. 146-158.

- 1) What are the various definitions of repression and what is its relation to the pleasure principle regulation of instinctual drives? [p. 292]
- 2) What are the historical predecessors, prerequisites and steps in the development of repression? [p. 297] What is the "attraction" of the repressed? [p. 302]
- 3) What are the relations between censorship, resistance, consciousness, distance from drive, distortion, cathectic intensity? [p. 307]
- 4) What are the two mechanisms of repression? [p. 314] What are the two components of the drive-representations [p. 318] and what are their fates in repression? [p. 322]
- 5) What are the relationships of substitute formation and symptom in the various psychoneuroses? [p. 323]

- Rapaport: Who is prepared to take a whack at the systematic relationship of the reality principle to the pleasure principle?
- Lustman: It is to the secondary process what the pleasure-pain principle is to the primary process.
- Rapaport: Precisely. Now look back to the Seventh Chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams. Do you get any reaction? Do you notice anything?
- Lustman: He didn't have the reality principle then.
- Rapaport: The primary process had a principle which ruled it, which had a paramountcy in it; whereas the secondary process was discussed without any cohesion. Now the importance of seeing this systematic relationship is that up till this point it was the secondary process in the main, though not exclusively, which stood for what?
- Mahl: It stood for the reality principle.
- London: It referred to the distinction between thought and ideation.
- Lustman: It really was the ego in a sense.
- Rapaport: A year or two from now we will discuss that, but here is an opportunity already to begin to see that the secondary process was up to this point one of the two or three things that stood for all that the ego is to account for. Not to pooh-pooh your points, Dr. Mahl and Dr. London, but we are on this very general point, taking a look at the coordination of the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Now we have something that pulls it together, as it were, so you have to notice that slowly something like an ego-psychology begins to take shape. I am at pains to demonstrate this, and as we go along I will do more and more, though I have done this in the Seventh Chapter also, do you remember? So there you have it; you have a principle of cohesiveness then. Now is there anything else that you notice between these two systematically? You would have to look very closely to find it, but it is there. It says something about the reality principle systematically, and from there you can reconstruct what that means for the pleasure principle. You notice that what Dr. Lustman did was to reconstruct from the systematic place of the pleasure principle the systematic place of the reality principle. Now there is another assertion about the systematic position of the reality principle, not stated very clearly but still perceptible; the systematic position of the pleasure principle can be inferred.
- Lustman: Their relationship to each other, in that the pleasure principle still remains the basic one.
- Rapaport: These are the practical relations concerning what role the two principles play in the whole system. What would you say is the major assertion about the reality principle here? What does it do?

Mahl: I think it's the one about putting off an immediate gratification for one in the future.

Rapaport: That's a very important statement. I think you will agree with me in a minute or so that it is not the major statement. What was the major thing asserted here about the reality principle and reality-testing as a function? What are they for?

London: What I had in mind was the statement that the reality principle was a safeguarding of the pleasure principle.

Rapaport: That's the most important practical relationship, I would agree. It is not the systematic relationship. All right, so you will learn to see what I am inclined to call systematic, and you may be able to say to me that that's wrong. But for the time being, follow what I am saying. First you saw that the first one was a broad systematic statement: one is to the other as this is to that. This is a major systematic statement. Then try to think, what do these two things--the reality principle and its executive mode or method, reality testing--what do they do really?

Lustman: They are both regulators of discharge-processes of psychic energy.

Rapaport: Already highly specific. But it is a good statement, just as Dr. Mahl's is a good statement. What do they do? How does he start discussing them?

Lustman: It's really an introduction of adaptation.

Rapaport: This is the point.

"In the first place, the new demands made a succession of adaptations necessary in the psychical apparatus..." (pp. 219-220)

This is the cardinal point about it. It is poorly stated, obviously; it isn't stated like a general proposition. I wouldn't ask the question if it were stated explicitly. Would you now agree with me, Dr. Mahl, that this is a superordinate general proposition one has to derive? Nor is it mentioned only here. Did you notice the other place where it is mentioned? Also a very awkward way of putting it. The last paragraph. It is stated in such a way that you could say, "Well, I will accept it if you say so, but that's not what he means." That's what he means.

"In these few remarks on the psychical consequences of adaptation to the reality principle I have been obliged---" (p. 226)

He says that this is an adaptation to the reality principle.

Easily misunderstandable, ambiguous propositions, and yet what we have before us is adaptation. How about the pleasure principle and the primary process? Are they adaptations?

Lustman: No.

Rapaport: No. Where is the major discussion of the primary process here? The major discussion is in the footnote going from p. 219 to p. 220. Let me read it and try to explain.

"I will try to amplify the above schematic account with some further details. It will rightly be objected that an organization which was a slave to the pleasure principle and neglected the reality of the external world could not maintain itself alive for the shortest time, so that it could not have come into existence at all."

Does that sound as if he were discussing a problem of adaptation? Now note what he says now:

"The employment of a fiction like this is, however, justified when one considers that the infant--provided one includes with it the care it receives from its mother--does almost realize a psychical system of this kind." (p. 220)

What does this passage mean to you? If you say that the secondary process and its reality principle are adaptations, what is said here about the primary process?

Lustman: Without the ever-present source of such gratification and the mother, the child is then helpless.

Rapaport: But he says "provided one includes...the care it receives from its mother..." How would you characterize such a situation in which an apparatus or an organism abiding by a certain regulation, within a certain environment, can survive? It is a state of adaptedness. He says that such an apparatus is a figment; but still, such an apparatus does exist in approximation, provided there is maternal care. Now you could say that all this about adaptation is just my figment, but if you will go back as far as the so-called "Project for a Scientific Psychology," or to the "Three Essays," you will hear Freud stressing one major point: man has to be understood as a creature who has the slowest maturation of all creatures. All his psychological life has to be understood in those terms. In other words, his beginnings cannot be studied or understood alone, but only in relation to the maternal care. Now in the kind of propositions to which

I am alluding, and in the overtone to this one also, you find the beginning of all that you would call the psychosocial considerations, whether that's the Erikson kind of consideration or the Hartmann kind of consideration--

Lustman: This is then mutuality.

Rapaport: Erikson's mutuality comes somewhere from here. Hartmann puts it this way: this is the state of adaptedness of the infant to the average expectable environment, which is one in which maternal care, or caretaking people, are provided. Do you see now the systematic position? And this, as a matter of fact, is a broader systematic position than the other. In the primary process, you are talking about a state of adaptedness; in the secondary process you are talking about adaptations. The pleasure principle is the governing principle in the primary process; it is not unadaptive per se either.

Lustman: It is not adaptive in the sense that the constancy of the maternal care is questionable.

Rapaport: I don't understand.

Lustman: Well, if one includes the maternal care, then it's adaptedness; but if this maternal care is aberrant or not good or partially absent or absent, then the primary--

Rapaport: There is a very wide latitude to what the care has to be, as we know clinically. The ecology of the average expectable environment is a very important open problem. Let's not discuss it; that will crop up over and over again in ego-psychology. But you see then what I would consider the two broadly systematic relationships. All right; let's see then what are the practical relationships.

Lustman: That's the one both Dr. London and I mentioned before. P. 223.

Rapaport: Well, there is one there. Let's have it.

Lustman: "Actually the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle implies no deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of it. A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time."

Rapaport: Are you reminded of something we studied before? Can you recall the equivalent formulation in the Seventh Chapter?

Mahl: Where he says that all thought is but a roundabout way to wish-fulfillment.

Rapaport: Yes, but there is something more specific than that. P. 599:

"I therefore postulate that for the sake of efficiency the second system succeeds in retaining the major part of its cathexes of energy in a state of quiescence and in employing only a small part on displacement."

Then at the end of the paragraph,

"When once the second system has concluded its exploratory thought-activity, it releases the inhibition and damming-up of the excitations and allows them to discharge themselves in movement." (pp. 599-600).

Meaning, the pleasure principle is in the last analysis the full flowing off, and that is then permitted. Only there is inserted an intermediate period. Do you see the correspondence?

London: I felt about all of these papers that I've read this past week, but particularly beginning with this particular sentence about "...in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time" (p. 223) that a shift is being made.

Rapaport: What shift?

London: In The Interpretation of Dreams that we've been reading up-until now, he is presenting a psychological model, and a concept to explain the thought-process and the whole concept of discharge and delay of discharge, detour, and so on, that arrives at a concept of thought. Now he is saying something different, because this already is talking not about automatic processes such as thinking, but about behavior.

Rapaport: Are you talking about the generalization to behavior at large? Is that the problem? That generalization was present there when he steadily tried to show that these processes operate, introducing the behaviors which we call symptoms. Now clearly, and not only in the Seventh Chapter, you found his steady allusions to symptoms. Recall that? So there is nothing really new presented here except that while he was limiting himself to the thought-process and alluding steadily to those behaviors which are pathological, he does not need this here any more because he has analyzed--who knows what in particular, besides pathological phenomena? By this time we have what? The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. There he analyzed a great many

behaviors which we don't consider simply pathological. So he doesn't have to limit himself to the pathological. Am I meeting your point now, Dr. London?

London: You are, except that I am still left with the question.

Rapaport: What is the question? ...

London: I found the clinical data in the Seventh Chapter very smooth and I found no difficulty in seeing the parallels. And at this moment, with this statement,

"A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time."
(p. 223)

--already now he is talking about a purposeful activity--

Rapaport: You mean that you see more teleology in it than you had before? Is that your point?

London: Yes; I think so.

Rapaport: Well gentlemen; actually Dr. London makes two points: 1) reading the Seventh Chapter was prefaced by a lot of data, and one could therefore know what the hell he is talking about, if one stretched one's imagination anyway. Here we don't have the primary data immediately back of this; so it is difficult. 2) He makes the point that this sounds very teleological. Okay, what do you make of it?

Lustman: Well, in many ways the Metapsychological Papers are kind of a continuation of Chapter Seven, and in some ways they are expansions of the same data. He doesn't give up those data.

Rapaport: If one argues that way, one has to add that there is The Psychopathology of Everyday Life also, and there are all the papers on neuroses. Now it would be much nicer if you people had parallel with this a course on the elementary data of the 1890's, read what everybody who starts anything with psychoanalysis has to read, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and read "Three Essays," and read also the four major case histories, because three of those histories were prior to this time. It would be much better teaching. I think that this is the stuff on which people should start, because otherwise they lose sight of what they want to ask of that material. You see, Dr. London, about your first point I would go along with Dr. Lustman.

About your second point, I would take that up and discuss it more

broadly: teleology and psychoanalysis, and this whole issue. First of all, people understand the pleasure principle to mean that you want pleasure. Now that's teleology. But the psychoanalytic pleasure principle has nothing to do, in essence--it has much to do, but nothing in essence--with the gain of pleasure. It has to do with the definition of pleasure as reduction of tension, discharge of tension. If it is a question of discharging tension, then either the entropic principle is also teleological, or this ain't teleological either. I am talking only about the pleasure principle so far. Now comes the next step. Historically, barriers are set up here--in genetic history. How they are set up is not important for us now. Together with these barriers, means are established to seek for the object which will allow for the discharge. If these steps in building these up don't imply teleology, then delay certainly doesn't imply any teleology, and the delayed drive action does not imply teleology. In other words, I am trying to say that as long as you have a situation in which you assume for the moment that this part does not imply teleology--the historical development there of such searching and delaying methods--there is nothing teleological in saying that this stuff operating by the reality principle really safeguards the pleasure principle. The question whether this is teleology stands and falls on what is happening developmentally. Can you account causally for the development of this barrier, and for the means reaching out for the object? Is this clear? After all, your job is always to localize where the teleology is. If you can account for this without teleology, the whole process has no teleology in it.

London: I can see where my difficulty arises, because I'm thinking of clinical material all the time as I go over this, and I guess where I get troubled is that this is followed by a concept of psychic determinism, and we followed it from the beginning, in Chapter Seven, and seeing where one step leads to the other. Now, as we swing into behavior--

Rapaport: But for God's sake, man, the behavior study was prior to the Seventh Chapter. The pattern had been discovered; here is an impulse; if you block it off, you begin to get repercussions in the form of fantasies, in the form of symptoms. This comes from everything before 1900. That existed before. Really the teleological problem is localized to this. Clinically, the most elementary observations are in line with the pleasure principle, and in line with the fact that you have development of barriers.

This reference on p. 223 is good, but there is another and more elementary statement prior to this one. Actually, this statement becomes necessary because of a prior statement, which is well familiar to you. The question, you remember, was how the two principles are related practically. The prior statement is

on p. 219, and states the elementary relationship between the two.

Sacks: "It was only the non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment experienced, that led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination."

Rapaport: Now what is this the converse statement to? Do you remember it in the Seventh Chapter?

Mahl: Wish-fulfillment.

Rapaport: Correct. The definition of wish. P. 598.

"A current of this kind in the apparatus, starting from unpleasure and aiming at pleasure, we have termed a 'wish'..."

And then comes the hallucination. This is the converse statement, that this wishful hallucination is given up, because of the disappointment experienced. Do you notice something here in this statement which has great clinical importance? --All right, let's continue the statement.

Sacks: "Instead of it, the psychical apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world and to endeavour to make a real alteration in them." (p. 219)

Rapaport: So what is the predecessor of this conception of reality circumstances?

Mahl: Frustration?

Rapaport: He uses that term later; did you notice where?

Mahl: P. 222.

Rapaport: What about clinically? What does that tell you?

London: That there must be frustration.

Rapaport: For what?

Mahl: For growth, for development--

Rapaport: For secondary process development, for realistic development. You understand why that is clinically significant?

- Mahl: For one thing, you frustrate all sorts of needs in the therapeutic situation.
- Rapaport: That's one of the things. The other is--?
- Sacks: In a baby, since it's impossible to gratify all of the child's instinctual needs, there is inevitably frustration involved.
- Rapaport: Correct; but that is seen by us this way only today; for a very long while what was obvious here was never noticed, and people gathered from psychoanalysts, and psychoanalysis allowed people to gather, that you must not frustrate children. This is the whole Ribble malaise.
- Sacks: The Rights of Infants.
- Rapaport: Yes; the rights of infants, and the slavery of the parents. I don't mean to say that our job is to frustrate, but our job is to know that a family is a social unit. In it only bearable things are bearable; and a parent is a good parent only when he is not an exasperated parent. The beginning of the parents' exasperation is the limit of the gratification of the child, because if you go beyond that, you are frustrating in another way which is much more severe. This is now coming back. Fenichel was one of the few people who clearly realized that, and you would be well-advised to check in with Fenichel to see how he does it.*
- Sacks: Today we believe that frustration is inevitable because of the inability of the parent to satisfy the child's instinctual needs, and it seems artificial to feel that parents, at a later time in the child's life, will hinder ego-development by attempting to gratify all these needs, because by definition they are ungratifiable.
- Rapaport: Obviously. So let's continue with the next sentence.
- Sacks: "A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was presented in the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable." (p. 219)
- Rapaport: Who would like to try to state what practical relationship is implied here?
- Mahl: This becomes the means for gratification. Is that what you mean?

*[See, for example, "The Means of Education," in Volume I of The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.]

Rapaport: But why does it become the means? Because the earlier thing sooner or later proved unworkable. When that is beginning to happen is when, in Erikson's terms, emergence from the phase of mutuality begins. What I would like to stress here is that that's always a crisis when the phase ends. It is a crisis because what grew in that phase reaches beyond the limits of that phase; things arise which the child must himself do. As soon as muscular controls are established, there are things the parent can't do any more. He can only help the child to do it himself. For instance, the parent can't defecate for the child, and can't hold back. In that moment, frustrations become inevitable until the child is capable of doing things for himself, by himself, so meanwhile the crisis arises. When you read about frustration here on p. 219, you have to understand that it is a growth crisis that we are talking about, and you should notice that this is not couched in developmental terms here.

So we have as a relationship first of all a sequence, as far as the practical relationship is concerned. You notice how different this is from the systematic, Dr. London? The practical always refers to the actual processes, the systematic to the theoretical view at large. To be sure, the rest is theory too. So the second is that the relationship is one which is causal in the sense of frustration. --Are you satisfied that we have covered the first question?

Now the last sentence we read already deals with the second question. What is reality-testing? What are the passages you want first of all to quote for it? Or what statement that we have already made would you like to repeat now? What is reality-testing?

London: There's a statement on p. 221:

"The place of repression, which excluded from cathexis as productive of unpleasure some of the emerging ideas, was taken by an impartial passing of judgement, which had to decide whether a given idea was true or false--that is, whether it was in agreement with reality or not--the decision being determined by making a comparison with the memory-traces of reality."

Rapaport: Fine. This is an important statement concerning reality testing. It pertains to judgment. Judgment, as he defines it here, is an important part of reality-testing. But first, let's ask more generally, what is reality-testing?

Lustman: I think the explanation is "Negation" is better; on p. 184*:

"Thus the first and immediate aim of the process of testing reality is not to discover an object in real perception corresponding to what is imagined, but to re-discover such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there."

Then at the end of that paragraph:

"But it is evident that an essential precondition for the institution of the function for testing reality is that objects shall have been lost which have formerly afforded real satisfaction."

This ties in with what we were just talking about, in relation to frustration.

Rapaport: Fine. Now keep that together with this. Still, the most general proposition.

Mahl: I think it's in the sentence that we just read, where it said (p. 219) "the psychical apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world..." That's one important element of this.

Rapaport: This is the reality principle, really. We have seen already the proposition that reality-testing is the modus operandi of the reality principle. When he starts to talk about the reality principle he begins to enumerate what all belongs to it and what all it does. Reality testing is the modus operandi of the reality principle. Then comes the next proposition, which Dr. Sacks read in another connection. (P. 219)

"A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was presented in the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable."

The first job of reality-testing is to test something as real and recognize something as real, even if it is unpleasant. From there you go to Dr. London's point, that it

"...had to decide whether a given idea was true or false--that is, whether it was in agreement with reality or not--the decision being determined by making a comparison with the memory-traces of reality." (p. 221)

And then comes the more general proposition that Dr. Lustman quoted, from "Negation," that once you have to make the decision whether something is in agreement with reality or not, the first proposition has to be, is that thing that was experienced still to be found in reality? We will see more about the details of this. But when you are asked about reality-testing, these steps here are indeed the way to begin. Did you find a place in this paper which explains further:

"...what was presented in the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable."
(p. 219)

Mahl: Yes; in the section on art there's a reference to this.

Rapaport: Yes, there is one there, and there is one before. Let's have the one on art.

Mahl: "But he can only achieve this because other men feel the same dissatisfaction as he does with the renunciation demanded by reality, and because that dissatisfaction... (p. 224)

Rapaport: Let's come back to that in connection with the fifth question. It's a good point. Where is the crucial proposition which explains really what this passage means?

"...no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable." (p. 219)

What do you call that function which recognizes as real only that which is pleasant?

Mahl: In the unconscious only that which is pleasant is regarded as real.

Rapaport: Yes, correct, but here he gives it a special name. P. 223:

"Just as the pleasure-ego can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid unpleasure, so the reality-ego need do nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself against damage."

If you don't see that connection, then you don't have the explanation in this paper of what pleasure-ego and reality-ego are. This is the only way you are going to understand that pleasure-ego which tries to reject everything--tries to project outward everything if it isn't pleasurable, and tries

to incorporate everything that is pleasurable, even if it really did not belong. There is much clinical argument centered around this--the breast as belonging, the belly as not belonging, the good objects, the bad objects, all this kind of stuff has a lot to do with this. This is one of the points from where such irresponsible excursions as Melanie Klein's can become possible. Needn't, but can. By the way, without seeing this clearly, you won't quite get a clarity on the issue of narcissism either. Do you see how this really amplifies this;

"...what was presented in the mind was no longer what was agreeable..." (p. 219)

What conceived of the pleasant? How do we call that conceiving of the pleasant?

Lustman: Wish-fulfillment.

Rapaport: You remember in the Seventh Chapter:

"A current of this kind in the apparatus, starting from unpleasure and aiming at pleasure, we have termed a 'wish'; and we have asserted that only a wish is able to set the apparatus in motion..." (p. 598)

And there is the other definition of wish-fulfillment there; let me find it because it is worth reminding you of it. P. 565-66:

"As a result of the link that has thus been established, next time this need arises a psychical impulse will at once emerge which will seek to re-cathect the mnemic image of the perception..."

You notice, this is conceiving of the pleasant, and to re-evoke the former percept itself.

"...that is to say, to re-establish the situation of the original satisfaction. An impulse of this kind is what we call a wish..."

This is the reason I ride so hard those definitions, so that we can link it back. To conceive of the pleasant is wish-fulfillment, and a primitive apparatus which operates that way is called the pleasure-ego--here, anyway. Now the next is to conceive not only of that but of that which is real, even if it should be unpleasant. Where was that discussed?

Mahl: That's where he said the psychic process had to have available all the memories. Page 600:

"It is unable to do anything but wish. If things remained at that point, the thought-activity of the second system would be obstructed, since it requires free access to all the memories laid down by experience."

Rapaport: Then he makes one more point which I wanted to see. Next page:

"...or it might find a method of cathecting unpleasurable memories which would enable it to avoid releasing the unpleasure." (p. 601)

So it can conceive even of that which is unpleasant, but only if it can limit the discharge of it.

London: "The inhibition of unpleasure need not, however, be a complete one: a beginning of it must be allowed, since that is what informs the second system of the nature of the memory concerned and of its possible unsuitability for the purpose which the thought-process has in view." (p. 601)

Rapaport: What is real even when it is unpleasant. So are we reasonably clear what reality-testing is about? And what the distinction between the pleasure-ego and the reality-ego is? How about the means of reality-testing? What is the first means reality-testing uses?

Lustman: (P. 220 "Two Principles":)

"...the sense-organs that are directed towards that external world, and...the consciousness attached to them."

Rapaport: So this is the first one, the system perception-conscious. The second?

Lustman: "...comprehend sensory qualities in addition to the qualities of pleasure and unpleasure which hitherto had alone been of interest to it." (p. 220)

Rapaport: You recall that we have discussed this in great detail; partly that last argument we had, but even before that, the arguments around verbal trace versus all the perceptions. The original two qualities were only pleasure and pain, which were the expression of quantitative transactions within the apparatus. Now new qualities come in, which allow a more refined regulation of the processes. So you have two things here: first of all

perception-consciousness becomes more important, specifically it introduces new qualities. The third is what?

Mahl: Attention.

Rapaport: Yes. And how is attention defined? As a function which...?

Mahl: Scans.

Rapaport: Yes. That's the present-day modish expression. He says that it "meets the sense-impressions half way, instead of awaiting their appearance." (p. 220) Now let's see the fourth one.

Lustman: The system of notation.

Rapaport: How is that defined?

Lustman: (P. 220-221).

"...whose task was to lay down the results of this periodical activity of consciousness --a part of what we call memory."

Rapaport: How did you understand that?

Mahl: I understood this in terms of his analogy to the marks left in the wax slab of the bottom layer of the mystic writing-pad. I think you have to think of this part of memory as a recording of some sort, a record.

Rapaport: So what is the distinction between notation and memory--a distinction which makes one part of the other?

Mahl: Notation is a means of memory, a device that produces memory.

Rapaport: And the rest is what retains it? Is that what you mean? All of memory would include notation and retention, while notation alone is just a recording. Is that how you understood it, Dr. Mahl?

Mahl: He says that notation is only part of it, so presumably memory contains more, but he doesn't say what more--

London: To note something you have to call upon other memories, don't you?

Lustman: Notation is laying down of memory-traces.

Mahl: Maybe there is something else in memory that is never noted by the perceptual-conscious system.

Rapaport: Sure, we have some evidence that there are such things. But let me tell you how I would put what is puzzling here--how I would draw the conclusion concerning why notation is only part of memory.

In these passages is introduced a system of notation. Memory was not then introduced; memory existed before. Notation must be something pertaining to the secondary process, to reality-testing. And then I would make the next step precisely as Dr. London made it, and say that in order to note something in a secondary process way, the relationship created must be different. Namely, it has to pertain to reality and not to the pleasure-system. We conceive of two kinds of systems of memory. In Organization and Pathology of Thought I called these two the drive-organization and the conceptual organization of memories. This is where that comes from.

Now it is possible, however, to argue the other way: that all this means is that this is registration; that really the process of registration itself is something that is introduced; that as long as you have the pleasure-pain qualities only, and no new emphasis put on the sense-organs and their qualities, memories are not registered in this way, and we don't know how they are registered. The two things would come out to the same point, in the long run.

I am trying to say that notation is a system which is meaningful, that it requires connections already, if you make notes or anything, and that we see here that proposition about relationship which I have discussed many times before. Soon we will come to the point in "Repression" where we will realize that repression amounts also to severance of relationships, and that primary process does not operate with the kind of relationship which is meant here, which has to be at the disposal of judgment. What I want to call to your attention is that while it seemed that the original adaptedness had none of this, and all these were introduced, you begin to see that there are ancestors of these things already in the early adaptedness. Notation has the ancestor memory; sense-organs have been there before, but now a new emphasis is put on them. things that were perceived are now met half way. The ancestors of these things are there. These are the arguments that underlie the whole business of the apparatuses of primary autonomy. This is already a product of differentiation. There is a primary undifferentiated phase in which these are present, but only when the differentiation takes place do they come into the service of the reality principle, do they get integrated into the ego, because the ego itself is differentiating as it integrates these. You understand, nothing can differentiate before it can be integrated, nothing can be integrated before it can be differentiated from other things. This is an elementary proposition to all developmental psychological thinking, and I am trying to take pains again to show you the roots of later thinking.

All right, so you have there then the fifth point which Dr. London already made, namely, the passing of judgment. And now comes the sixth point. What is it?

Mahl: That's action. (p. 221):

"A new function was now allotted to motor discharge, which, under the dominance of the pleasure principle, had served as a means of unburdening the mental apparatus of accretions of stimuli and which had carried out this task by sending inner-
vations into the interior of the body (leading to expressive movements and the play of features and to manifestations of affect)."

Rapaport: What would you call such a discharge into the interior of the body? Do you know the technical term? In biology?

Mahl: This is an autoplasic business.

Rapaport: Correct. This is the autoplasic adaptation. You see that already here we have adaptation. It is very important to realize that all affects are autoplasic adaptations; that they later become means for communication and thus turn into alloplastic things. That's another story, but I want to warn you people, particularly those of you who have anything to do with ethology, that the recent turns in ethology bring good evolutionary evidence of how such autoplasic adaptations actually, demonstrably, turn into alloplastic methods of communication. This is particularly clear in Tinbergen's 1951 paper in the journal Behavior, a zoology journal, ethology journal, titled "Derived Activities."

Mahl: Freud referred to this in the footnote what you referred to. (p. 220)

"It probably hallucinates the fulfillment of its internal needs; it betrays its unpleasure, when there is an increase of stimulus and an absence of satisfaction, by the motor discharge of screaming and beating about with its arms and legs. Later...it learns to employ these manifestations of discharge intentionally as methods of expressing its feelings."

Rapaport: These are the kind of things which Erikson will refer to as mutuality signals. They obviously presuppose some kind of receiver on the other end, who has a mutuality receiving apparatus. Correct. That's it. I want to call your attention to the fact that this "intentionally" in what you just read links up with "its activity meets the sense-impressions half way." (p. 220) Originally this is conceived of as relatively passive reception, and it is turned into an intentional, active, meeting half way. You notice here the beginnings of activity-passivity issues, which we will encounter again and again

throughout our studies, particularly in ego-psychology. The whole Problem of Anxiety centers around this activity-passivity issue. But you will see it already here in the Papers on Metapsychology also.

What is this new function now?

Mahl: "[Action] employed in the appropriate alteration of reality..." (p. 221)

Rapaport: And we call that alteration of reality what?

Mahl: Alloplastic.

Rapaport: So here you have discharge turned into action. Now at times you use for discharge the term "drive action", and use for action the term "purposive action," or "secondary-process.action." But it is actually discharge vs. action.

Ideation would be the seventh point, but we come to that under our third question. What I want to discuss is, what are the limits of reality-testing? Did you discover the passages concerning that?

London: Fantasy.

Mahl: Repressed fantasy.

Rapaport: Fine. But first let's have something still here.

Lustman: Well, if I can once again go to the "Negation" paper, he says,

"The reproduction of a perception as an image is not always a faithful one; it can be modified by omissions or by the fusion of a number of elements. The process for testing the thing's reality must then investigate the extend of these distortions." (C. P., Vol. V, p. 184)

Rapaport: Yes, to be sure, that is one of the limitations of reality-testing; when there is an intrusion of primary process. But we want to see more general limitations. In the footnote that we discussed, just after the sentence on intentionality:

"Since the later care of children is modelled on the care of infants, the dominance of the pleasure principle can really come to an end only when a child has achieved complete psychical detachment from its parents." (p. 220)

You realize? That means never. It always decreases, at best.

True, when one becomes a father oneself, that helps, and many other things help. You see people in their late twenties and thirties who still believe that there is somebody somewhere who knows everything about therapy and that they will get it from the horse's mouth. They still believe that there is some knowledge somewhere which one doesn't derive directly out of his own experience and struggle with hard reality, but that there is somewhere somebody who will tell him. Also, particularly those who haven't been in analysis still believe that the analyst is going to solve all their problems. This is the point here: as long as one did not grow to an inner detachment from the parents the hope springs eternal, that somewhere somebody will give you the knowledge-food or the happiness-food or simply the food, or will make good every foolishness you do. This is the human comedy and tragedy and that's what's nice about human beings. If we achieved this complete detachment from the parents, life would be really without any hope, just as it was for that hired man in Frost. There would be nothing to look forward to with hope. And, as a matter of fact, nothing to look backward on with pride either. This is a goal to be striven for and never to be achieved, because there is no such thing. Otherwise religion would have never sprung in the world. But this is an aside, I wanted just to make it clear that this is what is meant. This is the parallel statement to what we find stated in an entirely different way in the 7th Chapter. P. 603:

"As we well know, however, that aim is seldom attained completely, even in normal mental life, and our thinking always remains exposed to falsification by interference from the un-pleasure principle."

The later statement in 1911 is only the psychosocial representation of the same issue here. You people mentioned the other crucial place. Where is it?

Mahl: It really starts when he refers to fantasy-making as being kept free; but on p. 223:

"In the realm of phantasy, repression remains all-powerful..."

Rapaport: It means also that the primary process remains all-powerful, because it works both ways, you see. You have repression all-powerful only where the primary process is all-powerful, and vice versa. Please go on.

Mahl: "...it brings about the inhibition of ideas in statu nascendi before they can be noticed by consciousness, if their cathexis is likely to occasion a release of unpleasure. This is

the weak spot in our psychical organization; and it can be employed to bring back under the dominance of the pleasure principle thought-processes which had already become rational." (p. 223)

Rapaport: This is then the weak spot. Do you know the technical clinical term for this? "The return of the repressed." See, Dr. London, I am making these points about the clinical terms because that should serve for you as the bridge to link up to the evidence on behavior. I think that I myself would be satisfied with this point, though we could bring other such points, to be sure. For instance, you could bring the point here on p. 225:

"The strangest characteristic of unconscious (repressed) processes, to which no investigator can become accustomed without the exercise of great self-discipline, is due to their entire disregard of reality-testing; they equate reality of thought with external actuality, and wishes with their fulfillment--with the event --just as happens automatically under the dominance of the ancient pleasure principle. Hence also the difficulty of distinguishing unconscious phantasies from memories which have become unconscious."

Let's go to our third question. What are the definitions of ideation, of thinking, and of their relation?

Lustman: P. 221:

"Restraint upon motor discharge (upon action), which then became necessary, was provided by means of the process of thinking, which was developed from the presentation of ideas." *

Rapaport: So what do we know so far?

Lustman: Ideation preceded thinking.

Rapaport: Ideation precedes thinking, thinking develops, accordingly, from ideation. And it is what?

Lustman: It subserves delay.

*[In the old translation, C. P. Vol. IV, p. 16, this says "developed from ideation."]

Rapaport: It delays, restrains, motor discharge. This is the kind of point which you will want to take recourse to much later on, when you will want to figure out what the relation is between various types of structure formations and corresponding representation-formations. It is not certain but that every time a defensive or controlling structure is established, that is at the same time the establishment of new thought-forms also. That problem comes up in various connections later in meta-psychology, as you will notice. Now what else do we learn about ideation? Any other proposition about it?

Lustman: "It is probable that thinking was originally unconscious, in so far as it went beyond mere ideational presentations and was directed to the relations between impressions of objects..." (p. 221)

Rapaport: As soon as you have a transition from ideation to thinking, you turn to relations between object-impressions. It is not just object-impressions but relations. This is a point which I have been promising you ahead of time already when we discussed the Seventh Chapter. Did you notice this? Now let's see; what about thinking itself? What are the characteristics of it?

Lustman: "Thinking was endowed with characteristics which made it possible for the mental apparatus to tolerate an increased tension of stimulus while the process of discharge was postponed. It is essentially an experimental kind of acting, accompanied by displacement of relatively small quantities of cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them. For this purpose the conversion of freely displaceable cathexes into 'bound' cathexes was necessary, and this was brought about by means of raising the level of the whole cathectic process." (p. 221)

Rapaport: Okay. But what does it mean? Were you struck by something, were you bothered by something, do you understand it? What I think you should have been struck and bothered by in this passage is this thing:

"Thinking was endowed with characteristics which made it possible for the mental apparatus to tolerate an increased tension of stimulus while the process of discharge was postponed." (p. 221)

Now what are those characteristics? He didn't say. A very puzzling, confusing sentence, actually. Because it says that it is thinking which makes delay possible; there are certain character-

istics of thinking which allow for tension-maintenance.

Mahl: I was bothered by that when I first read this. I thought he didn't say. But then I thought perhaps he was talking about those qualities when he talks about the use of the

"...displacement of relatively small quantities of cathexis together with less expenditure...of them." (p. 221)

Rapaport: How does that allow for "tolerance of increased tension"?

Lustman: "...'bound' cathexes...by means of raising the level of the whole cathectic process." (p. 221)

Mahl: This passage in Chapter Seven (Pp. 599-600).

Rapaport: Yes; but you see that here this is attributed to thinking. Do you see the point?

Mahl: Whereas in Chapter Seven it was attributed to the secondary process and the system.

Rapaport: The whole system at large, and it spoke in terms of structure-formation there. This on p. 221 would suggest that the thoughts themselves are those structures. In that case, when you speak about defense which certainly does such things, then you are talking about thinking. That would be a foregone conclusion, according to this. This is, to my mind, a very far-reaching inference, and I think he was talking shorthand here and rather careless shorthand. It would be more consistent to say that thinking comes about in this period of delay, and the same thing that produces the delay is productive of thinking also.

You know that Allport's main argument against either the learning theorists or psychoanalysis, or any genetic psychology for that matter, is that they all explain human behavior in terms of getting rid of tension while one of the main characteristics of human behavior is the remarkable ability to hold tension--in fact to generate tension. Now this is a much broader conception than the earlier conception. The earlier conception of binding and inhibition pertained only to drives; now it is not specified any more that just drives are going to be inhibited. In so far as reality requires it, tension will be maintained. That is in subjective terminology--the unpleasant will be met provided it is real. The processes are far more complex in the following pages: Freud reviews some of the means by which this is done, or some of the processes which subserve and are made possible by this maintenance of tension. So the reality principle is not defined simply as the opposite of the pleasure principle. It allows for an accretion of many new conceptions specifying the processes which occur in order that tension-discharge not be

the only regulator of psychological processes. I am not at all sure that it is an ideal cohesive principle, but it is the first cohesive principle, the very first one, preceding the statement that the ego is a system, preceding any statement concerning the cohesiveness of the processes which are not dominated by the pleasure principle. Today we have another conception for that: ego. Identity, self, synthetic function of the ego, differentiating function of the ego--all these are coordinated, now, under the concept ego. At this point, however, the only cohesive principle is the reality principle. The primary processes had one of old--it was the pleasure principle. You see the distinction I am trying to make between the systematic role of the reality principle and its actual conceptual content. Its conceptual content is rather weakly stated here because it is as though it would be nothing else but the opposite of the pleasure principle. It is a far more differentiated thing. But it is a systematic cohesive principle for all the processes not dominated by the pleasure principle.

Allport chooses to disregard the implications of the concept of reality-principle, but so did 90% of the analysts who touched on the topic. He is in bad enough company--I mean good enough company. In the company of Abraham, of Jones, and quite a few others. He ain't alone. Once when I called his attention to this and sent him a paper, he wrote back and said, "Very interesting paper; you do injustice to yourself to attribute all this to psychoanalysis." What can you do?--hold your peace.

Can we go to the ego-instincts and their relation to the principles? Who wants to state the passage?

London:

"These two factors--auto-erotism and the latency period--have as their result that the sexual instinct is held up in its psychical development and remains far longer under the dominance of the pleasure principle, from which in many people it is never able to withdraw." (p. 222)

Lustman:

The sexual instincts, finding their own satisfaction in the child's own body, do not come into frustration and therefore--

Rapaport:

Do not come up against the reality. Tell me, are you aware of what this business of beginning to find an object is about? Did you notice it in "Narcissism"? Here he says:

"when, later on, the process of finding an object begins..." (p. 222)

What does it mean, "the process of finding an object begins"? Doesn't the libidinal instinct have an object outside to begin with?

Lustman: This implies development in that the first object is the infant itself.

Rapaport: Right; that's what it means. The first libidinal object then is the body. First it is autoerotic. Does this mean that libidinal drives do not have objects to begin with? Is that correct? From your reading in "Narcissism."

Mahl: There are two kinds of object; the mother and the body.

Rapaport: The mother is object of what?

Mahl: Of both the ego-instincts and the libidinal instincts. They lean against--

Rapaport: The libidinal relation at that point is an anaclitic relation. The object is an anaclitic object. It is not the object really. The sexual drive is a flexible one in regard to object. First it is autoerotic; insofar as it is alloerotic it leans up against the object-choice of the ego-instincts. It is rather important to see here because this very flexibility implies what you have heard so far and will hear more about the possibilities for displacement.

There is an additional passage that one should add, and this is the last paragraph on p. 222:

"In consequence of these conditions, a closer connection arises, on the one hand, between the sexual instinct and phantasy and, on the other hand, between the ego-instincts and the activities of consciousness."

Did you take any pains to discover what the ego-instincts are?

Lustman: They're very hard to find, but I think quite generally they are self-preservative. He talks about it in terms of its biological roots, in "Narcissism."

Mahl: In "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" he made the same point.

Rapaport: Yes, but that's farther ahead of us. The origins of all this you will find mainly in the "Three Essays" and should be taught in the instinct course, obviously, and we are not dealing with it in detail here. You notice that this relationship--this "closer connection"--is considered secondary. Do you see why? What is the primary connection?

Mahl: According to which principle of mental life they operate on.

Rapaport: That's right. And the important point here is in this "secondary," because this is where Kris latched on, whether he referred to it

or not; Hartmann latched onto it too--to the fact that fantasy can be used by thought. As a matter of fact, much of fantasy is used by us for productive thinking. We plan with fantasy also. So this connection is secondary. The primary connection is between the primary-process characteristics of the sexual instinct and those of fantasy.

Still one more word about ego-instincts. Here you see the second component of ego, ego-instincts. Do you know what they are supposed to explain? Did you go to "Narcissism" to try to understand what they are supposed to explain? What is the connection, sexual instinct and fantasy? How would you express that relationship systematically? So far we have discussed it historically, genetically. Systematically, if you hadn't read this what would you have said? What is the relation between the sexual instinct and the fantasy?

Mahl: Means of gratification. Substitute gratification.

Rapaport: Substitute gratification is what the fantasy is in relation to the drive. How about the drive in relation to the fantasy? What is it?

Mahl: The cause.

Rapaport: It is the cause. In other terms, psychological terms, it is the--

Mahl: Motive.

Rapaport: The motive power behind it. If you see that, then the parallel statement says that the ego-instinct is supposed to be the motive power behind the activities of consciousness. Do you see what you have to discover? Now not only consciousness, because consciousness is linked up with reality-testing in general. What was the predecessor of reality-testing? Reality-testing and thought are supposed to delay. What was the predecessor of this delaying, criticizing, selecting function in the Seventh Chapter?

Mahl: Censorship.

Rapaport: Censorship. What are the forces behind all the reality-testing, secondary process, censorship, all those things which draw a line between the primary process and the secondary? Ego-instincts are supposed to account for all these things. This is what you should have discovered here. In this period the ego-instincts are introduced to shift for all, be a jack of all trades, to account for all this.

Let's go to the last thing. What ego-psychological and what early psychosocial conceptions do we encounter here? One of them I am sure you already know.

Lustman: States of adaptedness and adaptation are the precursors of the psychosocial....

Rapaport: Well, that is not psychosocial really. That is adaptation theory. For a psychosocial point we have to have a definite social statement. Did you encounter so far a definite social statement?

Lustman: What about when he talks about education?

Rapaport: That is a somewhat later psychosocial statement. But first, one which we already had. Don't you recall? That footnote-- "...provided one includes...the care it receives from its mother..."

Lustman: I thought that was what we meant by adaptedness.

Rapaport: O.K. I am sorry. Now what other psychosocial statement do you find? You said education. What about it?

Lustman: Education is "an incitement to the conquest of the pleasure principle, and to its replacement by the reality principle; it seeks, that is, to lend its help to the developmental process... To this end it makes use of an offer of love as a reward from the education²⁶³; and it therefore fails if a spoilt child thinks that it possesses that love in any case and cannot lose it whatever happens." (p. 224)

Rapaport: What will you link this up with in what we have already discussed?

Mahl: The child has to learn that he is not always going to get love, that there must be frustration.

Rapaport: Yes. P. 222 on the one hand, and the other statement, where we had that--

Mahl: P. 219. Disappointment.

Rapaport: Yes. That's what we ought to link it up with. And you ought to realize that this most general statement on education is essentially as unsociological, as unpsychosocial as can be. It is purely in terms of object-relations, as you notice. The whole epigenetic problem of how society meets a phase--any specific phase--is not here.

Mahl: I don't understand.

Rapaport: How society meets the various phases of development is not here. This is an all-over, umbrella statement, which applies at any stage of development. No specificity to it. Are you following me?

Sacks: No, I don't think so.

Rapaport: At any developmental level reward and frustration are essential ingredients. That love and reward are different at the first oral phase, or the second oral phase, or at the genital phase---that is not taken account of. In other words, this is not a developmental proposition.

Education later will mean many things, when you get either to Hartmann or to Erikson. When you read what they have been writing you will see that it differs from this, that it begins to ask the questions just what is reward, what is punishment, what is frustration, what can be done with this, what can't. This Freudian statement is exactly replicated by Kardiner in his purely automatic social disciplines. Kardiner knows that you apply at each phase a discipline. He spells it out that in each phase there is a discipline, but doesn't know anything about what this discipline does and what kind of means it uses. So Kardiner stands on this quite comfortably, but never discovers what hit him, why he doesn't get---for all his pains---any understanding of how individual problems become social institutions and social institutions become individual problems. For that you have to go not to Kardiner, not to Sullivan, not to Horney, but to Hartmann and Erikson. These generalities don't solve the problem of education. That problem begins to be solved when concepts are advanced which give shape to the meaning of disciplinary intervention at every phase. You need new concepts for that meaning. In order to form new concepts you have to study these phases.

It's important to think about it because education as discipline becomes one of the basic things---that's true, by the way, with Dollard too, you realize. They cooked it all up in the thirties together, you know. Sapir spreading his wings over them and Margaret Mead boiling the pot under them, and all the whole holy family was together there. David Levy did his little part on it and all that. All people made their own contributions in various ways. But they really stuck on this because there was no precedent.

The other psychosocial propositions?

Lustman: The other psychosocial concepts are religion, science, and art.

Rapaport: But they are not propositions. The crucial proposition is at the bottom of paragraph 6: (p. 224):

"But he can only achieve this because other men feel the same dissatisfaction as he does with the renunciation demanded by reality, and because that dissatisfaction, which results from the replacement of the pleasure principle

by the reality principle, is itself a part of reality."

This is the most far-reaching psychosocial conception, and you will find that, while Erikson doesn't refer to it, the very form of thought is the one that is elaborated by Erikson; namely, the very dissatisfaction is not only an internal reality but an external one also. And that gives it existence; in other words, there is an environmental niche for it. Erikson put it that way later. This is just as it is with scientific discoveries. Scientific discoveries don't come from observation. They come from man's hunch; a hunch is a thought-pattern a man has. If in the course of study he hits on a part of nature which contains a pattern like his thought-pattern, then a conquest of nature is made. Show that same set of data to somebody else and he ain't gonna do anything with it.

Sacks: Chance favors the prepared mind.

Rapaport: Correct. The prepared mind, however, is one that has thought-patterns and has access to them. These are crucial passages. Not crucial in the sense that the people who elaborated on them took these passages and quoted them. This, for instance, is a passage that I don't believe anybody ever quoted. The point is that these passages show you some of the anatomy of Freudian thinking.

Mahl: Isn't there a comparable statement about religion, where he says (p. 223)

"But the endopsychic impression made by this substitution has been so powerful that it is reflected in a special religious myth."

Rapaport: Well, that is like it and yet isn't like it. I would not like to dwell on this at length. You see, the issue that you raise ought to be taught in a psychosocial course on "Totem and Taboo." However, the burden of the sentence is also a psychosocial preposition--that here something endopsychic is turned into a social institution.

Mahl: That's what I meant. When I said "comparable," I meant that this has a systematic status. Your answer to Dr. Lustman when he first mentioned religion was that there was no systematic statement about this comparable to this one down here.

Rapaport: Comparable to this one. My emphasis was on "comparable to this one." This is the main burden of "Totem and Taboo;" you understand. "Totem and Taboo" is a misunderstood book. It tries to create means to establish how something psychologically individually necessary can become a social institution. It fouls it all up, but it raises for the first time that basic psychosocial question, the question to which Erikson really addressed himself, more than

anybody else. As to the reference here to art, if he had spoken not about art, but about esthetics--meaning the canonized art-appreciation of every time, then we would be on the same level as we are on this one. He comes back to these problems in many a point later on concerning art.

London: There's another sentence--

"...it is plausible to suppose that the form taken by the subsequent illness (the choice of neurosis) will depend on the particular phase of the development of the ego and of the libido in which the dispositional inhibition of development has occurred." (pp. 224-225)

I only brought it up because I was surprised to see ego-development and libido-development side by side in this early paper; and I don't know too much about Erikson's concepts of stage of arrest and fixation, but--

Rapaport: You take us to the first part of the fifth question. This is really the major ego-psychological conception that you were to discover here: that this man knows that there is a difference between ego-development and libido-development. If you look back at the "Three Essays," you will discover a few of the things that called his attention to that. True that there, ego-development is treated in the main in environmentalist terms, as an effect of environmental impacts. But if you watch his treatment of environmental impacts and their effects, then you will discover how he could see that ego-development and libido-development are two different things. This is an important passage, because this dies, this conception, with Abraham. Abraham kills it. In Abraham, in his anal characters, oral characters, phallic, urethral characters--ego-development becomes an epiphenomenon of libido-development. This is why this is important to notice.

Now another important proposition here is obviously the pleasure-ego vs. the reality ego, which we have already touched on. Before we leave the "Two Principles," let me summarize a point or two about where this paper fits into the development of psychoanalytic theory.

Alienation from reality is observed. The question is, how come? Now, when this issue is raised in 1911, it is somehow a big surprise. What was until now the great psychoanalytic discovery--alienation from reality? No--it was alienation from something that goes on inside--not knowing about what goes on inside. Alienation from reality is a new question. Therefore it deserves to be treated with great care in order not to put later what is historically earlier, and put earlier what is historically later. The first point then is that there is alienation from reality and this is a fact newly taken into consideration. Until now the prob-

lem was: How is it that we don't know about many things that motivate our behavior? And not: How do we not know or how do we distort, or how do neurotics distort reality? The alienation is found to be an alienation of things that are "unbearable". That gives the clue to what makes for their exclusion--they would arouse what he refers to as "pain" and invoke the pain-pleasure mechanism. Thus, this alienation must be achieved by the same mechanism as all pain-pleasure processes work with, namely repression. You see, repression comes in at the tail end of this argument. Here is a sequence from the observation of something excluded, to the discovery of the nature of the excluded, to the pain-pleasure mechanism and finally to repression which subserves the pain-pleasure principle. Why doesn't he say that reality is repressed, if it is repression that effects alienation? You say that part of what is unconscious is repressed; now will you say that reality is repressed? The answer is that it is not explained here. You have to realize that in 1911 this is new in the theory, and that much of the time when you read the literature you will find that the authors act as if it were still 1910, as though it were not clear that reality is affected by repression. If you want to know what we know about this from other sources, then one can simply say that no perception and no appraisal of reality is possible without relating it to past experience. If the relevant past experience is cut away by repression, then obviously that part of reality the relevant experiential mass of which is not available--is repressed--becomes meaningless whether you see it or not, whether you try to think of it or not. So, it may be denied, it may be simply turned away from or it may become useless for practical purposes.

Repression is not a one-way avenue. This is something new; you don't usually think of it, not even today do you think of it so simply and clearly as it is implied here. It behooves us to become aware that here the classic conception--which still stalks around at night, in the darkness of the literature--is changed. Repression is a two-way avenue. There are other evidences of this in the literature.* Freud is already calling our attention to it that it is not just an intrapsychic story that he is talking about.

Who is reminded of something in the Seventh Chapter? Remember what the attempt in the Seventh Chapter was--he says, "So far in this book we tried to describe how the dream works. Now we will attempt to fit this into our psychological theory, establish its place." So, first he did an empirical investigation of dreams, then in the Seventh Chapter he tried to establish its place in a theory systematically. Here instead of the empirical investiga-

*For instance in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense and in Rapaport's commentary on "A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad" in Organization and Pathology of Thought.

tion, he does a reconstructive-genetic-developmental investigation, and again the aim is to fit it into the theory. By that reconstructive investigation, he hopes to attain a systematic view of it, to establish the place of reality. Reality had no place so far in this theory--since 1900. Before 1900 it had a place; it was what lay behind everything; it was the danger that was to be fended off. Later the danger became the intrapsychic force, the instinctual force.

Now reality has to be re-introduced, not as the danger but as something else. You have been filled up with half-systematized stuff about reality, about identity, about society, about adaptation, all kinds of Hartmann and Erikson concepts; you must not forget that those are late historical products. How the concept of external reality fits into the psychoanalytic theory is a very great question; it is raised early. It wasn't raised first by Horney or Sullivan; it was raised here.

Another point I want to emphasize before we leave this paper is one that concerns the very essence of the economic point of view. "Pleasure" and "pain" here evidently refer to subjective experience. This is an unabashed presentation of the earliest theory, at this late date of 1911. The later theory does increasingly dispense with this direct connection of pleasure and pain with sensation; it is immediately transparent in the later theory that accumulation of tension is what is referred to as pain, and discharge of tension what is referred to here as pleasure. Pleasure and pain are concepts--and the pleasure-pain principle represents the tension-reducing tendency of the psychic apparatus. If you take this as a conceptual fiction it is perfectly all right, but if you take this to mean actual sensations of pleasure and pain, then you have the earliest phase of the theory, that before 1900, in quite an unabashed fashion here. This is not what we understand today by the pleasure-pain principle or the theory of the primary process. It is made particularly clear in the Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 1920 that this is a question of accumulation, of damming up of instinctual tension versus discharge of such tension. Already in the Seventh Chapter the same issue is fairly clear, because the primary process and the pleasure principle are equated with the concept of mobile energy.

195a.

"On Narcissism: An Introduction"

What are the basic phenomena to which narcissism refers? What is the first one he mentions?

Lustman: Autoeroticism.

Rapaport: So the first thing is autoeroticism, and when it gets extreme then it is a--

London: Perversion.

Rapaport: Correct. Now what are the next ones?

London: Narcissistic attitudes in homosexuals and neurotics as "...one of the limits to their susceptibility to influence." (p. 73).

Rapaport: One of the basic phenomena to which the concept of narcissism refers is the insusceptibility to therapeutic influence. Very good.

London: The schizophrenic process is characterized by megalomania and withdrawal of interest from the outside world.

Rapaport: Very good. But before those, we want not to forget that he mentions another thing.

London: He extends it to every living creature.

Rapaport: Very good; but first, one of the definitions includes one more point that you did not mention. A referent of narcissism.

Mahl: It's a component of the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation.

Rapaport: So egoism is also one of the basic referents. Do you have the basic referents together now? Autoeroticism; its generalization in perversions; the uninfluenceability, wherever it occurs; the megalomania; and the withdrawal. Withdrawal: obviously you could link that up with uninfluenceability. These are then the major referents he mentions to begin with. What is narcissism not? What is the major point he stresses about what isn't narcissism?

Lustman: Introversion?

Rapaport: Introversion. Do you know why narcissism is radically different from introversion? And how does Freud define introversion here in contrast to Jung?

Mahl: He defines it here as libido directed still onto objects, although they are objects in fantasy.

Lustman: (p. 74) "...substituted for real objects imaginary ones..."

Rapaport: Yes, that is Freud's definition here. What did Jung do, according to him?

London: Used the concept indiscriminately.

Rapaport: Used it indiscriminately for all the narcissistic things. If you can use it indiscriminately, then all energy can be treated indiscriminately, as one psychological energy, and so for Jung all psychological energy becomes libido. This is important.

Lustman: Did Jung's defection serve Freud to the extent that it crystallized things, in terms of refutation? A lot of this paper, for instance, seems to be rooted in expressing discontent with Jung.

Rapaport: There is no question about it, he was put on his mettle. You must understand--there is a book by Jung which Freud hailed in the highest terms, the book that was an epoch-making book that all psychiatrists ought to know, "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox." He has much there which presents the French equivalents of those things about attention which we have been discussing. That's the book to which Freud refers when he says that after all,

"...the researches of the Swiss school... elucidated only two features in the picture of dementia praecox..." (p. 81)

Common complexes and common fantasy-formations; which is really only one point. Jung said that the difference was based on unknown substances. The problem of schizophrenia remains unchanged, and the great Swiss discovery wasn't anything more than that people who aren't schizophrenic also have such complexes and fantasy-formations. Freud had said that again and again, much earlier. Look at the early papers on defense. But still he was delighted that here suddenly a psychiatric school of great repute, under the leadership of Bleuler, demonstrated the same thing. And in the same year in which he is writing this, he knows that Bleuler is coming out with a book on Schizophrenia in which Freud is not mentioned. It's a crisis of first importance. Schizophrenia is pre-empted by these people, and he had to make clear what the nature of schizophrenia is; that it is not just introversion, as in the neurotic. He doesn't mind if you call that investment in fantasy-objects introversion, but then the word is dropped just as soon as it is used, never to recur in Freudian writings. He has no more use for it. But here he wants to show a difference, keep apart the theory of neurosis and the theory of psychosis, and replace the Jungian speculation with theory. Otherwise I must say that I will not dwell on Jung any further because his stuff just has nothing to do with the kinds of things we are interested in.

You know, that's not true for any of the other dissidents, except possibly Stekel. The trouble with Stekel is that although it's all very interesting, the chances are that it is constructed more or less the way X's things are.*

Mahl: Out of his imagination?

Rapaport: It is impossible to have that many cases. It is impossible. People were around and the cases were not around. One of my friends was there then and was a confidant of Stekel's--and I knew Stekel personally too--it was known precisely that it was impossible.

Mahl: Jones tells about Stekel's Wednesday morning patient**. The Viennese Society met Wednesday night, and when some theoretical point would be brought up Stekel would say, "Oh, yes, I just saw a patient this morning who showed so and so," and then he'd proceed to talk for an hour or so about his patient and the theory. It became a standing joke among them about Stekel's Wednesday morning patient.

Rapaport: So you see where we are with that.

Now these are the basic phenomena. What about the definitions? What are his definitions of narcissism?

Lustman: The first definition is on pp. 73-74:

"Narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature."

Rapaport: How do you understand that? This obviously should be amended by the Næcke--and later corrected--Havelock Ellis thing. That has a story behind it also...

London: There's a definition in the Schreber case that I liked.

"What happens is this. There comes a time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual instincts (which have hitherto been engaged in auto-erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins by taking himself, his own body, as his love-

*[After a little rash thought about naming an additional author or two with the one named here by Dr. Rapaport, the editor decided not to be rash and not to let Rapaport be rash either.]

**[The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 2, p. 135.]

object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself as his object. This half-way phase between auto-erotism and object-love may perhaps be indispensable normally..." (S.E., V. 12, pp. 60-61).

Rapaport: Very good. Just note one inconsistency. Between autoeroticism and object-choice there is a phase in which the body is chosen first. Now how does that differ from autoeroticism?

London: It doesn't.

Rapaport: It doesn't. That's the inconsistency there. What is next about autoeroticism?

Lustman: He says:

"The auto-erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be something added to auto-erotism--a new psychical action--in order to bring about narcissism." (p. 77)

Rapaport: What is that?

Mahl: Unity comparable to the ego.

Rapaport: That's what he says here, and it avoids the contradiction in the Schreber passage. As the ego is being established, it is the ego which is cathected this way, not simply the body--not the body chosen as object, but the ego. So the phenomenon autoerotism can be only one means of narcissism.

What is the "complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation"? What would you substitute for "instinct of self-preservation" here to make our life easier?

Mahl: The ego-instincts.

Rapaport: If you substitute that, then you see that narcissism is a libidinal complement to the ego-instincts. The ego-instincts imply a certain kind of egoism, as you correctly put it. Self-preservation. That's natural to the self-preservative instinct. But it has a libidinal component. You understand that at this point there is no structural conception, and that therefore the reality principle, which is now already crystallized in the secondary process, is not sufficient to carry the burden of this whole thing. A motivation has to be present, so two different concepts stand for the ego: the ego-instincts on the one hand, the secondary process with its reality principle and reality-testing on the other. Therefore, here you talk about the libidinal component of the ego, really, since the ego-

instinct is to shift for the ego. We could mention here that the same problem of the transition from autoerotism to narcissism is the beginning problem with the undifferentiated phase, that today is equivalent to this autoerotic phase. So the problems will come back.

But let's wait and see, for the moment. Where is the second definition?

Lustman:

"The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism. But megalomania itself is no new creation; on the contrary, it is, as we know, a magnification and plainer manifestation of a condition which had already existed previously." (p. 75).

Rapaport: What is our technical term for that condition?

Mahl: Primary narcissism?

Rapaport: It's being called that here, but we have another term for it, from before. We had it in the Seventh Chapter. Omnipotence. That which existed before is the omnipotence of thought, which corresponds to wish-fulfillment. It is the ideational equivalent of primary narcissism. Wish-fulfillment projects as ideation, as hallucination, that which formerly existed in actuality. So it is omnipotent, because it can make seem to happen that which doesn't happen. This is the ideational equivalent of the narcissistic phase, which comes back in megalomania again, because megalomania too is omnipotence of thought. It was there already in the beginning, in the phase of pure wish-fulfillment, of primary process. After the ego is crystallized, that omnipotence comes in the form of megalomania. That's the correlary of the definition that you had here. The first definition was that the libido was withdrawn. That's how you got the libidinal component to the ego or to the ego-instincts. Now how do you get the second one?

Lustman::

"This leads us to look upon the narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured by a number of different influences." (p. 75)

Rapaport: This is secondary narcissism. In primary narcissism the ego crystallizes and libido is invested in it. In secondary narcissism the libido is called back, after object-loss, disappointment, etc.

Let's go to the second question in the syllabus. What is the conception of the ego?

Mahl: "Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out." (p. 75)

Rapaport: The conception of the ego here then is this original reservoir. You have encountered in later writings this very term, haven't you? That the ego is the reservoir from which the libido is sent out? This is what this says. Now what definition of the ego did you have in mind?

Mahl: That the ego is a unity.

"--I may point out that we are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start..." (pp. 76-77)

So we have ego meaning unity. Then he says,

"...the ego has to be developed." (p. 77)

Therefore it is a unity that develops.

Rapaport: And that is what must be added to autoperotism. The ego is something which is a complex organization, therefore it has to develop; it is the source from which the object-cathexes are sent out.

London: But "ego" still isn't defined.

Mahl: I think that you're saying, "He is beginning to define the ego," but I think Dr. London is saying, "He's not doing it explicitly." And he isn't.

Rapaport: He takes it for granted that there is such a thing as ego. He has taken that for granted by this time for 20 years. He used the term in the Seventh Chapter; he used it in the very earliest papers prefatory to Studies on Hysteria.

Mahl: But he didn't define it.

Rapaport: True, he didn't. In 1923 he will have several definitions. Those represent the status of the situation, and nobody else has anything better, mind you, till this day. That's the tragic situation, actually. So one has to study to know what it is like, what a struggle it was. Do you see clearly the reservoir business, the sending it out? Please don't forget one thing: since the ego, even in our present-day terms, is the executive of everything that happens in the psychological organization, if it is not the reservoir it is still that which sends that libido out. You will encounter that point again and again--for instance, at the end of "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" there is quite a point made of it. Let's watch and see.

How about the ego-instincts?

London: Here he is much more precise. He gives four specific definitions on p. 78. First of all he refers to

"...the serviceability of such a hypothesis
in the analysis of the transference neuroses."

Rapaport: Did you realize why that was useful there?

Mahl: There it was the equivalent of censorship.

Rapaport: Correct. This is the only way to understand it. That's how it came in in all the papers on transference neurosis in the 1890's. If you have that point, then you have the key to this whole business. Here he says there is an antithesis, making it clear throughout that this is just a hypothesis, and that he is ready to drop it. But it is

"...the hypothesis we...adopted of an antithesis
between ego-instincts and sexual instincts..."
(p. 79)

London: Go ahead, Dr. London.

London: The next point is the clear, popular differentiation between hunger and love. The next after that is the biological construction of the duality of man's functions, as an organism in itself and an organism serving for the continuation of the species. The fourth point is his interest in a possibility of someday finding a chemical differentiation between these two.

Rapaport: The origin of that point is in 1905, in the Three Essays, you must realize, with some forebearers in "The Project." But then

comes what? The discussion in which he says that it is quite possible that libido will turn out to be a differentiation of an energy at work generally in the mind. And indeed, energy is simply energy. When we make distinctions between electrical energy, atomic energy, thermal, mechanical, and all these, we speak of the form that energy takes. Energy itself is the same anywhere. The differentiation of those forms has to be explained. Jung said there is only one kind of psychic energy. You saw it here. In 1905, when Jung is still the favorite child, Freud writes that instinct by itself is without quality. The question is how the various instincts gain differential qualities. And he discusses how they gain it, to his mind--from zone and aim.*

Gentlemen, we will consolidate #3 and #6, and let's try to get to it. The question is, "What is the relation between narcissism, health, pathology, and object-love?" First of all, what do we find here concerning narcissism and health? Did you find something?

London: P. 85:

"Here we may even venture to touch on the question of what makes it necessary at all for our mental life to pass beyond the limits of narcissism and to attach the libido to objects. The answer which would follow from our line of thought would once more be that this necessity arises when the cathexis of the ego with libido exceeds a certain amount. A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love."

Rapaport: Tell me, people, did you understand this?

London: Well, this was a question of economics. The question is "Why aren't we content with our infantile narcissism?"

Rapaport: My question was not that. This answer brought that in. My question was about the relationship between narcissism and health. And the answer is in the last sentence. Do you understand that answer? Now I am perfectly willing to discuss the other; it is a very important point that you brought up; but do you understand

*[Since, as Dr. Rapaport points out, "energy itself is the same everywhere," we can note that in distinguishing electrical energy, thermal energy, etc., physicists are careless with their terms. That, of course, is not the problem of psychoanalysis. But we have our corresponding carelessness in such conceptions as libidinal energy, aggressive energy, neutralized energy, etc.]

the answer?

Mahl: You have to make an inference here as to what he meant. Since he's discussing organic changes in this section, it looks as though he meant that maybe this energy that is dammed up in the ego can produce physical changes.

Rapaport: That's a different question: that's the pathology. But what about normality? "A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill."

What does that mean?

London: I think that can best be explained by adding another sentence from p. 98:

"Everything a person possesses or achieves, every remnant of the primitive feeling of omnipotence which his experience has confirmed, helps to increase his self-regard."

Rapaport: I think that is pertinent, and I would like to discuss it, but it does not necessarily have anything to do with the statement in question.

Mahl: Self-preservation? The self-preservative instincts come into play here.

Rapaport: The egoism spoken about here is cathexis of the ego with libido. Egoism in general I am sure he means also, and so to the extent that it pertains to both self-preservation and libido I would go along with you. But it certainly pertains to libido. Why is strong egoism a safeguard against disease? Quite aside from this other very interesting point that you make. After all, egoism means strong libidinal cathexis available in the reservoir. Why is that one of the guarantees of health, why is that something that protects against disease?

Sacks: Well it's a peculiar way of reasoning, but in times of illness there is an outflow of libidinal cathexis. At the risk of incurring your displeasure, I think of more clinical examples, and of course--

Rapaport: My displeasure--I never worry about that, sir.

Sacks: Though she puts it in a different language Anna Freud's paper on bodily illness talks about the necessity of strong libidinal cathexes in helping children to cope with bodily illness. One characteristic response to illness is withdrawal: they don't want to be touched; and for some reason which is unexplained in her paper these children do not require the excessive amount of dependence on the mother, as other children do. She explains

all this on the basis of the outflow of libidinal cathexis.

Rapaport: Now you see, the question for us is to understand mental disease first, and then we will go, if you want to go, to physical disease. It is a good point you make, and never mind clinical examples; as long as they stick to the point I love them too.

Lustman: Adaptation depends on the ability of the ego to function, and the ability of the ego to function depends on having cathexis available to it.

Rapaport: Here is the question. At this point [1914] the ego is considered as the reservoir of libido. Now from our point of view this is no more so. We have to be careful. The question is, does a sufficient amount of libido really offer a guarantee against neurotic disease? What is neurotic disorder like; what is its main characteristic?

London: Weakness of the ego.

Rapaport: That's one of the explanations. Still, it's usually not weakness of the ego but a peculiar one-sided strength of the ego. For instance, you couldn't quite say that it is a weak ego, in a certain respect, which keeps impulses bottled up as compulsion neurosis does.

London: Then it's a depletion of functioning ego because of object cathexis.

Rapaport: Let me try to formulate it. This proposition contains two questions. One of them is whether a sufficient amount of libido alone--wherever this reservoir is--constitutes one of the factors which will combat mental disease. The second question is, does sufficient libidinal investment in the ego, meaning narcissistic charge, represent another factor against disease? The first question is to be answered, within limits, in the affirmative as he does, and the second also has to be answered, within limits, as he does.

In regard to the first question. If for instance, in an early conflict situation the libidinal reservoir is weak, the solution of the conflict is going to go in the direction of no gratification. What results from that is those inhibited people whom you see clinically, inhibited, anxious, characterized by ego-limitation, depressive lassitude, overwhelming passivity--do you see the pale, ghostlike, immobile, ineffectual picture? You work with those people psychotherapeutically as if there weren't any ally anywhere. Do you know the picture? This is the extreme caricature of what he means. On the other hand, strong impulses are a guarantee of health, but only within a certain limit, because when the person is impulse-ridden, when the impulses are over-

strong, you are again in trouble. But within a certain optimal limit, the strength of libidinal impulses is a guarantee. The middle step, to go to the point Dr. Lustman made, would be the following: you would go to Anna Freud's first chapter and read there that in therapy one of the most important allies of the therapist is the id. Why? Because it tries to rise to the surface. Contrary to the usual assumption that the ego is our working ally, the major portions of the ego we work with in therapy are against the therapy. An optimal strength of impulse is necessary both in therapy and otherwise in the natural course of conflict-resolution. You understand, there is an instinctual conflict, a structural conflict, very early, and an attempt is made again and again to resolve it. Resolution to a point where some kind of reasonable gratification is possible depends in part on the intensity of the impulse--within an optimal limit. What is optimal is prescribed to you by the two caricatures: the impulse-driven character and the totally ineffectual one. We don't have a measure of it. It is a quite tragic problem in a way; tragic in the sense that you are never sure whether you are dealing with overstrong structures, thresholds high to begin with, and insufficient coordination with any external stimuli the appearance of which would lower these thresholds. Remember, we discussed the threshold problem in connection with the Seventh Chapter at least twice--how thresholds are heightened and how we have to conceive of defensive structures as heightening of thresholds. This is one issue involved in this question.

The other issue is the egotism issue, meaning what of the libidinal cathexis is deployed in the ego, narcissistically. Now tell me, simply clinically, what would this mean?

Lustman: Would it have to do with what he says about the self-regard?

Rapaport: That is very important on another level. But there is a more primitive business there. Look, clinically we know perfectly well there are some patients who just want to get well, want to get going. There are things important for them that are their personal aims, and to pursue those they have to get rid of certain things, and they come and want to work. Others hang themselves around your neck and say, "Doctor, help me, I can't stand it"--but they don't want anything, or don't know what they want. Such a patient tells you he doesn't like himself; it shades into the self-regard, but it is more primary than that. It's as though he himself would not be of any value to himself. Now you can say this is self-regard, but this is not yet the level on which ego ideals come into question; this is the level where the self is not cathected by itself.

Tell me, how does the self-regard come about? Let's anticipate. It is a relationship between what and what?

Several: Between ego and ideal.

Rapaport: It is the relationship between the ego and the ego ideal. How is the ego ideal constituted?

Mahl: Of narcissistic libido.

Rapaport: Historically, how is it constituted out of narcissistic libido?

London: By projection into the future of the infantile ego's narcissism.

Rapaport: Projection into the present or future--present, whenever you talk about it. Why? Because the infantile narcissism had to be given up, proved unrealistic, and the ego ideal formed to take the place of that.

Mahl: Well, more to recapture the lost state.

Rapaport: To recapture the lost state, that is, to replace something that could be unmitigatedly perfect, idealizable. That's one connection. That's the genetic connection between the ego and the ego ideal. What is the concrete dynamic connection?

London: You mean self-regard?

Rapaport: That is it. But what produces it?

Sacks: The relation of the child to its parents.

Rapaport: Criticism of the parents is one of the producing factors, and--

Mahl: Self-observation.

Rapaport: Self-observation is the heir of that criticism. Who does the self-observation?

Mahl: Conscience.

Rapaport: Conscience. So conscience with its tools serves as this measure. But please notice that if the ego was not strongly charged to begin with, then whatever ego ideal it establishes, the discrepancy is going to be very great between the two. So while you are absolutely right that it is the self-regard, partly, that is represented in this proposition, "A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill," there is a fundament to that, that the original narcissistic deployment of libido will determine the discrepancy between ego and ideal. And the assessment of this discrepancy by self-observation, by conscience, will depend on

that.

London: The stronger the ego, the more manageable, the more realistic will be the ego ideal. I'm having trouble working that into the--

Rapaport: The stronger the person the more realistic the ego ideal. That is rather simple. The ego ideal is established under the pressure of what?

Mahl: Parental criticism.

Rapaport: Parental criticism. The stronger the ego the less vulnerable it is to parental criticism, and the less at a distance will the ego ideal be established.

London: That's what I wanted to hear.

Rapaport: You see, earlier you said that the ego will be depleted. Well, it will be depleted if it was weak from the beginning on. This is the meaning of the Biblical statement: to him who hath shall be given. As cruel as it sounds, you will see that psychologically that statement is steadily true. That's true, for instance, for that example you brought from Anna Freud. The child who can ask for help will get it, and that will steadily replenish the circuit. He who can't ask for it won't get it and won't replenish it.

Sacks: You consider this then a measure of ego strength.

Rapaport: Yes; but I can't give a quantitative appraisal, because that's the clinical job. That's the art part of the matter so far, because our theory doesn't extend to quantification. Only within an optimal limit, sir. Look, there are people--ourselves, for instance; you know, when you get to my age you don't usually ask any more. You have established those relationships where without word you get and give, and beyond that you carry the cross of your own life. Period. It is the same way with knowledge, love, friendship, understanding, raises, jobs--you are no longer in a position to ask, and either you made a resignation or you are a most unhappy man. Not just resignation, but achievement and resignation.

Mahl: The original amount of ego libido that you've referred to in your previous comments--are you talking of it as if something that's to be conceived of constitutionally?

Rapaport: I believe that some of it must be conceived of constitutionally, and some of it must be conceived of as basic as the constitutional, namely, the given differences between the parent and the child. You understand that that coordination is as basic as the constitution

itself, because it is not only the question what the child brings with him, but he brings it into this kind of environment. And then come the modifications.

Mahl: I asked this question because according to this conception originally it's all ego libido. And I wondered at what stage you are starting out from in your--

Rapaport: Who will contradict Dr. Mahl?

London: Originally it's all undifferentiated.

Rapaport: Even according to this, originally it is--what is the phrase we have to quote on this point? ...

London: Pp. 76-77:

"As regards the first question, I may point out that we are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first..."

Mahl: That has to do with the object.

Rapaport: So there something must be added to autoerotism.

Mahl: That has to do with the difference between the body and the ego, not with my question, which is whether originally it's all ego vs. object.

Rapaport: We can easily get lost in the historical complexities. If you say that everything is originally narcissistic libido, then you are in contrast with this statement. Is that correct?

Mahl: Not with this one.

Rapaport: Why not?

"...so there must be something added to autoerotism--a new psychical action--in order to bring about narcissism." (77)

Mahl: Yes, that's true. I am in opposition.

Rapaport: All right. Here is an ancient condition about which Freud is uncertain. If we could judge it from the ethological point of view--or from Hartmann's point of view or Erikson's--we will have to say that there is a situation where displacement-

activities are not displacements from well-organized instincts; things first have to be crystallized; imprintings have to take place. In ethological terms the undifferentiated phase has to undergo some differentiation. If we talk about it in classic psychoanalytic terms we will have to say that the mechanisms of the primary process are not yet mechanisms; they are fluid productions by which the mobile energy moves, in the given, very vague structural conditions. Later they will be mechanisms, and they will be used by the primary process as much as they will be used for defensive purposes. For instance, displacement is as much a mechanism of the primary process as it can be used as a mechanism for defense, in the service of censorship or what have you. This transition is what is really bollixing up the situation for you. Freud later proceeds as though things start with the narcissistic stage--and psychoanalysts in general talk as though this were an open and shut thing. Actually in the next section he will talk that way, won't he? So you are not wrong, if we take the colloquial usage. You are wrong if you take this baseline which we have here.

Mahl: Well, here's my question: it goes back to your statement that there are differences between people in the original amount of ego-libido. And then your subsequent comments elaborating what would happen if you didn't have these individual differences. My question is, given three people who have different amounts of this original ego-libido, how do you conceive of these differences being brought about? Is it constitutional or is it because you are talking about a stage that has already reached some object-cathexis? Does this then enter in?

Rapaport: I see what you are asking. Dr. Lustman wanted to say something on this.

Lustman: We're talking about wanting, and that has to do with drive endowment, constitutional thresholds, and the environment into which the child is born. Three things.

Mahl: The importance of the environment then is--

Lustman: No, it's three things, it's a combination--

Mahl: I know, but I'm just taking the one now.

Lustman: You can't. They don't occur independently.

Rapaport: But he can take it; let's see whether it is a meaningful question--

Mahl: The environment then does what? It returns something to the ego? And what does it return? Or what do you mean by this?

Rapaport: By this I mean the following: if the objects are available in the environment, and a response to them is made because intense libidinal charges are present, then there is discharge. If there is discharge, then this apparatus is self-fulfilling. You know, in sexual intercourse there is a self-replenishment; it depends, however, on the discharge. Now this complicates it, because we translate it into older age terms. When you ask for something and get it, you can have the continuation of asking--like the spoiled child who asks or demands in one way or another. If you have to do something to get it, you have a continuation of those replenishing processes which will replenish your doing something in order to get it.

Mahl: I understand; my question is answered.

Rapaport: Now if you should say that one should be very wary of saying that one gets something from the environment, you would be absolutely right. I should be criticized that way. But you understand that this, on a higher level, is the only way we can talk about it, because in the actual human relations of the adult it is experienced as getting something. One meets a person, and one is attracted to that person. If that person gives a signal--meaning, shows herself or himself as an object--we experience that as though we have gotten something; but all that happened, in a certain sense, is that the process of excitation which brings the impulse closer to firing occurred. You know, as a rule we don't have an erection when we see an attractive person. When that attractive person has given a signal that she is attracted too, you still don't usually get an erection about it; but with time, more and more of that is done in exchange, and a situation is created where you are in private, and some exchanges of affectionate touches and/or words begin to occur, then that excitation reaches the point of firing the impulse. There is always an excitation from the outside necessary to overcome the barriers that have been built up in the adult. The external superficialities, the experience which is well-grounded in a whole series of things, as we will see later, is that we are getting something.

Mahl: But really something is coming from inside.

Rapaport: Only when you reduce it to what I just tried to describe. We have to account theoretically for that experience of getting, because there is a reality in it. That's particularly clear when we don't talk about direct sexual, direct aggressive, or any direct impulse-discharge, but exchange some tension, or

appreciation. Now if somebody says to you, "You gave an excellent lecture yesterday," do you experience it as a present to you, if it is the right person? The basic material out of which that was built up is the same as what we are talking about here. But it is a mistake to reduce it really, because many other things, historically, structurally, came in between. You have to realize that what we are talking about, as the individual is followed by us into his structural growth, sooner or later becomes a give-and-take matter, a being given, asking for it, how one asks for it, how one indicates or explores whether the other is ready to take from us, or will be captured by us, by our gift or will run away, and all that. Do you see?

Mahl: Yes; but I am still just trying to get clear on how this has to be conceived of. There are triggers that set off internal energy-changes--excitation-changes--still I can only conceive of this energy not as passing in the air between you and me but as changing within me, but the trigger or device that set this change off is the interplay between us.

Rapaport: Hold on for a second and let's see what Dr. Lustman has to say.

Lustman: But there is more. One way that Freud has said this already is that the secondary process, in establishing delay, really does so by the raising of the thresholds, and this is environmental in many ways, in terms of frustration--

Rapaport: Now you are getting ahead of us.

Lustman: But he is talking about the constitutional drive and the thresholds and the environment, and this is why I say it is inextricable, you can't really...

Mahl: What we're talking about now goes beyond just the original constitutional--it gets into changing the balance. The interplay changes the balance, this internal dynamic.

Rapaport: What Dr. Lustman tried to say and what I also tried to tell you was that it is not the dynamic that is being changed, because later structures (that's what he referred to, secondary process and delay) are built up which, while maintaining the basic dynamic balance, operate as means structures through which you operate without, much of the time, even getting--

Mahl: But these are inside us too. Aren't they?

Lustman: They become internalized.

Rapaport: Yes, they are inside us. Let's let Dr. London speak. I would like to make a statement on this and close it up. I hope I can clarify it to our satisfaction.

London: Well, in terms of the language he is using now, it seems to me that the stronger the original libidinal investment, granted a favorable environment, satisfactory parents, the less will be the relative depletion of the ego with frustration, the more realistic the ability to perceive the parents and parental criticism, and ultimately the more amenable will be the ego ideal formed.

Rapaport: That is a good summary of what we have done so far. Let me say this: if I understand Dr. Mahl, he is trying to establish whether we are talking about a mystical bond between two people or we are talking about the individual within the confines of whose skin all this occurs--

Mahl: Psychic skin too.

Rapaport: Yes, in relation to external stimulation. Certainly it is perfectly justified for us to keep in mind that the individual can't do anything beyond his own skin. You have to conceive of what is happening with him to be happening somehow within his skin. I also want to say, however, that when we study ego psychology, and examine more fully those issues Dr. Lustman referred to, then you will see that there is a way to put the interpersonal relationships--social relationships, man in his society--in such terms that they do not violate this rule that everything a human being does can be described in terms of things within the confines of his skin. That can be still stated in a way which makes this problem irrelevant.

Lustman: Back to the question of health, I think that what he says on p. 83, when he talks about sleep implying

"...a narcissistic withdrawal of the positions of the libido on to the subject's own self, or, more precisely, on to the single wish to sleep."

has to do with health too.

Rapaport: You mean that the healthy individual is able to make such a withdrawal. True; this is close to the formulation of Hartmann that not only to will but also to accept necessity, submit to inevitability, is the sign of a healthy ego. It suggests, too, the Kris formulation, that a strong ego can regress and give up its control for a period but gain it back; but this passage here is at a great distance from those later ideas.

Let's see, what about pathology? Narcissism and pathology.
What are the statements?

London: What we just read:

"...we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love." (p. 85).

Rapaport: Well, this is an ultimate statement; let's work up to it.
What would be the most primitive statement about illness?

Sacks: P. 82:

"...the sick man withdraws his libidinal cathexes back upon his own ego, and sends them out again when he recovers."

Rapaport: That's a very good one; there is another statement on this page which we need here.

Mahl: The one about interest, right up above.

"...a person who is tormented by organic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in the things of the external world...he also withdraws libidinal interest from his love-objects: so long as he suffers, he ceases to love." (p. 82)

Rapaport: What is this interest about? On this page you have a statement which tells you what interests are withdrawn.

"Here libido and ego-interest share the same fate and are once more indistinguishable from each other. The familiar egoism of the sick person covers both." (p. 82)

In other words, ego-interests as well as the libidinal drives, the concern for survival as well as the concern of loving--

Mahl: Loving the aching part.

Rapaport: --Are both there. In other words, the first relationship between narcissism and pathology is what? State it in your own words.

London: Pathology demands a narcissistic position.

Rapaport: In pathological conditions there is always an increase of the narcissistic position.

Mahl: I have a question about that. He distinguishes here between the ego-interest and the ego-libido, and the distribution of ego-libido; ego and object-libido. Are two different functions supposed to be conceived of, and is this ego-interest sort of a regulative factor?

Rapaport: What does he mean by ego-interest here? Ego-interest stands, in relation to ego-instincts, like libido to sexual instincts.

We have to see that he assumes that illness in general somehow increases narcissistic investment, and accordingly, withdrawal of that investment from object-investment. This is the first proposition, is that correct?

Mahl: Right. But my question is, is he postulating two different functions in this increase in narcissistic investment? Is the change of interest a necessary condition for the withdrawal of libido?

Rapaport: Compare two people with very serious organic diseases. Freud knew he had cancer and he did not quit working. He went to London; he did a great deal of work, all of which is the perpetuation of the creativity of the man. It has a lot to do with the ego-interests even in the strict sense of self-preservation.

There is another famous man who had cancer. The doctors decided, "This is an abstract scientist, an objective man; he ought to be told," so they told him. The man first of all immediately fell back on his newly acquired church affiliation--he was a Jew originally--he called for the priest and very soon, on top of this religiosity, became psychotic.

Mahl: I think this substantiates the kind of idea that I got out of this; he gave up ego-interest. Freud didn't.

Rapaport: That's right.

Lustman: But Neumann didn't give up ego-interests; he just went to a distorted and bizarre way of trying to use them.

Rapaport: Dr. Lustman, from the point of view of the baseline of this paper, the cathexes of external objects by libidinal and ego-interests were given up, and an internal cathexis took place, a narcissistic position was reassumed, one would have

to say.

Lustman: But religion is an object. The church and the priest, isn't this a...

Rapaport: If it hadn't been intertwined with a psychosis, you could make out a case for that; but we won't discuss now the nature of religion.

Mahl: In the discussion of organic illness, in this discussion of hypochondria, he explicitly says there are two things that take place: change in interest and withdrawal of libido. In the case of sleep, he doesn't explicitly say in this paper that there is a withdrawal of interest from the outside world, but this is certainly the case. Therefore I am wondering if this change in ego-interest isn't to be conceived of as a condition, and whether this is a regulative condition.

Rapaport: Both of them are conceived of as occurring when the narcissistic position is assumed. There is no question throughout this paper--

Mahl: I know that they go together. But what is the inter-relationship between those two?

Rapaport: We do not know, because, as you remember, we were shown that this concept, ego-instincts, has to shift for the ego. Now if you asked me now for the ego as against the id, then we could discuss that; but you see, you are stretching a point. I am trying to answer. Two factors are assumed. Both factors are involved in narcissism.

Mahl: And nothing is intended about the relationship between these two factors. This is my question. It's just a question of information at this point.

Rapaport: Yes, it is intended. People, why don't you quote: what is intended about the relation of these two? Where do the ego-instincts come from? Why does he postulate ego-instincts altogether?

Mahl: Analysis of the transference neuroses.

Rapaport: More specifically, out of the necessity to account for censorship, for the forces pitted against the sexual ones--we discussed that in great detail. So there you have the relationship. But there is a point where neither of these is important any more. The censorship function preventing object-cathecting, and then forcing a different kind of object-cathecting; and libidinal object-cathecting. Both of these are relegated to

the realm of the unimportant, with the important thing being the cathexis of the ego or the body ego, or a part of that body ego. Is this now clear?

Mahl: Not completely. The issue is whether this ego-interest--which he has taken pains to separate out from the change in libido--is one of the regulative factors.

Rapaport: What do you mean by regulative factor?

Mahl: Well, if there were not the change in ego-interest, for example, in sleep, in organic illness, in hypochondria, could the change in libido take place? Does the change in the libido take place only because of this change in ego-interest? This is my question.

Rapaport: We can say this about it from what we know of dreams: When the ego-interest is no more to affect something outside, but to keep the ego at rest, then the economic conditions become such that the libidinal factors, as well as ego factors, take a regressive course. But ego-interests take a regressive course also, because the dream represents the ego-interests too, as we know today. He was not in a position to discuss it that way at that time; don't forget that this is a transitory theory. These questions that you are asking in detail were never worked out. I am telling you how much you know already from the Seventh Chapter, how you would apply it to them.

Mahl: Yes; you have answered my question, that is that this change in interest is not intended here to be a condition and a regulative principle.

Rapaport: Yes and no! Because it has to shift for what later we will recognize as the postulate that ego also has energies. We have to assume that it has energy because otherwise we can't make do. I am sorry. We have to go on. What about pathology further? What more do we learn about pathology?

Mahl: Hypochondria.

Rapaport: In hypochondria what is the situation?

Mahl: Both things take place again.

Rapaport: Yes, but what is the difference?

Mahl: Withdrawal. But now there is no actual organic illness but substituted for this are changes in erotogenicity.

Rapaport: Did you understand that statement? What page is that statement?

Mahl: Pp. 83-84.

Rapaport: Did you understand what that meant?

Mahl: I thought it meant that various organs can become places where there is a lot of excitation going on.

Rapaport: What was the situation with the organic disease? There was what?

Mahl: An organic change of some sort.

Rapaport: There was organic change and that resulted in what?

Mahl: Narcissistic withdrawal.

Rapaport: What led to it? Increased excitation. And that results in a withdrawal of libido from objects.

Mahl: All right, now, in erotogenicity it's the excitation-process heightened to a high degree that effects this withdrawal; and this, in terms of the pleasure-pain principle is analogous to pain.

Rapaport: This heightened excitation and this withdrawal, with further excitation placed on the point--how does he explain that?

Lustman: P. 84:

"For every such change in the erotogenicity of the organs there might then be a parallel change of libidinal cathexis in the ego."

Rapaport: What is that libidinal cathexis in the ego? What change is that?

Lustman: It's a meeting of this increased excitation by hypercathexis.

Rapaport: By an increased narcissistic cathexis. But how is that explained, since all this would result, actually, in a further increase in tension? This is against the pleasure-pain principle, isn't it? How does he explain that?

London: This sentence on p. 84:

"I will merely mention that from this point of view we may suspect that the relation of hypochondria to paraphrenia is similar to that of the other 'actual' neuroses to hysteria and obsessional neurosis: we may suspect, that is, that it is dependent on ego-

libido just as the others are on object-libido, and that hypochondriacal anxiety is the counterpart, as coming from ego-libido, to neurotic anxiety."

Rapaport: Dr. London, your answer is this. How is that an answer? It's a very good answer.

London: The point is that hypochondriasis is a tension state.

Rapaport: So the answer is that we don't precisely understand, but when this happens, there is an accumulation, a damming up, of the ego-libido in these conditions, just as in the transference conditions there is a damming up of object-libido. There also all we can say is that there is no means of discharge given here; and what is the means of discharge then?

Iustman: Internally.

Mahl: There is some discharge in the form of the hypochondriacal anxiety. It's transformed.

Rapaport: That's right. So there is affect-discharge under these conditions; and if the person is to remain healthy or recover health, what point has to be reached again? You quoted that before. The dammed up cathexis sooner or later has to be discharged. In regard to ego-libido this means that it has to be turned into object-libido again. Because beyond a certain point that is not tolerable.

Sacks: I'm trying to weave this concept in with Anna Freud's notion that the hypochondriacal symptom represents a fusion of the mother and child.

Rapaport: You won't succeed this way, because that is a content proposition, a proposition about ideational contents. These are formal propositions. The road is long; we would have to analyze the proposition itself into many components before you could discover in it what happened. Because, you understand, one of the implications of anybody's--and probably Anna Freud's; I don't know what passages or paper you have in mind right now--of anybody's attempt to localize this disorder is that the mother-child relationship locates the hypochondria. How? By identifications--the mother has it. Or by introjecting the overconcern. The child can identify with the mother in two different ways--identifying with the mother as the mother behaves herself, or as the mother treats them. This is also connected with the anaclitic and narcissistic solutions. There are two different kinds of hypochondriasis, according to that, some of which don't look at all like hypo-

chondriasis, actually; so you see, you have to follow the clinical business with the content interpretations for a long while--I followed it a little bit--to begin to make it plausible to you that you can get to this. There is a distance, and to bridge that distance you use your clinical ingenuity on the one hand and theoretical knowledge on the other. You can't immediately jump from one to the other. You will see that as we go on.

Lustman: Not only in terms of affect-discharge, there is also discharge in secondary gain; because--especially in hypochondriasis, always--

Rapaport: Discharge in secondary gain, Dr. Lustman, is a very complicated business. Secondary gain and discharge is a complicated issue which you won't understand clearly until you understand The Problem of Anxiety. Only there will it be clear what that has to do with any kind of secondary gain, and if we mix this in we are going to be sunk. We did quite a bit of that today. Let's go on.

So we see about pathology two different points: the organic pathology, the psychological pathology, the correspondences and the differences. Now comes the question about pathology that Dr. Mahl brought up: the restitution. Let's see what are those phenomena which we observe--don't look now but try to remember so that we can review these two pages quickly. If you watch pathological phenomena, what kinds of things do you see in it from the point of view of narcissism, narcissistic libido, or object-libido? When you look at a sick person you will see, from the point of view of narcissism and object-libido, what kind of things?

Mahl: Some object-cathexis still remaining.

Rapaport: You will see some object-cathexes, which will be--?

Lustman: They will still gratify the narcissism.

Rapaport: We will see remnants of original object-cathexes. Second, as you will see.

Sacks: You can see restitutional efforts--

Rapaport: For instance, what restitutional efforts? There are two kinds.

Mahl: Efforts to recathect objects.

Rapaport: There are two different ways to do that. In the transference neurosis what are these restitutive things?

Mahl: Symptoms?

Rapaport: Fantasies. The symptoms are expressions of fantasies. You see, I am trying to make order here. What is the corresponding thing in paraphrenias--narcissistic neurosis?

Several: Delusions.

Rapaport: Delusions. What is the actual narcissistic feature of the psychosis? of the narcissistic neurosis?

Mahl: Withdrawal and megalomania.

Rapaport: The world collapse fantasy is the clearest indication of the narcissism; the megalomania already goes together with that, and with delusion-formation. All the secondary symptoms are restitution-formations. You have to remember this clearly because when you get to ego psychology, to those two papers, "Psychosis and Neurosis" and "Loss of Reality in Psychosis and Neurosis."* These considerations play a fundamental role there. These are the two crucial papers in the 1920's; without them you will have no understanding of the real pathology as clinically seen in neurosis and psychosis. These are fundamental papers, but here is their root, and that's what you have to remember historically. He lays the foundation of that in relation to Jung, as you people asked. This is the basic thing there. You understand that Bleuler has written it also at the same time. Only in a much less effectual way. Bleuler also showed that all the so-called classic symptoms are secondary, only he thought that the association-mechanism and the affect-mechanism are the basic things, while for Freud they are not; something a bit more basic lies there. If you study the Bleuler business you will see that. This is a parallel refutation and yet borrowing from; making sense of the other man's discovery. Now there is more to this.

Lustman: What's the second restitution? You said there were two; first is fantasy, what's the second?

Rapaport: Megalomania.

Mahl: And delusions.

Rapaport: Megalomania, delusions, hallucinations, all are restitutive of the world. How about narcissism? What forms of narcissism do you observe?

*[Collected Papers, Vol. II.]

Mahl: Megalomania.

Rapaport: The original narcissism. The relapse into narcissism in the form of megalomania and collapse of the world.

Mahl: Omnipotent thought.

Rapaport: Yes. But you will observe a third kind of narcissism also, which you don't encounter yet here; namely, the secondary narcissism which may remain not pathological, which you will read about in The Ego and the Id, where the conception of neutralization comes in. The ego offers itself as an object to the id, gets cathected, and is not regressing but uses that cathexis as a freely available one for new object-interests. A transformation, therefore, of id energy into ego energy will belong here. Please remember this; you don't see it here clearly, but it will come, in relation to The Ego and the Id. The pattern, actually, is set here for both the megalomaniac secondary narcissism and for the normal secondary narcissism. And this normal secondary narcissism plays a great role in the stuff with which we started our discussion today, on p. 85: "A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill," because secondary narcissism, if it doesn't cause regression, then provides working energy for the ego. This is the kind of thing which you will find in ancient Hebrew song, for instance one that goes like this: "Why and wherefore does the soul descend into the body? From great heights into great depths does the soul descend to the body? Why does the soul descend into the body? Because only from descent can come ascent." When a person is sick or has suffered a reverse, he asks himself, "How will I manage? This is the end." If he can turn it to "I will rise again"; this is the same kind of thing as "Them bones, them bones, them dry bones, will they rise again?" This is an ancient myth. You have it returning over and over again. It represents this issue, that the reverse that makes you fall back on yourself, rock back on your heels, will be a measure of the ego--a measure of how much it can use the secondary narcissism, or how much it will regress with it to a position which is megalomaniac, world-destroying, etc.

We have to go to the question of object-love. Where do you find the statements of the relation between narcissism and object-love?

Mahl: We had one on p. 75:

"Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off

to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out." (p. 75)

Rapaport: Jump now to the next statement.

Mahl: "We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido." (p. 76)

Rapaport: In other words, wherever you spend on one you reduce your capital in the other. Let's have the second statement. We had that already today.

London: On p. 85:

"A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill..."

Rapaport: That is, if narcissistic cathexes are piled up beyond a certain point, there is narcissistic disorder. Unless these can be used up in object-cathexes, pathology will result. In turn, if all of it went into object-cathexes, such a depletion can occur that one is totally vulnerable to disease. People who are so anaclitic that they can only love deplete their narcissistic supplies. They humble themselves; constitutionally they are humbled; they can't keep a reservoir. Clinically this means that nobody who can't like himself at least as much as the love-object, can't love the love-object. Nobody who can't love a love-object can love himself well enough. These are the clinical kinds of immediate inference. The obverse of these statements is very well read in Sullivan, who says that if you hate somebody you hate yourself. It's the obverse of this, only there is no theory to it there; there is theory to it here. It's good clinical observation; just as good as Freudian observations. Excellent clinician, ingenious clinician, no question about it. He understood a great many things clinically which one wished that psychoanalysts who are more disciplined would have. So you see this second proposition about object-love. Let's see where the third proposition is.

London: P. 100:

"At the same time the ego has sent out the libidinal object-cathexes. It be-

comes impoverished in favour of these cathexes, just as it does in favour of the ego ideal, and it enriches itself once more from its satisfactions in respect of the object, just as it does by fulfilling its ideal." (p. 100)

This is really the key paragraph.

Rapaport: I tried to indicate to you earlier that this impoverishes itself in a limited sense. It impoverishes itself to the extent that it was poor already. The impoverishment is relative. The poorer it was, the more it impoverishes itself. The richer it is, the less it impoverishes itself. The very fact that it can extrapolate to that ego-ideal is a way to enrich itself again. To extrapolate when you are depleted means that you are anyway depleted and deplete yourself further, and you can't enrich yourself again. I don't know whether you read existentialist stuff; particularly I hope you don't fall too much for the usual crap in it. But if you go back to Heidegger, you will see that Heidegger says that it is in the very essence of man to reach out beyond himself--and there comes what he calls existential anxiety. If you translate that into the everyday situation, you will find it socially, for instance, in a poor state which reaches out beyond itself, uses all the resources to wage a war to gain resources. You observe the same thing in individuals. Because of lack of knowledge we reach out for more knowledge. We don't have enough knowledge, we are afraid that we won't be able to gain more knowledge, we won't understand the new thing because we don't know enough. This is the steady problem in any learning or research; and yet the man who has capital, even though he feels it is short, is going to be able to come back rich from it; the man who has no capital is going to come back more confused and more impoverished from this venture. These are essential human issues, not just psychopathological issues.

This passage that you read has to do with the clinical judgment we have to make, whenever a patient is trying to strike out for something, whether this is a self-defeating venture, or whether this is the activity without which there is no possibility for him to get well. This is the kind of clinical judgment needed to decide whether this person is only acting out or whether he is exercising a new-gained freedom. These are clinical issues. Only you have to be able to translate them.

Let's go to the next question--what is the difference between anaclitic and narcissistic object-choices, and what are their characteristics? Where is the crucial passage?

Lustman: P. 87. He starts out by saying that

"The first auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with vital functions which serve the purpose of self-preservation."

Rapaport: You understand what these are. What are they?

Lustman: Sucking.

Rapaport: That is the very first one. How is sucking guaranteed biologically, do you know? Proximally, how is it guaranteed? It is a reflex. What he talks about as self-preservation is reflex-given. How is that; is that teleological?

Lustman: Yes.

Rapaport: But teleology which is guaranteed by evolution. In other words, it is not teleology in the sense that the explanation is by a goal, but teleology in the sense that here is an apparatus created by long past, now functioning purposively. All the other mutants or variants who did not acquire this reflex have been eliminated, whatever the elimination process was like. Here is one point where one of the crucial things in psychoanalytic thinking will have to occur. Namely, there is a broad area within which no decision will be reached except by evolutionary study. You understand, we reconstruct from adults; we begin to observe infants to learn about the earliest years. It is doubtful that a great many of these things will be amenable to decision by either or both of these methods. Some of them can be clarified only by comparative evolutionary study.

We will come to this point again, and I will discuss it in detail. Here is a major area; that means, for instance, that people who want to go into this business have to read about evolution, have to read about the relationship of genetics and evolution theory; the kind of stuff George Gaylord Simpson and his associates have been doing deliberately in the last 20 years in integrating genetics with evolution theory--you know a little bit about that, I presume. We have to do it also, sooner or later. There is a recent paper by a Hungarian who is in Sweden; his name is Szekely, in the last issue of the International Journal, which may be of interest.*

*[Szekely, Lajos, "On the Origin of Man and the Latency Period," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 38;1-7;1957.]

Not that it is very good, but it makes a real point. That's the sort of thing we ought to have. Which of these sorts of things will prove fruitful we can't know. ...All right, go on, to the next sentence.

Lustman: P. 87: He continues that

"The sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts; only later do they become independent of these and even then we have an indication of that original attachment in the fact that the persons who are concerned with a child's feeding, care, and protection become his earliest sexual objects: that is to say, in the first instance his mother or a substitute for her."

Rapaport: Remember, people, we have a question about the anaclitic choice. The object-choice is anaclitic too. Not only is the instinct anaclitic, but the object-choice is anaclitic. Tell me, how do you understand these two propositions? Is there sense that these should be two, or do the two say the same thing; or what does it mean that the sexual instinct is anaclitic upon the other? Gentlemen, let me try to tell you, if you didn't think this through, that the only way to understand this first one--that "The sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts"--is that we can't distinguish them; and the second sentence means that only later do they become independent; that is to say, later you can see them independently. For instance, sucking for pleasure, when no nourishment is gained. But even then, the object-choice is still anaclitic. To begin with, there is no way to differentiate.

Mahl: But that doesn't necessarily mean that they are undifferentiated at that time; it just means we don't know whether they are or not. Is that true?

Rapaport: Well, you see, this is always the general problem of the scientist: a difference that doesn't make a difference is no difference. On the one hand you know that. On the other, we always ask ourselves, will we find a way to make a difference or not? But at this point we can't establish it, therefore we don't know whether there is a difference. This is all the problem of the undifferentiated phase. You notice already here we are full of it. If anybody tells you that Hartmann made a big innovation, then say, yes, he made one: he conceptualized this. But the issue was there from the very first; and let nobody tell you this is no good because it is new-

fangled, and no good. Sure it is an innovation, because it is a new concept, introduced in that Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein paper.* (Actually, it is introduced there, not in the original big Hartmann paper.) Okay, so do you see the difference here? Very important to see it.

All right, how about the anacletic and the narcissistic object-choices? What is the difference between them?

Lustman: Well this first one is the anacletic type; that is, that the earliest sexual objects are the mother or her substitute. The second type:

"...psycho-analytic research has revealed a second type, which we were not prepared for finding. We have discovered, especially clearly in people whose libidinal development has suffered some disturbance, such as perverts and homosexuals, that in their later choice of love-objects they have taken as a model not their mother but their own selves. They are plainly seeking themselves as a love-object, and are exhibiting a type of object-choice which must be termed 'narcissistic.'" (pp. 87-88)

Rapaport: Then comes a sentence which is crucial for that whole paper.

Lustman: "In this observation we have the strongest of the reasons which have led us to adopt the hypothesis of narcissism." (p. 88)

Rapaport: You notice that this sentence means that he not only used that in the very first pages as the point of departure--in our listing of the primary phenomena to which he refers with the concept, we have homosexuality and perversion--but now it is clearly stated to us that this is one of the central points. It is important to state that because otherwise you would imagine that the whole issue comes to Freud only from the psychoses. This is, however, not true. There are two fulcra: we have seen one of the fulcra in connection with the Jung discussion; here is the second fulcrum. It is very important to see, if you want to study the structure of this paper and retain it here. One of our tasks is so that you people can say, "I have read it; I have a structural survey of this paper and the major issues in it." I am glad besides that we get a first-hand

*["Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure," Psycho-analytic Study of the Child, Vol. II.]

touch on the clinical connections and that kind of thing but you have to know the structure. Here are the two pivots of the paper.

The paper has, however, a bridgehead to which we will come only now. The paper leads to a new bridgehead to which we will come. It is not only pivoted on the problem of psychosis and the problem of perversion, but it leads to psychic structure, which is the bridgehead it makes on the other side, and it is that from which the development of ego-psychology later proceeded.

Very well; let's go on. What were you about to say?

Lustman: I was going to say that he summarizes it in the next paragraph by saying

"...we assume rather that both kinds of object-choice are open to each individual, though he may show a preference for one or the other. We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects--himself and the woman who nurses him--and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone, which may be some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object-choice." (p. 88)

Rapaport: "In a dominating fashion his object-choice." I would like to make a point about "dominating" and a point about the "open to each individual." You understand this correctly only when you assume that every time an object-choice is made it is a compromise between these two tendencies. It is this compromise within which one or the other will be dominating. And in the course of one's lifetime one makes choices in which this dominance may shift. The necessity of having a girl friend besides a marriage; or a marriage besides a girl friend; or a deep involvement with friends--contemporaries, fatherly friends, younger friends. This whole economy is a distribution of these issues. That's quite independent of whether narcissism as a theory will stand. These facts of this dominance and distribution are clinical facts which will be accounted for, whatever will happen to the theory of narcissism. It will remain a problem.

You understand, this question is complicated by the following: that there are homoerotic object-choices which are not purely narcissistic; that these homoerotic object-choices may be turned into a heteroerotic choice, which will be a complex mixture of narcissistic and anacletic choices, a compromise

between them. A very complicated business. Let's go on with further statements of the anclitic business.

- Lustman: "A comparison of the male and female sexes then shows that there are fundamental differences between them in respect to their type of object-choice, although these differences are of course not universal. Complete object-love of the attachment type is, properly speaking, characteristic of the male. It displays the marked sexual overvaluation which is doubtless derived from the child's original narcissism and thus corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual object." (p. 88)
- Rapaport: Tell me, what is the connection between anaclitic choice, original narcissism, overestimation or idealization? Did you understand?
- Lustman: Yes; because he postulates an existence of a primary narcissism which under the service of anaclitic choice then results in overestimation and idealization of the sexual object. It is the narcissistic libidinal investment which, because of the anaclitic type, becomes invested in the object, and results in--
- Rapaport: Do you follow Dr. Lustman's argument? There is no independent object which is primarily chosen. The primary object that is chosen as the ego crystallizes is the narcissistic choice. It is anaclitically transferred and results in this overestimation, for two reasons; partly because the objects are indispensably important, and for another reason--namely, from the point of view of the ego-instincts, the self-preservative instincts. The constellation of megalomaniac omnipotence of the narcissistic position is only transferred anaclitically to the object.. Is this clear?
- London: Is he saying that the overestimation, the idealization, of the love-object, is peculiar to the anaclitic object-choice?
- Mahl: No; this is true of narcissistic object-choices too.
- Rapaport: Yes, it is; but why?
- Mahl: Because there it is part and parcel of the narcissism.
- Rapaport: There you don't have to idealize. In the narcissistic object-choice there is no idealization.
- Mahl: Sure there is.

Rapaport: I am sorry; then you misunderstand the concept of idealization.

Mahl: One's child is a narcissistic object-choice, if I understand this correctly. There's overestimation there.

Lustman: But that's substitution.

Rapaport: You have there-- I am sorry; look--

Mahl: No no; wait a minute, I'm answering the question he asked, which is, is overestimation unique to anacletic object-choice; that's his question.

Rapaport: Did you say overestimation or idealization?

London: Idealization.

Mahl: All right, idealization.

Rapaport: I think that here is where you should make a distinction. If your answer is in terms of overestimation, I would have to go along, because the fact is that the love-objects are always overestimated, whether they are narcissistic or not. If it's a question of idealization, then that is a specific process pertaining to the anacletic object. Then in narcissistic object-choice no idealization takes place or is necessary, because the narcissistic object is a substitute. He tells you that. Dr. Lustman told us that. Is a substitute for the original omnipotent ego. It is loving it, nothing changed. It is an external substitute for the original narcissistically overestimated ego. So overestimation, yes, in all object-choices. But idealization, no; that is a very complicated business, and we will see in a minute, when we get to it.

London: I'm lost on this. I'm thinking of, for example, an adolescent crush, where the love-object is so idealized; and it seems to me that would be primarily a narcissistic object-choice.

Rapaport: Oh, I think that there are as many actual attempts at real object-choice there as there are narcissistic ones, and again you are bringing in a clinical example. This is a terminology recommended to you, sir; you had better take it. Overestimation you can see in all kinds of object-choices. Idealization--you soon will define it for us, and it is something highly specific. Do you want now to define the idealization? Let's have the page.

Several: P. 94:

Rapaport: All right; I want Dr. London to read it, if you don't mind.

London: "Idealization is a process that concerns the object; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido. For example, the sexual overvaluation of an object is an idealization of it. In so far as sublimation describes something that has to do with the instinct and idealization something to do with the object--"

Rapaport: I think that my appeal to this passage is not good, because he says,

"Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido." (p. 94)

Not right.

London: Well, it's on p. ~~94~~¹⁰⁰ that he makes the statement that led to my question.

"Since, with the object type (or attachment type), being in love occurs in virtue of the fulfillment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say that whatever fulfills that condition is idealized." (p. 100-101)

--that is, the anaclitic choice becomes idealized.

Rapaport: I don't understand, Dr. London, this phrase here:

"Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido." (p. 94)

You see, I was myself convinced of--

Mahl: Isn't he referring there to narcissistic object-choices? This is what is in the sphere of ego-libido.

Rapaport: Yes; that's why I get puzzled, because I never thought that that's idealization.

Lustman: On p. ~~94~~¹⁰¹ again, he says

"[The sexual ideal] may be used for substitutive satisfaction where narcissistic satisfaction encounters real hindrances." (p. 101)

Rapaport: Yes, but that is not this point, does not pull us out of the lurch there. Because that is actual anaclitic object-choice, as a substitute for a narcissistic choice. This is not the narcissistic object as a substitute for the original omnipotent ego.

London: In this sentence, at this particular point he has been talking about the ego ideal. Now is the love for the ego ideal necessarily narcissistic?

Rapaport: That's what the assumption is; you have read it. You have read it in the earlier session; you have read it specifically. Remember, the original narcissism breaks down because of reality difficulties, and the narcissism is transferred to a part of the ego, the ego-ideal.

London: Yes, but--I understand that the energy for the ego ideal is derived from narcissistic sources; all the energy is; but so far as the fantasy of the ego ideal is concerned, it is taken from the parents and so from an anaclitic relationship.

Rapaport: Yes. Now what about it?

London: So it would seem to me that the idealization of the ego ideal contains anaclitic object-choice components as well.

Rapaport: I am afraid that there again you are doing what Dr. Mahl did earlier: trying to push this too far. Because, you see, there you would have to bring in the introjections, identifications, in question, and there would be a very great deal of doubt about attributing the idealization to the introjected objects themselves. The idealization will depend upon the narcissistic charge. It is the narcissistic charge which gives it the character of idealization.

Mahl: I wonder if a way out of this difficulty isn't in the roots of the misunderstanding when I responded to Dr. London's question--that is that sexual overestimation and idealization are not sharply differentiated.

Sacks: They are used synonymously.

Mahl: Yes.

Rapaport: Yes, but I thought that sexual overestimation is one form of idealization. There are other forms of idealization also. For instance, in the adolescent there are idealizations of all sorts, not sexual idealizations--you can call them sublimated. In each of these cases you are dealing with idealizations. But I thought that idealization is strictly connected with the anaclitic object-choice.

Mahl: Not if idealization is similar to or partially synonymous with overestimation, because overestimation is clearly, throughout this, a point of any object-choice, whether it's narcissistic or anaclitic.

Rapaport: Oh well, I would agree with that. That's the distinction I tried to suggest. But read down here, sir, when he says that idealization is possible in the sphere of both.

Mahl: Then he goes on to say,

"For example, the sexual overvaluation of an object is an idealization..." (p. 94)

Rapaport: That means only that he gives one example. This ego-libido --"possibly in the sphere of the ego-libido" (p. 94)--somehow mixes it up. I propose that we simply recognize that there's a problem here that we don't understand how to resolve, and leave it at that. Dr. London?

London: But go back to this sentence on pp. 100-101:

"Since, with the object type (or attachment type), being in love occurs in virtue of the fulfillment of infantile conditions for loving..." (pp. 100-101)

Now I would conclude from this that a narcissistic object-choice cannot result from the fulfillment of infantile conditions of love, and therefore there can be no idealization in the narcissistic object-choice.

Rapaport: Well, you see, that's all very nice, but it stands in contrast with this statement on p. 94. I would suggest that we just take cognizance of it. I am sorry that I didn't realize it earlier; I was absolutely convinced, actually, that idealization pertains only to the anaclitic object-choice, and though I must have seen this passage in the last few weeks 4 or 5 times, and many, many more times before, it never registered with me; I am sorry. I would leave it at that.

Now let's see, what are then the characteristics of the two choices? First of all it is stated what they are; then is stated what the man and woman's primary choices are; then it is stated that though one is the primary choice and the other is not the primary choice of women, there are plenty of women who make the second type of choice also. I must say, gentlemen, that while a man also runs after this kind of ideal, he always burned his

fingers on it, and the woman he was looking for, finally, and felt happy with was always to some extent a part of himself that he found difficult to live with. Finally you have here the statement of what these choices are characterized by. You remember, there are 4 types of narcissistic and two types of anaclitic choices.

Lustman: P. 90.

Rapaport: Yes. I think that that about exhausts point 4, and we want to push on to point 5, on which we have to dwell in some detail. Let's see, what do you have here on the ego?

Lustman: That goes back to something we read last time; p. 77 in part.

Rapaport: If you want to, just mention it in one sentence of your own.

Lustman: The ego has to develop; it's a unity that cannot exist from the start.

Rapaport: Yes; but there is more on the ego.

London: It starts with the reservoir concept, but through this, by defining all of these other things, he is limiting the concept of the ego.

Mahl: Making it a differentiating and differentiatable unity.

Rapaport: All right; so you have two things already. The first one was what, Dr. Lustman?

Lustman: It cannot be present at the start but has to develop.

Rapaport: Yet, second, it is a reservoir. Thirdly, it is a progressively differentiating thing, apparently. All right. But now there are new propositions coming fast. What does he say?

Lustman: "Repression, we have said, proceeds from the ego; we might say with greater precision that it proceeds from the self-respect of the ego."
(p. 93)

It's almost as if he begins to spell out ego-functions.

Rapaport: Correct. But early there are other statements which we have also to see in this same context. He says that it has narcissistic interests and ego-interests--narcissistic interests, in which both blend, and ego-interests which are purely of the ego-drive character. These are both on p. 92.

These appertain, as you notice, to the whole question of castration complex and penis envy. From what we discussed earlier, why is there in regard to these two constellations, penis envy and castration fear, a unification of ego-libido and ego-instincts? We discussed pathology, remember? Any increased excitation mobilizes both of them. This is the point Ferenczi's pathoneuroses brought out--this whole business is based, in a way, on Ferenczi's paper on pathoneuroses.* That's why we dwelt on pathology at so much length, to understand that when you come to this business of castration threat or penis envy, you are coming to something where the self-preservative and libidinal interests are again welded together into one, because you are dealing with something as close to pathoneurosis as anything psychological possibly can come.

London: What does pathoneurosis mean?

Rapaport: Pathoneurosis is a neurosis connected with organic pathology, whether it is psychosomatic or somatopsychic in form. Pathoneurosis applies to both, whether it is a somatic disease of psychological origin or a psychological response to somatic disease. I am trying to show you another continuity in this paper.

Our discussion about hypochondriasis and organic illness established that unity of ego-instincts and sexual instincts mobilized there; we saw why they are mobilized, and what the anxiety of both forces is. Here you see why he laid them down there. The other thread that you have to see is that here he uses it to explain why that unity gets so significant that for Adler it becomes the central point. Without thorough analysis the whole two things are welded together so closely that it appears as a unity, and for Adler it becomes the ultimate explanatory principle. He is trying to hit Adler and Jung at the same time, and settle their hash with the concept of narcissism. So you see on the one hand he follows the pathoneurosis issue of Ferenczi, links it up with narcissism, uses the Swiss achievement** to provide the empirical material to substantiate the answer to two different problems: the problem of perversion and the problem of psychosis. In the meanwhile, he hits the other two people who explain these two things in a very different way, Jung and Adler, by showing that these pathoneuroses themselves indicate a welding

*[Ferenczi, Sandor, "Disease- or Patho-neuroses," in: Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-analysis, Basic Books, New York, 1953, pp. 78-89.]

**[See p. 197 of this volume.]

together of these two things, and that's what Adler couldn't see, but saw instead as one thing. Do you see the structure of the paper?

Sacks: I had misunderstood it before, in terms of a personal matter, a digression, rather than as part of the structure.

Rapaport: No digression here; this is a highly artistically structured thing--though it does appear terribly bungling when you read it the first time. At any rate, you see where this argument fits into the sequence of the paper, but in the meanwhile it is also a specification further of what we learned about the ego: ego as a reservoir; ego as something that has to develop as an added factor to autoerotism before we get narcissism; ego as a progressively differentiating thing; ego, however, also as something that has interests of its own, interests which are the energy supply behind the repression. That is the explanation of that phrase he has repeated ten times already, that we introduce the ego-instincts because of the transference neuroses. We had one explanation of this same character before. Remember what page?

Mahl: Was that the one containing the word antithesis?

Rapaport: Yes. P. 79. Here it is spelled out. Repression proceeds from the ego. All right; so here we have the first things about the ego. Now I would like you to go to the ego ideal. What do you have on it?

London: It is the conditioning factor in repression. The bottom of p. 93 and on to 94:

"...which contains the conditioning factor of repression... We can say that the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no such ideal. For the ego the formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression."

Rapaport: Conditioning factor--meaning the prerequisite. Repression proceeds from the ego; its prerequisite, however, is the ego ideal. Now we have to keep this very closely in mind, because this ego ideal is going to confuse all of us for a considerable while, not only for now but in general theory also. All right, what else does he say about the ego ideal?

London: "This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile

ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value." (p. 94)

Rapaport: In other words, the perfection is not expected from the ego itself, though it will operate in the shadow of the ego ideal; but what it does will be done for the ego ideal's sake. That is the idealized thing now. You note, you have already seen that he said in the Seventh Chapter that ever new institutions and layering them over each other is the characteristic way of operation of the psychic apparatus. You will encounter it again, but here you have encountered it once more.

Mahl: This is idealization in the sphere of ego-libido.

Rapaport: I am not sure.

Mahl: "...finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value." (p. 94)

Rapaport: This I would say is not idealization in the sphere of ego-libido, but as inconsistent a statement as they come. Now it turns out that ego-ideal can deem itself also something. I would not take it very seriously, because in no other place does he attribute observation function to the ego-ideal itself. To which is the observation function limited?

Mahl: Conscience.

Rapaport: Conscience, which watches. This distance between the ego and the ego ideal is measured by conscience. This is very important to see how it is here; whether it is logical or not. Later I will show you what happens with it, but first you have got to know what it is like. I wouldn't draw a conclusion out of it, because it is self-contradictory, and this paper has more of that, as you will see in a minute. Let's go on. So far we know about the ego-ideal that it is a measure, that it is a condition of repression, that it is the successor of the infantile narcissism; what else?

London: This sentence is worth reading: (p. 94)

"As always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed."

Rapaport: He puts it off to another instance, pushes the same battle to a higher level. By the way, that image comes back as one of the crucial points at the end of The Ego and the Id.

The battle is carried on now on a higher plane. The next proposition concerning the ego ideal?

Sacks: P. 96:

"For what prompted the subject to form an ego ideal on whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his environment--his fellow-men--and public opinion."

Rapaport: We have to note that there is more to it than just the parental voice, that the superego has a later history. Analysts usually forget it. Do you notice the last sentence? The sentence tells us about the later history. We should criticize it, however, from the viewpoint of Hartmann's work and especially of Erikson's. What Freud here calls an "indefinable host" is really a structured society, and it is what exerts this effect and structures the superego and particular formations of it. When we get to Erikson you will see it--the individual is the representative of a social tradition and executor of it. But this is all a much later question; just note that this point here is something which we will encounter in ego psychology again and again.

How about the next statement about the ego-ideal?

Mahl: I have a question about homosexual libido; p. 96.

"In this way large amounts of libido of an essentially homosexual kind are drawn into the formation of the narcissistic ego ideal and find outlet and satisfaction in maintaining it."

Rapaport: What is it that you don't understand?

Mahl: So far I have understood that the energy that went into forming the ego-ideal was primary narcissistic libido. Then I assumed that homosexual libido implies an object, a narcissistic object, to be sure, but nevertheless an object. Therefore, this seems to be a new energy-source for the ego-ideal that's different by virtue of this factor. And I'm puzzled by this.

Rapaport: Do you want to make some comment on that?

London: Well, so is parental criticism another source, in terms of the influence of the father in a man's forming his ego-ideal, the role of a man's society--all of this has to do with homosexual libido.

Rapaport: I think that Dr. London is on the trail. You see, to begin with you start the definition with the substitute. Remember, we had that on p. 51. Narcissism is displaced to the new ego-ideal. That's the beginning. Then he says that the formation of this new ego-ideal begins with parental criticism and continues with the criticism of the host of others--society. So there are two conditions that the ego-ideal has to fulfill: on the one hand, it has to become a substitute; on the other, it has to derive from these criticisms.

London: From reality.

Rapaport: Criticisms from reality, if you like, but that's a complicated image. You can understand it as a biphasic business, that to begin with, reality broke the original narcissism down, because of its resistance. Then it became displaced, and the child could incorporate this reality, this realistic breakdown of its narcissism, as the first form of criticism experienced. Do you hear the conceptual thing you have to do? Something didn't work. The parent wasn't there to make this almighty majesty almighty. That already implies a criticism also. But as this then is built further, you have identifications coming in, which he doesn't even talk about here. The ego identifies, builds a structure within itself corresponding to those objects, and the object-cathexes towards them therefore are transferred onto the ego. (This is spelled out in detail in The Ego and the Id.) This would be a next step. That homosexual libido will come into it is natural under these conditions, because the father is one of those objects.

Clearly, however, it has an entirely different origin also, because this is the successor of one sentence in Three Essays--it's really only a half-sentence there and two or three sentences in Totem and Taboo, where he tries to show how sublimated homosexual libido is the basis of stability of society. The brethren, by means of their homosexual attachment to each other, manage to prevent further bloodshed and the recurrence of that stuff, and establish then regulations by totem and taboo. But it is the predecessor of the whole argument in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; there you see it as the power which holds masses of individuals together and the power which is given by the mass to the leader; the charismatic power of the leader.

This paper is the predecessor of that paper and of The Ego and the Id. Are you following what happens here?

There is the external observation that men, in their clubs, when they hold together, somehow provide a stability for society. Freud always was puzzled with it; this comes back even as late as Civilization and Its Discontents. The hetero-erotic stuff leads to competition; the homoerotic stuff balances this competition. There is something true about that, you understand. And the opposite is also true, you know: women often serve men as the balance-wheel. There are men, for instance, who are awfully nice to the wives of their friends. We needn't see in that anything overtly homoerotic, but this is one of the methods to balance and find outlet for homoerotic tension. The balance breaks down if a man then goes to bed with the friend's wife. The fantasy usually is to bugger the friend through the wife or, through the wife--then reversing the fantasy--to be buggered, screwed, by him. Both of them happen again and again. In this kind of triangle more actual outlet to the homoerotic wishes is vouchsafed. Are you following me clinically? Rather familiar to all of us.

In analysis people discover--to their consternation--the homoerotic elements in the fantasies (latent or even overt) that accompany their actual heterosexual activity. Those elements are quite common--even ubiquitous, from what I can gather, though it's often very difficult to discover them. Probably ubiquitous, because both kinds of factors must be involved in order to make a meeting possible. Because we are bisexual and have both narcissistic and anaclitic factors in the choice. The bisexuality is really represented in the anaclitic and narcissistic choice. Again, in a sense, this bifurcation, anaclitic and narcissistic, is a rerepresentation of the biological bisexuality. Complex clinical stuff, but this is where the roots of it are.

London: He brings it in here to explain paranoia, for which it is a very nice explanation. I would like to feel that that proved the explanation.

Rapaport: I'm sorry, I don't understand. What do you have reference to?

London: The end of the middle paragraph on p. 96.

Rapaport: But that takes us already to censorship. All right. Let's then see the whole business of censorship. You have to start at the beginning of the paragraph;

London: "In this way large amounts of libido of an essentially homosexual kind are drawn into the formation of the narcissistic ego ideal and find outlet and satisfaction in maintaining it. The institution of conscience was at bottom an embodiment, first of parental criticism, and subsequently of that of society--a process which is repeated in what takes place when a tendency towards repression develops out of a prohibition or obstacle that came in the first instance from without."

Rapaport: Now hold on. Do you see that here repression, prohibition, and formation of ego-ideal are in a way equated? So here he goes a step further than what we had before. This is a loose point; I will try to tell you how to think about it later, but notice that at first repression itself proceeded from the ego. Now the two are pulled together suddenly. Go ahead.

London: "The voices, as well as the undefined multitude, are brought into the foreground again by the disease, and so the evolution of conscience is reproduced regressively." (p. 96)

Rapaport: You understand what that means--that when the psychotic gets psychotic, he begins to hear these voices coming from the outside. They were internalized; now they are reprojected. That's the term we use for that. What is next?

London: "But the revolt against this 'censoring agency' arises out of the subject's desire (in accordance with the fundamental character of his illness) to liberate himself from all these influences, beginning with the parental one, and out of his withdrawal of homosexual libido from them. His conscience then confronts him in a regressive form as a hostile influence from without." (p. 96)

Rapaport: This is the standard point put forth in the Schreber paper. What's wrong about it--according to you? I know what's wrong about it according to me.

London: What's wrong about it according to me is that I can't see

anything wrong about it. It makes sense, and yet I know that the issue of paranoia is not considered to be solved.

Rapaport: Let me try to seal this off by explaining two things. First of all he uses an illustration. Insofar as this illustration goes, he didn't ever say that all of the narcissistic ego ideal consists purely of homosexual stuff. Therefore the censoring institution is not made out of homosexual stuff alone. He illustrates on the homosexual component of this how something internal can turn into persecutors from the outside. This is an illustration. It has nothing to do with the validity of the theory of paranoia. It is one illustration. Whether this is the whole paranoia story or not, is another question. You have to limit yourself. In this case we had that illustration which holds clinically.

Gill has an unpublished paper on these clinical observations, and others have written about it too, though not so pervasively as Gill. He pointed out that when you work clinically for a sufficient number of years, you encounter manifestations as follows: you see overt homosexuals who, when their homosexuality is tackled, disclose an underlying layer of paranoia; the homosexuality was a defense against paranoia. Have you seen it clinically? We have seen half a dozen cases over the years. Or you analyze paranoid cases or you work with them in whatever way you can, and analysis is part of it. And you find a homoerotic layer immediately underneath the paranoid layer. Sometimes you pick a homosexual case and directly underneath the homoerotic business you find aggression; and the homosexuality is a defense against the aggression. But in many of these cases, if you go further, then you see homoerotic, aggressive, paranoid; paranoid, homoerotic, aggressive, layered one over the other. It's a veritable seven-layer cake. It's the same issue that I always talk about, that Freud talks about, the instances layered one over the other. Now in the theory of affects you will encounter that again, variously stated.

There is plenty of reason to be dissatisfied with the theory of paranoia, because it is a very complicated one. But it is not unsolved; it's just that it is not definitively laid down. Gill's paper--and I wish he would publish it--settles it more or less, because it shows the general outline, and beyond that it is a clinical problem. To explore the specific conditions under which these multiple layerings have come about--but you will see soon, in the "Repression" and "Unconscious" papers, how these layerings come about. Watch it as you read it, because I will ride it.

So we have gotten the censorship business a little bit into focus.

Let's first try to finish up the ego-ideal; there is one more passage on ego-ideal; do you have that? Then we will finish up the censorship also.

Lustman: He speaks of it again on p. 100 and on p. 101.

Rapaport: All right, let's have 100 and 101.

Lustman: "The ego ideal has imposed severe conditions upon the satisfaction of libido through objects; for it causes some of them to be rejected by means of its censor, as being incompatible." (p. 100)

Rapaport: You notice again that the distinction between censorship, ego-ideal, and the third thing which you haven't read yet, conscience, is confused here. Read the next one.

Lustman: The next one he talks about in terms of group psychology, the psychosocial aspects, on p. 101.

"The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation."

Rapaport: This is the beginning of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, but it is also the point that Erikson would speak about, if he cared to try to establish the forebears of his ideas. But he never was bothered with trying to demonstrate how his psychosocial stuff fits with "orthodoxy." Now to go on:

"It binds not only a person's narcissistic libido, but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido, which is in this way turned back into the ego." (p. 101)

We have discussed the method by which this happens, and we will discuss it more later, when we get to the ego-psychological business. Doesn't this clear up in general the position of the ego-ideal and the confusions he gets into about it?

London: We didn't have the quotation on p. 97. Since we'd already started the censorship--

Rapaport: Yes, on censorship we do need p. 97.

London:

"We may here recall that we have found that the formation of dreams takes place under the dominance of a censorship which compels distortion of the dream-thoughts. We did not, however, picture this censorship as a special power, but chose the term to designate one side of the repressive trends that govern the ego, ..."

Rapaport: "...that govern the ego"; do you notice? Instead of "which the ego governs."

London: That is distinguished from the ego at this point.

Rapaport: Yes, because it has been relegated to the ego-ideal, you notice. Let's go on.

London: "...namely the side which is turned towards the dream-thoughts. If we enter further into the structure of the ego, we may recognize in the ego ideal and in the dynamic utterances of conscience the dream-censor as well." (p. 97)

That is, he has separated the censorship from the ego and given it to the ego-ideal, but he has not yet separated the ego ideal from the ego.

Rapaport: And he hasn't yet separated the ego-ideal from conscience, as he does to a certain extent in later passages. Go ahead.

London: "If this censor is to some extent on the alert even during sleep, we can understand how it is that its suggested activity of self-observation and self-criticism--with such thoughts as, 'now he is too sleepy to think,' 'now he is waking up'--makes a contribution to the content of the dream." (pp. 97-98)

Rapaport: Which speaks about self-observation. Now let's take self-observation, as long as we got into it.

Lustman: Wasn't that what we first--some time ago--attributed to waking consciousness? This reflective awareness?

Rapaport: When I discussed it, I tried to indicate to you that there is an awareness of awareness. But we are now in a different realm of discourse. How we will coordinate these you will see when we get to ego-psychology. I can't do it all at once. For now we go to p. 95 to see what Freud says about self-observation.

- Mahl: "It would not surprise us if we were to find a special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured and which, with this end in view, constantly watches the actual ego and--"
- Rapaport: Stop there, because that leads to conscience. Let's have the bottom of page 95 next.
- Mahl: "Patients of this sort complain that all their thoughts are known and their actions watched and supervised; they are informed of the functioning of this agency by voices which characteristically speak to them in the third person. ('Now she's thinking of that again,' 'now he's going out'). This complaint is justified; it describes the truth. A power of this kind, watching, discovering and criticizing all our intentions, does really exist. Indeed, it exists in every one of us in normal life."
- Rapaport: Okay; I think we should leave that and see what is the point on page 96.
- Mahl: Introspection--or, as he says, "internal research."
- Rapaport: Yes.
- Mahl: "The complaints made by paranoids also show that at bottom the self-criticism of conscience coincides with the self-observation on which it is based. Thus the activity of the mind which has taken over the function of conscience has also placed itself at the service of internal research, which furnishes philosophy with the material for its intellectual operations. This may have some bearing on the characteristic tendency of paranoids to construct speculative systems."
- Rapaport: Later, in The Ego and the Id, he will take this back, and attribute the watching function, the self-observation function to the ego. You will see that; that will make it again more complicated.
- London: Here he has distinguished between two separate functions, self-observation and self-criticism.

Rapaport: Well, yes; but it's not very clear. Sometimes both of them are attributed to the ego-ideal, sometimes self-observation is attributed to the ego-ideal and self-criticism is attributed to the conscience. You see that there is a welter of confusions. I want to go to conscience and to read the formulation. That goes back to p. 95. We read the beginning of it. Then:

"If such an agency does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a discovery--we can only recognize it; for we may reflect that what we call our 'conscience' has the required characteristics."

Meaning he identifies it with a very well-known thing. That's the whole point about it. Now self-respect, which I asked you to note here, is represented as the tension between the ego and the ego-ideal, or the corresponding degree of depletion of the ego in relation to the ego-ideal, as read by the conscience. The corresponding passages concerning self-respect are on p. 93. The self-respect of the ego causes the repression, meaning the tension between ego and ego-ideal does it--

"The same impressions, experiences, impulses and desires that one man indulges--"

etc., lead to the ideal. On p. 98 is the next passage, where he says,

"At this point we may attempt some discussion of the self-regarding attitude in normal people and in neurotics. ...self-regard appears to us to be an expression of the size of the ego; what the various elements are which go to determine that size is irrelevant...self-regard has a specially intimate dependence on narcissistic libido...in paraphrenics self-regard is increased--"

Why? Because the ego itself has all the cathexes--

"...in the transference neuroses it is diminished--"

because it is transferred, as much as possible, either to the object or to the fantasy-object.

"...libidinal object-cathexis does not raise self-regard." (p. 98)

Only the return of it does that. Now we have on p. 99 ego-

syntonic sexual tendencies. If they are not ego-syntonic then they are repressed:

"In the former case (where the use made of the libido is ego-syntonic), love is assessed like any other activity of the ego."

Love is ego-function; it is not sex. Sex is an id-function, or something of the unconscious.

"Loving in itself, in so far as it involves longing and deprivation, lowers self-regard; whereas being loved, having one's love returned, and possessing the loved object, raises it once more." (p. 99)

You understand, that is because there is then a return. We discussed this return earlier; we don't have to come back to it again. All right; the last one on this is on p. 100.

"One part of self-regard is primary--the residue of infantile narcissism..."

That was the very beginning of our discussion. How much is there of the damned thing.

"...another part arises out of the omnipotence which is corroborated by experience...whilst a third part proceeds from the satisfaction of object-libido."

Mahl: The return?

Rapaport: This is the return. Actually, a certain part of it comes back also in the form of secondary narcissism, which I discussed in some detail in relation to the conditions of restitution. The only point in the syllabus which we haven't discussed so far is the difference between sublimation and idealization. Remember, sublimation pertains to what?

Lustman: Aim.

Rapaport: To the aim and cathexis. While the idealization pertains to--?

Lustman: The object.

Rapaport: And there is no one-to-one relation between sublimation and

idealization. The clinical examples illustrate why not.

Gentlemen, the last thing I would like to do in our discussion of this paper is to make a flat statement: you have watched here the problems which are encountered as soon as you begin studying egotism with strong self-feeling (if you don't mind my putting it this way) and the pathological forms of it. You are led immediately to the problems of what is conscience about and what is self-respect about, what is the relationship between low self-respect, strong conscience, high self-respect, weak conscience--a whole set of problems open up. Here a concept ego-ideal was created, which is somehow distinguished from and also tied together with the concept conscience. In the later psychoanalytic literature, the heir of both of them often seems to be the superego. There is no doubt that conscience had a legitimate heir in the superego. The ego-ideal does not necessarily have such a legitimate heir in the superego, because many of the things that are described about the ego-ideal are not superego-like. Whether the superego is a narcissistically cathected heir of the original narcissism, or whether that is a special institution is a great question, which has to be encountered squarely. You see in these present formulations the first attempt at clarifying what the superego is to be, but there is also a problem left, the problem of whether the ego-ideal will submerge in the superego or should be maintained in the theory further. The problem of the self is already involved in all of this too, but is not clarified here.

"Instincts and Their Vicissitudes"

Rapaport: Did you find "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" tough?

Lustman: Yes; the last part very tough.

Rapaport: You ain't seen nothing yet.

Lustman: Which is the toughest?

Rapaport: Oh, I mean that you haven't seen anything yet of "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." It's really a complicated paper. Of all that we are covering, though, I think that the toughest really to digest is the part on the primary and secondary processes in The Interpretation of Dreams.

Gentlemen: did you find Freud's attitude to basic concepts in this paper? Where are they, and could we quickly get them?

Mahl: It's on the first page.

Lustman: (P. 117) "Thus, strictly speaking, they are in the nature of conventions--although everything depends on their not being arbitrarily chosen but determined by their having significant relations to the empirical material, relations that we seem to sense before we can clearly recognize and demonstrate them."

Rapaport: "Sense"--meaning have a hunch about it.

Lustman: "It is only after more thorough investigation of the field of observation that we are able to formulate its basic scientific concepts with increased precision--"

Rapaport: Meaning make concepts out of what was just a hunch.

Lustman: "...and progressively so to modify them that they become serviceable and consistent over a wide area. Then, indeed, the time may have come to confine them in definitions. The advance of knowledge, however, does not tolerate any rigidity even in definitions. Physics furnishes an excellent illustration of the way in which even 'basic concepts' that have been established in the form of definitions are constantly being altered in their content." (p. 117)

Rapaport: Do they do much better today? Let's see the other passage about basic concepts.

Mahl: P. 124. He gives the proposition that there are two classes of instincts, and then he says

"But this supposition has not the status of a necessary postulate, as has, for instance, our assumption about the biological purpose of the mental apparatus..."

Rapaport: What does he mean by "biological purpose"?

Mahl: His statement that the task of the nervous system is to master stimulation.

Rapaport: The pleasure principle; that is a necessary postulate. If somebody studies what is dispensable and what is indispensable in this theory, what might be cut out of it--

Mahl: That he makes it neuro-physiological could probably be cut out.

Rapaport: Yes, that could be but I didn't want to go that far. I just meant to say that, for instance, any proposition concerning what kind of instincts there are could be pared off. But that there is something that might or might not be called instinct but that operates by the pleasure principle, Freud would consider an indispensable postulate. One can carry through such an attempt to seek out what is known to be necessary for this system, without which the whole theory as a system falls--one can carry that through, and I made an attempt to do that in "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory."* Would you go on?

Mahl: "...it is merely a working hypothesis, to be retained only so long as it proves useful, and it will make little difference to the results of our work of description and classification if it is replaced by another." (124)

Rapaport: This you should confront people with when they start telling you that this whole thing is a doctrine. Obviously, however, in the hands of the practitioner it has become a doctrine.

*[In: Psychology: A Study of a Science, Volume III, Sigmund Koch ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959.]

Anything becomes a doctrine when you don't want to fall back beyond it and think critically about it. I am stressing these things so that the sense of the man will be clear to you. Now the next sentence I would like to read, so that we have the continuity from "Narcissism."

Mahl:

"The occasion for this hypothesis arose in the course of the evolution of psychoanalysis, which was first employed upon the psychoneuroses, or, more precisely, upon the group described as 'transference neuroses' (hysteria and obsessional neurosis); these showed that at the root of all such affections there is to be found a conflict between the claims of sexuality and those of the ego." (p. 124)

Rapaport:

I want to hammer home again what I believe we have hammered home again and again, throughout "Narcissism" and before that in "The Two Principles." Where does the assumption about ego-instincts come from, and for what do they have to make do? It is stated most directly and clearly here that it is the conflict, the control of the ego over sexuality, that is to be accounted for by this auxiliary construct ego-instinct. Is this absolutely clear? You have to understand it, because otherwise the later development of the instinct theory will remain thoroughly muddy. Without understanding this you won't understand the whole business about the death instinct, or where all of that comes from. Only in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" do you see it clearly, and here is the first point, where it reaches back to "Narcissism" and "The Two Principles." And also, as I told you, to "Three Essays on Sexuality."

Let's see how, what is the difference between external and internal stimulations? First let's have the statement on what the external stimulation is and how he describes it.

Lustman:

On p. 118, where he turns to physiology, he says:

"[Physiology] has given us the concept of a 'stimulus' and the pattern of the reflex arc, according to which a stimulus applied to living tissue (nervous substance) from the outside is discharged by action to the outside."

Rapaport:

Now let's stop on that. Does anybody find something peculiar or outrageous here?

Mahl: The stimulus isn't discharged.

Rapaport: Obviously the stimulus isn't discharged! This is outrageous--just careless stuff. Why would I dwell on this? Simply to show you that there are carelessnesses here in editing. Obviously the man knew his neurology; he is acknowledged today to have been one of the most ingenious neurologists of the time. This can only be an editorial mistake. I am trying to make it absolutely clear that besides the marvelous German style, the writing style the man had--he prided himself on it, and others praised it, that he could write something down in its final form--the editorial mistakes are there. I am picking on this point where there is no doubt that the man knew what he was talking about; so that in retrospect and in prospect you notice that when I say that he just messed it up you don't feel that I am being arbitrary or that I just don't understand--though that is always a possibility.

Well, let's go on.

Lustman: "This action is expedient in so far as it withdraws the stimulated substance from the influence of the stimulus, removes it out of its range of operation."
(p. 118)

Rapaport: What does that mean? It's a rather complicated proposition.

Lustman: Well, it's the anticipation of what he describes later on; that the effect of the reflex is to remove the organism from the stimulus coming from the outer world.

Rapaport: This is really the purpose of the reflex, always. Did you ever go over the list of reflexes to see what reflexes do really? They do at least two things; they may do many more. What are the two things they will do? For instance, you hit someone's knee. What does the reflex do?

Sacks: It wards off the insult--

Rapaport: What do you mean by that? Say it concretely! What does it do?

Sacks: It extends the leg.

Rapaport: Why? What does that accomplish?

Sacks: It wards off the insult.

London: The knee-jerk isn't an adaptive response, is it?

- Rapaport: I didn't say that it is an adaptive response. Dr. Sacks implied it, but you can't even pin it on him, because he was very cautious. What does it do?
- London: It's a stress reflex which responds to the state of stress of the tendon.
- Rapaport: So what happens?
- London: The tendon is in a state of tension; you tap the tendon and there's a redistribution of--there is an energetic relationship--
- Rapaport: What is the energetic relationship?
- London: The state of tension of the tendon and the neuromuscular forces are disrupted and you have an overreaction to re-establish an equilibrium.
- Rapaport: To my understanding it is that an excitation comes in and is carried off.
- Lustman: That is the original model of bound energy that they talk about--
- Rapaport: Yes, but that goes farther. I was taught in my time that an excitation comes in and to get rid of that excitation in the peripheral nervous system there is an action, a muscular action. Is this contrary to anything you have learned since?
- Mahl: Yes; something contrary to what I learned about this is your statement, "to get rid of it."
- Rapaport: Oh, you mean there is a purpose implied? I didn't imply any purpose. What happens is that--
- Mahl: There is a transmission of a nerve impulse from changes in the receptors to the end-organs in the tendon and in the muscles.
- Rapaport: Yes.
- London: It's a summation effect, isn't it, of a stimulus?
- Rapaport: Let's just establish one thing: Is there something here carried off? Is there an excitation discharged?
- Mahl: It depends on what you mean by "discharged." If you mean "carried off"...
- Rapaport: Made to disappear.

Mahl: It does disappear, because of the mechanical changes in the tendon and muscle...

London: An equilibrium is re-established.

Rapaport: I will accept the equilibrium re-established; that means that there is no excitation existing. Now, you may say, Dr. Sacks, that that's what you said. Yes; but the statements are really different, because "ward off" is so much more purposive than the way I put it. Now there is another thing that indeed happens in reflexes: the reflex itself removes the organ from the source of restimulation. There are such too, obviously.

Lustman: Or cuts it down. For instance, constriction of the pupils cuts down the intensity of the excitation.

Rapaport: Okay. So you have here a whole series of things, but they will all do one of two things--re-establish the equilibrium, eliminate the excitation; or withdraw the organ from it. In one case the reflex action deals only with the excitation which is already there; in the other case further excitation is made impossible or diminished, etc. Notice that this formulation--"withdraws the substance"--is oversimplified.

Let's go to the second point. What is the difference between external and internal stimulations? Let's take up the internal stimulus first.

Sacks: "What is the relation of 'instinct' to 'stimulus'? There is nothing to prevent our subsuming the concept of 'instinct' under that of 'stimulus' and saying that an instinct is a stimulus applied to the mind. But we are immediately set on our guard against equating instinct and mental stimulus." (p. 118)

Rapaport: Do you see what he means by "mental stimulus"? Anything that arouses mental processes. Stimulus to the mind. Watch it, because otherwise you will get balled up. He wants to make that distinction. Now watch the next sentence.

Sacks: "There are obviously other stimuli to the mind besides those of an instinctual kind, stimuli which behave far more like physiological ones." (p. 118)

Rapaport: Did you get hung up on this?

Mahl: Aren't instinctual stimuli physiological?

Rapaport: Did you notice how he defines physiological stimuli later--how he gets balled up on it? In the very next paragraph he gets balled up on it.

"We have now obtained the material necessary for distinguishing between instinctual stimuli and other (physiological) stimuli..." (p. 118)

This is utterly confused by now.

Sacks: You've read this in the original German. Is this a translation difficulty or is this confusion?

Rapaport: I find it very difficult to prepare for this set of seminars and go to the German also. This is what is available to you people; this is what has been available to most people. Jean Schimek and I have been going over some translations and then looking at the German also, and I hope he will bring out a list of mistranslations. But it is not just that. Sometimes--in one out of five cases--it is a mistranslation in the Collected Papers; it is in four out of five cases in The Basic Writings.*

Mahl: I finally decided that he does mean that instinctual stimuli are physiological, because on p. 123 there is this kind of sentence:

"Are we to suppose that the different instincts which originate in the body and operate on the mind..."

Rapaport: Gentlemen; I think that the way you ought to read this sentence--the "obviously" sentence--is: "There are obviously other stimuli to the mind besides those of an instinctual kind, stimuli which are like all physiological stimulations of the body." Physiological stimulations of the body. He doesn't talk here about what we would call interoceptive and/or proprioceptive stimuli. (We don't make that distinction so damned clear either, much of the time.) He doesn't talk about those here at all, not even about pain. We have encountered his talking about pain before, but there is not a word about it here. The real difficulty would be the distinction between instincts on the one hand and proprioceptive or interoceptive stimuli on the other. Does that cover the whole field, Dr. Mahl? That distinction is not even discussed here. He is talking about stimuli that impinge from the outside, and contrasting them with those peculiar things he wants to call

*[The figures aren't in yet on the Standard Edition.]

instinct. We will see what that is.

Actually there is one point which belies what I tried to say about his not talking about internal stimuli other than instincts here. Do you know the passage I have in mind? P. 135. Also it makes a connection way back to "The Two Principles."

London:

"In so far as the ego is auto-erotic, it has no need of the external world, but, in consequence of experiences undergone by the instincts of self-preservation, it acquires objects from that world, and, in spite of everything, it cannot avoid feeling internal instinctual stimuli for a time as unpleasurable. Under the dominance of the pleasure principle a further development now takes place in the ego. In so far as the objects which are presented to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, 'introjects' them...; and, on the other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure..."

"Thus the original 'reality-ego,' which distinguished internal and external by means of a sound objective criterion, changes into a purified 'pleasure-ego,' which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others. For the pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile." (p. 135-136)

Rapaport: No, it doesn't really belie my point--this reads as though only the instinctual painful stimuli would be dealt with by these mechanisms which result in a purified pleasure-ego. The use of those mechanisms holds for all pain experience, however, for all internal tension, and, as a matter of fact, for all internal stimulation which becomes continuous and therefore painful. You note this passage is important, because you may remember that in discussing "The Two Principles," I tried to point out that although he talks about pleasure-ego, he doesn't define it. Remember? This is the definition here. Do you have the passage where he talks in "The Two Principles" about it?

Mahl: P. 224 [S.E., Vol. 12].

Rapaport: Yes. There was no definition there. It is very well worth your while to note this; not that such a reality and pleasure-ego business is not relatively primitive--

Lustman: He's got them going in separate directions, though; on p. 224 he talks about a pleasure-ego transforming into a reality ego, and here he talks about a reality-ego changing into a purified pleasure-ego.

Mahl: It goes both ways.

Rapaport: It goes both ways. And it is mainly a pattern that will be of some importance to understand. It is imposed on the man by a lot of observations, and it doesn't fit into the whole theory.

London: I had thought that what he meant by a reality ego which precedes a pleasure-ego was just a hypothetical construction.

Rapaport: That's right.

London: It doesn't really exist.

Rapaport: In a sense it does, and in a sense it doesn't.

Mahl: He meant the first discrimination--on p. 119.

Rapaport: That's what it is, the first discrimination. This is a conception never fully carried out, and yet a pattern that one has to keep in mind. The specific application of any conception of wish-fulfillment somehow comes down to something like this--if you apply it to the earliest time. And it is the point where Ferenczi's introjection and projection comes in, the explanation of how such things do take place. It is not important systematically, but very important as an existing theoretical pattern. Now let's go to the next sentence.

London: "For example, when a strong light falls on the eye, it is not an instinctual stimulus; it is one, however, when a dryness of the mucous membrane of the pharynx or an irritation of the mucous membrane of the stomach makes itself felt.² (Footnote: ²Assuming, of course, that these internal processes are the organic basis of the respective needs of thirst and hunger.) (p. 118)

Rapaport: A shrewd son-of-a-gun, huh?

London: That's essential.

Rapaport: Sure it's essential. This is a shrewd son-of-a-gun. And he is not being read. People don't give him credit for how shrewd and circumspect he is. People read the sentence and don't read the footnote. The man knew precisely what he was talking about.

Well, let's make this short and clear. Is it clear to you that Freud definitely says that any external stimulus, however strong it may be, is not an instinct? To the psychologist it is perfectly clear that that pulls the rug out from under Dollard, Miller, Hull, etc.--insofar as Hull claimed any relationship of his stuff to this kind of instinctual drive. Is this perfectly clear? We are talking not about a scientific truth but a definitional question. Is it clear that Freud, insofar as he spoke about parched mouth--or any manifestation of the instinct--did it with the reservation that we do not know whether these are the basis of the instinct?

Did I talk to you about Richter and Young?* I would like to tell you very briefly about it. There is an ancient problem in psychology--ancient means about 35 years old--the problem was raised by David Katz. It is the problem of hunger and appetite. Hunger, okay. It gnaws. You know that you have to eat. But why appetite? How do you know that certain things are good for you or not good for you--and does appetite say it is good for you or not? Katz was the first to gather material to show that cattle starved for calcium are going to chew on bones, etc. He was also the first to make that famous experiment which you must have heard about, the prototype of experiments on self-selection of diet. He made noodles which looked the same on the outside, but some of them had calcium and the others didn't; he had chickens starved for calcium and chickens fed on calcium, and within no time the chickens who hungered for calcium were around the noodles with calcium, and the others around the other noodles. It was a crucial experiment. The first monograph was Hunger and Appetite.** From there on came experiments by several others on self-selection of diet in children.

*[Yes. See pp. 73-74 of Volume I of this transcript. The present exposition, however, is a fuller one.]

**[Katz, David, Hunger und Appetit, Leipzig, Barth, 1932.]

One thing that made the problem of appetite so popular in those days was a very famous case which became the more famous since Frank Fremont-Smith was in attendance by chance. A very sick child was brought to a hospital, and very soon died. Autopsy showed a long-standing degeneration of the adrenal gland, and nobody understood how the child could have lived at all. He didn't develop that degeneration in the last five days--but within five days the child was dead. So it was interesting, and they went into the history. The parents told them that this child had eaten salt like mad all the time, and he was brought into this hospital where there was hospital regime such that he didn't get salt--he died. Anyway, the problem of appetite was up, in a big way.

Two people were not satisfied with just simply showing that there is such a self-selection, but proceeded to experiment on it. The two men were Richter and Young. I select these people out of so many because they stuck to it. Richter was able to show that if you destroy the temperature regulation in the hypothalamus, the rat, if he has paper around, is going to build a nest, to keep himself warm. If you destroy the adrenals, the animal is going to take in salt. And dozens of other such things. What does he conclude? That when the organic regulation is eliminated, a behavioral regulation takes its role. If Richter's business means anything, it means that the psychological regulation is different from the homeostatic regulation; the behavioral regulation is a different thing. Richter indeed raises the question: does this behavior-regulation come into effect only when you destroy the organic homeostatic regulation, or is it already working when the homeostasis is working? At the time he cannot decide definitively--in those publications I am familiar with--but says it does seem that there is reason to assume that both are present. Obviously clinical psychological evidence says that both of them must be present.

Now comes P. T. Young. This is even more exciting, because he has evidence that both of them are present. What is the evidence? Young showed experimentally that there are three different things that are working in determining appetite. a) There is a need; for instance, hunger, or calcium hunger, or salt hunger. b) There is a hedonic factor; that is appetite. This is a behavior-regulation which can be brought into clash with the actual need. For instance, an animal in need of certain material will rather take the saccharine sweet stuff, which does not fulfill that need, and as a matter of fact is against the need of the animal, but the animal will stick with it because it loves saccharine better than the other. They are two factors in the normal animal because they can be brought into clash. And there is a third factor: c)

learning. It has to do with the others genetically--he demonstrates that too--but it can be brought into clash both with the appetite and with the need itself. These are different regulations. There are interactions between them; each can win out over the other, under conditions; each can modify the other, in the long run; all kinds of stuff. Regrettably Young has not been read by people. I offered this as a generalization of this Freudian point--Freudian caution. You see how cautious it is? Kubie for instance will say, "Why shouldn't we talk about a breathing instinct?" Well, breathing is a homeostatically regulated thing. The somatic needs of the organism have nothing to do necessarily with instinctual regulations. Not to every homeostatic regulation belongs a behavioral regulation, and behavioral regulations are often such that they are hardly related, or not related at all, to simple homeostatic regulations. Not to every homeostatic regulation pertains an instinct, and there are instincts which don't pertain to any homeostatic regulation familiar to us.

All right, so what is the relationship between the two? The internal and the external stimulation?

London: Pp. 118-119:

"Further, all that is essential in a stimulus is covered if we assume that it operates with a single impact, so that it can be disposed of by a single expedient action. A typical instance of this is motor flight from the source of stimulation. These impacts may, of course, be repeated and summated, but that makes no difference to our notion of the process and to the conditions for the removal of the stimulus. An instinct, on the other hand, never operates as a force giving a momentary impact but always as a constant one. Moreover, since it impinges not from without but from within the organism, no flight can avail against it. A better term for an instinctual stimulus is a 'need.' What does away with a need is 'satisfaction.' This can be attained only by an appropriate ('adequate') alteration of the internal source of stimulation."

Rapaport: First of all, what questions do you have about this important passage?

Mahl: One question that I had is his statement that an instinct

"...never operates as a force giving a momentary impact but always as a constant one."

If the instinct is acting purely by the pleasure principle, early in life there is always some kind of discharge possible, even though it may be autoplasmic; and I think instead of its being conceived of as a constant force, it must have to be conceived of as something that will always recur.

Rapaport: Continuously so. This paroxysmal character is indeed its major character; but you understand that the only point at which anything paroxysmal in the organism is really abrupt and serves as one impact is when it becomes a convulsion. Even in orgasmic experience, there is a slow working up to it, and the orgasm itself has a peak which is not just one moment--and the descending line is a slope, rather than an abrupt thing. If you go away from man and study other animals, you find that after-discharge often takes place in forms of displacement-activity. After copulation, especially in many bird species, you find displacement-activities--very often nest-building. In some other species it is immediate repetitions of the copulatory act. Well, you see what I am trying to answer to you. The only sharp form of discharge which we know is the convulsive discharge.

Mahl: I have two other reflections about this paragraph. One was his introducing the idea of need here.

Rapaport: A very important point. What did you think about it?

Mahl: Well it implies deprivation, and that seems more appropriate for the ego-instincts than for the--

Rapaport: I don't understand why it implies deprivation here.

Mahl: Something is lacking, and the satisfaction consists of meeting the lack.

Rapaport: No lack is assumed here. No deprivation is assumed here, really.

Mahl: I'm not saying that there is a lack--only that the idea is introduced with this concept of need.

Lustman: I wonder if you have to go that far and talk about deprivation. When we talked about this before we said there are certain degrees of inevitable frustration, which may not go to deprivation.

Rapaport: Gentlemen, I think both of you are off the beam. There is a constant excitation. You could call this a need. That which does away with this excitation provides satisfaction. What is it that does away with the excitation?

Lustman: Appropriate action?

Rapaport: Or appropriate object.

London: This is defining instincts in terms of a potential for being satisfied on an object.

Lustman: Is this an operational definition?

Rapaport: Yes; that's what it is.

London: We're born in a state of deprivation. We're deprived of objects.

Rapaport: Don't mix deprivation in. Gentlemen, the question of deprivation I am perfectly willing to meet; when you brought it up in another context before, I agreed with you. But here this is a very different matter--

Mahl: I only want to say what I was trying to say, and that is that I think introducing the word need in here is an unfortunate introduction, because we have to make clear that he's not talking about deprivation.

Rapaport: I am sorry I jumped down your throat. My mistake. But let me say that it is not at all certain that this is what it means. Bedurfniss is "need" in German, and though it can have the connotation of deprivation--Bedurftig means "needful"--Bedurfniss is what comes from the inside. If somebody asks, "Why do you do that?" and you answer, "I feel like it"--in German that answer would be "Es is mine Bedurfniss."

You see, it is not so open and shut. But here is something very different that I would like you to watch. There is a hierarchy of problems. Take the model: infant, restlessness, sucking on the breast, subsidence of restlessness. You refer that sequence to what? To tension. Tension is a descriptive term. If you want to link this model to instinct, what kind of concepts do you need in between? One of the concepts that you can put in here is need. There is a question of how you build your conceptual hierarchy, to make the transition from restlessness to instinct. This is what he is trying to say

here. The attempt to do that here is a poor one, particularly in the English translation, because it brings in the connotations we have today. Don't forget that they are today's. The issues implied here are worked out in my paper on "The Conceptual Model of Psychoanalysis."*

But let me try to tell you another thing which is basic for the understanding of instincts here. When you want to explain behavior scientifically, then you are in a fix. What is the fix? What is the nature of a scientific explanation? A phenomenon is given--science will state what?

Sacks: What is observable?

Rapaport: And?

Mahl: Principles.

Lustman: You begin to categorize and classify.

Rapaport: In terms of a cause. It will describe, and then it will explain in terms of a cause. You can classify in between; you can establish the circumstances, etc. All you do, however, is express in a complex way the cause of that phenomenon. Is that fair? Okay. But behavior acts in a funny way. It is directed somewhere; it is purposive. So science has to explain in terms of causes something which is directed to a goal. The basic problem of all psychological explanation is this: to explain as an effect of a cause something which appears as directed to a goal. This is the broadest problem of explaining behavior. This causes difficulties. Obviously, none of us will believe that we are moving to a goal because it is our destiny determined by God. We won't believe that a stone moves downward because the earth is its natural place, as Aristotle believed. We believe that the stone moves because there is a cause we can state for this movement. How do you explain the purposeful character of a behavior?--and nobody can question that it has a purposeful character. The discrepancies between explanations of behavior don't lie in disagreeing on the purposive character of behavior. The discrepancies are in the explanations. When Freud tried to explain the purposive character of behavior, then he did it as a trick. But all concept-formation is a trick. He said, here is a force, it is instinct. That's the causal factor behind behavior. But this causal factor is such that it will act only when the object is present. It's a specification of a causal agent. Well, such causal agents are very familiar to us in this age of electronics, aren't they? An electronic sorting machine doesn't act for the purpose of sorting out something. It acts because it has such-and-such an apparatus

*[See reference footnote on page 75.]

in it, but that apparatus works only when a certain kind of object--whatever is to be sorted--appears before it. We don't say that it is directed toward that object. We could describe it that the machine was constructed by us for the purpose. Now there is no god who constructed us that way. There is a broader explanation; that's the evolutionary coordination you referred to. Now you will see that Freud has something like that in mind, although he didn't see it so clearly as Hartmann saw it.

We have to push on. How are they distinguished, the inner and the external, by the organism?

Mahl: By the mechanism of flight. By the fact that it can remove itself from external stimuli.

Rapaport: Read the passage, please.

Lustman: P. 119:

"This organism will very soon be in a position to make a first distinction and a first orientation. On the one hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes to an external world. On the other hand, it will also be aware of stimuli against which such action is of no avail and whose character of constant pressure persists in spite of it; these stimuli are the signs of an internal world, the evidence of instinctual needs. The perceptual substance of the living organism will thus have found in the efficacy of its muscular activity a basis for distinguishing between an 'outside' and an 'inside.'"

Rapaport: Did you stop to think what this last sentence meant? Can you apply to it a term which we are familiar with by now? What is motor action--muscular activity, according to this?

London: It's the reality principle operating already.

Rapaport: This is the basic means of reality testing. Did we already see it in "The Two Principles"? Do you know the passage?

London: "A new function was now allotted to motor discharge, which, under the dominance of the pleasure principle, had served as a means of unburdening the mental apparatus of accretions of stimuli, and which had carried out this task by sending innervations into the interior of the body..." (p. 221)

Rapaport: Okay. Now let me tell you that on p. 232 of the "Meta-psychological Supplement" [S.E., Vol. XIV] there is a passage where you see this even more clearly.

Lustman: "In an earlier passage we ascribed to the still helpless organism a capacity for making a first orientation in the world by means of its perceptions, distinguishing 'external' and 'internal' according to their relation to its muscular action."

Rapaport: Yes; now he repeats that thing.

"Reality-testing need be nothing more than this contrivance."

Rapaport: You notice how the line about reality-testing goes through. This breaks down where? Did you think to realize that this is unworkable in some respects? Where doesn't this reality test work?

Lustman: Projection.

Rapaport: No. You are too complicated. We already talked about it. Can you withdraw from everything, from every stimulus?

Lustman: No.

Rapaport: Which ones can't you?

Lustman: For instance heat, cold--things of that sort.

Rapaport: Partly that. But partly all the proprioceptive ones you can't withdraw from, and they are still not instincts. What is instituted for that purpose? The purified pleasure ego establishes such a withdrawal by projection. That's where your term comes in. You see how it ties in? Remember, I discussed it before, that it's wrong the way he puts this because he limits it only to the instinctual pain, instinctual tension.

There is one more important proposition here about the relationship of the instinctual and external stimuli. Do you know it?

Lustman: Where he talks about the function of the nervous system on p. 120, saying,

"...let us assign to the nervous system the task--speaking in general terms--of mastering stimuli... External stimuli impose only the single task of withdrawing from them; this is accomplished by muscular movements, one of which eventually achieves that aim and thereafter, being the expedient movement, becomes a hereditary disposition."

--That confuses me.

Rapaport: Were you others confused, and did you find another place where the same confusion appears?

Mahl: The bottom of the paragraph.

Rapaport: That's right.

Mahl: "There is naturally nothing to prevent our supposing that the instincts themselves are, at least in part, precipitates of the effects of external stimulation, which in the course of phylogenesis have brought about modifications in the living substance." (p. 120)

Rapaport: All right. What confuses you people here, or who has the explanation?

London: This is the question of Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics, and that hasn't been solved yet.

Sacks: What's implied is that people who cannot abide by this view die off.

Rapaport: Where is that?

Sacks: The implication that--maybe this is what I wanted to read into it--that there is something to do with natural selection.

Rapaport: Obviously; but where do you read that into it?

Sacks: "...this is accomplished by muscular movements, one of which eventually achieves that aim and thereafter, being the expedient movement, becomes a hereditary disposition." (p. 120)

I wanted to read it into this.

Rapaport: Obviously, because today we don't think in Lamarckian terms. Freud is saying that it is possible that some of these got selected. Whether they were selected the way you say, or whether they were selected in terms of Lamarckian inheritance, is of no importance to us. What is very important is to realize that some of the problems we are dealing with in the origins of the psychic apparatus are not going to be solved either by psycho-analytic reconstruction or by direct observation or by comparative research, but will have to be solved by a comparative research which takes evolutionary theory and genetic theory also into consideration. There is no doubt in my mind in that respect. Therefore I would advise that you people do read at least such popular things as George Gaylord Simpson's Meaning of Evolution, and that you follow what is happening in the synthesis of genetic theory and evolution theory. There is a whole field of research open for us there; ethology pitches in there, and such stuff. We don't need to go further now. Hartmann's paper* which will be the major standby in the ego-psychology course we will have next year, will shed a lot of light on that. This is all the importance of this point for the moment. There is no reason for us to assume that a Lamarckian theory is indispensable for psychoanalysis. All right. But there is here still something else. I would like you to read the last sentences of this paragraph.

Lustman: "Instinctual stimuli, which originate from within the organism, cannot be dealt with by this mechanism. Thus they make far higher demands on the nervous system and cause it to undertake involved and interconnected activities by which the external world is so changed as to afford satisfaction to the internal source of stimulation. Above all, they oblige the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli, for they maintain an incessant and unavoidable afflux of stimulation." (p. 130)

Rapaport: Did you notice? What is this?

London: Man is more than a reflex organ.

*[Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, International Universities Press, New York, 1958.]

Rapaport: This is the basis of what Allport talks about. He thinks that psychoanalysis doesn't know it. That the human organism doesn't only discharge tension but maintains tension also. But it knows it! The pleasure-principle is the basic tenet; remember, just a little while ago he said that that's one thing you can't discard. But it is not an all-or-none principle. Are you following me? If you can't do it the organism doesn't die; as a matter of fact, the fact that there is steady instinctual pressure obliged "the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli..." (p. 120)

It has to live under "maintain[ed]...incessant and unavoidable afflux..." (p. 120)

This is not understood by Allport. By the way, there is no provision in the drive-reduction theory for anything like this either. This is crucial; this sentence here is as important for the basis of ego psychology as anything you will be reading.

Now, the definition of instincts, please?

Mahl: Pp. 121-122.

"If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view, an 'instinct' appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body."

Rapaport: Did you understand this? What problems arose?

Mahl: I'm not sure that I understood the phrase

"a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body."

Rapaport: What did you think it meant?

Mahl: I thought that this referred to his comment on p. 120, that there were

"...far higher demands on the nervous system" that "cause[d] it to undertake involved and interconnected activities..."

Rapaport: That's partly that. It is more concrete than that.

London: He's avoided the teleological problem by defining instincts in terms of the relationship.

Rapaport: That it is a borderline concept. First of all, it says the same thing as what I tried to tell you earlier--that you can't identify this with homeostatic regulations, that it is not the somatic process, but rather something which is in between. But still this leaves Dr. Mahl's point in the dark. What does he mean by the demand on the apparatus? Gentlemen: the simplest way to deal with this is to say that this speaks about the pleasure-principle. This excitation impinges and it is the job of the mental apparatus to get rid of it. And in so doing, it has to expend force over a path, and therefore it has to expend energy. You could go further, however, and say that this is a terrible complication, because when it is put this way, it seems that this would be a demand on the ego...in our present-day terms. Then you would have here that the ego already has energy, and it would be a terribly complicated thing. I advise that we take it in the simplest form--that the whole works of the pleasure principle are put into operation by this. That's what we should understand by the demand on the mental apparatus. Is that clear enough? This is just the crudest formulation. I tried to indicate that there are other problems involved here. It is not clear what he means by the mental apparatus, whether he means ego or what. --Any other problems?

Mahl: "...psychical representative of the stimuli..." (p. 122)

These cannot be given from birth, and this evidently refers to the section in Chapter Seven where he talks about the connection that is set up between a rise in cathexis and the memory-traces of early experiences of gratification.

Rapaport: No; I would say that here in the term "psychical representative", the term "representative" is not the same as in the term "drive representation." Remember, we talked about affects and ideas. That the instinct here is "psychical representative" means simply that we can't talk about it in terms of physiology, but have to talk about it in terms of the behavioral system. That doesn't mean that one can't use physiological analogies; that doesn't mean that one cannot bring in patterns of thought derived from physiology. But the theory is a psychological theory. This is what it means. Is this clear? This mental representation is simply the instinct. The instinct is the mental representation. I told you, representation here is to my understanding not the same term as representation in the phrase "instinct-represen-

tation." Here the instinct is the mental representative, as we should really put it, of these organic stimuli.

London: Later on when he says "ideational representative", that's something else.

Rapaport: Different. That's the representation of the instinct. Am I making myself clear?

All right. What is the regulative principle of their functioning?

London: Pleasure principle.

Rapaport: Let's have it. I want the whole passage.

Sacks: "When we further find that the activity of even the most highly developed mental apparatus is subject to the pleasure principle, i.e. is automatically regulated by feelings belonging to the pleasure-unpleasure series, we can hardly reject the further hypothesis that these feelings reflect the manner in which the process of mastering stimuli takes place..." (p. 120)

Rapaport: How does it "reflect the manner in which the process of mastering stimuli takes place"?

Sacks: I think it's implicit in the statement. The idea is to get rid of the excitation.

Rapaport: The mastery is getting rid of the excitation, and the feelings reflect that. Which reflects which? When there is mastery, what kind of feeling?

Sacks: Satisfaction.

Rapaport: Pleasure. When there is no mastery, it is pain. Mastery here means reducing. Go on.

Sacks: "...certainly in the sense that unpleasurable feelings are connected with an increase and pleasurable feelings with a decrease of stimulus." (pp. 120-121)

Rapaport: Okay; so this is the model. Please note. Now he will complicate this.

"We will, however, carefully preserve this assumption in its present highly indefinite form..." (p. 121)

Please; you notice? You will encounter it later in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where this coordination between these feelings and the mastery is taken up again. By the way, you defined it very well. I wish you would speak up more often because this was very good. Go on.

Sacks: "...until we succeed, if that is possible, in discovering what sort of relation exists between pleasure and unpleasure on the one hand, and fluctuations in the amounts of stimulus affecting mental life, on the other." (p. 121)

Rapaport: It is clear that he labels as a model this correlation between mastery and pleasure-pain feelings, and says that there are more complicated relationships. Therefore one has to keep this in an indefinite form. Remember, Dr. Sacks, where we encountered complications on this score? We had a hell of a time with it.

Sacks: Somewhere back in the Seventh Chapter.

Rapaport: Yes; in what connection? Anxiety. Why is anxiety a special point which causes this complication? What is the cause of anxiety; how did he define it there? That which would have been pleasurable for one part of the psychic apparatus and is not pleasurable to the other! This is the cause of the complication.

Mahl: I made the same connection to the "Repression" paper, where he brings this up again.

Rapaport: Sure that comes up again, but the basic connection is there, where we know it so far. When we come to the "Repression" paper, we will relate that to all of these. But the lack of one-to-one coordination, the reason this is only a model, is shown most clearly in the anxiety problem, where he spelled it out. Okay, let's go on.

"It is certain that many very various relations of this kind, and not very simple ones, are possible." (p. 121)

You see. And "many very various relations" means not only anxiety but that this holds for guilt, shame, and many other affects and many other situations.

Mahl: Masochism?

Rapaport: We will come to that too. It holds for instance for nostalgia, sweet sorrow--you know?--and all kinds of stuff. And there are

many jobs to be done later. These are issues not worked out till this day. There is much research--empirical research, theoretical research--to be done on these things. We have to go on. What is the object?

Sacks: "The object of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim. It is what is most valuable about an instinct and is not originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible." (p. 122)

Lustman: Was there some reason for your putting "objects" first in your question?

Rapaport: Yes, but I already took it away. Remember that discussion? About the nature of causality and teleology? That's the essential conceptual characteristic of the instinct. I put it first in order to bring home to you that the essential conceptual characteristic of the instinct is that it is a trick solution of the eternal causality-teleology problem. It is a causal problem with a built-in trick to take care of teleology. Am I making myself clear? Yes, there was the reason. I wanted that to stand out. It is very important about the instinct and this borderline position. Okay? Any more about the object?

Sacks: "The object is not necessarily something extraneous: it may equally well be a part of the subject's own body. It may be changed any number of times in the course of the vicissitudes which the instinct undergoes during its existence; and highly important parts are played by this displacement of instinct. It may happen that the same object serves for the satisfaction of several instincts simultaneously, a phenomenon which Adler... has called a 'confluence' of instincts." (pp. 122-123)

Rapaport: Does anybody know the term which we use nowadays for that?

Lustman: Fusion, for one.

Mahl: What I think of is the idea of synthesis, or many instincts, or all the component instincts--

Rapaport: Yes; that is involved, we will see that in the ego-psychology seminars. Another point about this? Ambivalence. --Let's go on.

Sacks: "A particularly close attachment of the instinct to its object is distinguished by the term 'fixation.' This frequently occurs at very early periods of the development of an instinct and puts an end to its mobility through its intense opposition to detachment." (p. 123)

Rapaport: The first issue is the conceptual status of the concept as a solution to the teleology-causality problem; the second outstanding thing about instinct is--what? That this is not so straight: that this is variable. And that's displacement. It is a crucial point. It gave rise to something in the theory which people didn't understand. What did it cause Freud to introduce into the theory of instincts? He enumerates here the crucial defining characteristics of the instincts. What is missing? What word was missing altogether here? That we usually attach to instinct? What is the term we have been talking about all through--

London: The economic?

Rapaport: What is the basic economic term?

London: Cathexis.

Rapaport: Where is it here?

London: Nowhere.

Rapaport: It is nowhere. It comes in on the side in the impetus--don't kid yourself, he wasn't forgetting it altogether--but it isn't here. What is the connection between displacement and the cathexis? Note please, here you have the second major defining characteristic of the instincts. If you don't remember that the first one was this object business, then the variation of the object called displacement gives rise to the concept of cathexes. Why? I explained that to you in great detail.

Lustman: Something has to flow around.

Rapaport: Yes. Why?

Lustman: Because if it is blocked it appears in another...

Rapaport: Yes, but why do you have to have for that an energy cathexis concept? Because the vector, the force, disappears. Where

did it disappear to? And why does it appear in another direction, as another vector? That can be explained only by a displaceable quantity, which is scalar and not vector. The vector can act only in its own direction; for instance the waterfall can act only in its own direction. It can't go to your house to make light there, can it? But that force can be transformed into another form of energy--with certain losses--and that can be transported and transformed again and light your house. This is basic basic. It is no use to read the paper unless you dig out of it; you see how he dwells on this at such length. He talks about fixation here as we would now talk about displacement. The same is true for what he says about confluence. The whole issue of the object is put in these passages in such a way that the displacement should emerge as the central point about objects.

I want you to find the other passage about displacement.

London: Well, on p. 126, about the sexual instincts.

"At their first appearance they are attached to the instincts of self-preservation..."

Rapaport: What is this?

London: This is the anaclitic...

Rapaport: Yes, the continuation of the "Narcissism" paper, spelled out in detail. Go ahead.

London: "...from which they only gradually become separated; in their choice of object, too, they follow the paths that are indicated to them by the ego-instincts. A portion of them remains associated with the ego-instincts throughout life and furnishes them with libidinal components, which in normal functioning easily escape notice and are revealed clearly only by the onset of illness. They are distinguished by possessing the capacity to act vicariously for one another to a wide extent and by being able to change their objects readily. In consequence of the latter properties they are capable of functions which are far removed from their original purposive actions--capable, that is, of 'sublimation.'

Rapaport: Who notices something striking? Is displacement described here just the way it was described before? How is it described here?

Mahl: Displacement across drives.

Rapaport: Gentlemen, this is a problem which has not been very carefully studied. You see, every time you have a displacement, you could argue--just as the ethologists really do all the time--that the energy is displaced, but the mechanism of the other drive is activated by the energy of the original drive. This is one other way to conceive of it. For instance, there would be a partial drive which is oral. If it is displaced to the vagina, and it produces the fantasy of vagina dentata, then what is happening is that the oral energy-quantity is transferred, together with its mode, and then functions on another instinct-executive-pattern. To my knowledge this is the only explicit point where Freud speaks about displacement in this sense. Now all displacements could be so treated, but it would be much more cumbersome to work with them that way. It is a terminological question. But this is how the ethologists treat the displacement activities that they observe, not quite realizing that that's the same. Amstrong, who introduced the concept, didn't understand that it is the same as the Freudian concept. Though he knew about the Freudian concept, he even said explicitly that this is not the same thing.

You see how you have two definitions here. The two amount to the same thing, only to carry out the whole displacement business in the terms of page 126 would be a very complicated thing.

Mahl: I want to check on my understanding of what you said about the concept of cathexis, about the relationship between the cathectic energy concept and displacement. Here's what I understand it to be: displacement phenomena are the observable phenomena and in order to account for them, you need the concept of cathectic energy. Are these the basic observable things for which one needs the concept of energy in psycho-analytic theory?

Rapaport: Indeed they are. We don't have observations here, but if you go back to Studies on Hysteria, you will see that he says we have to postulate a displaceable quantity. This is how he puts it. At that time the displaceable quantity is called affect. It is held back, produces symptoms, and if you recover the memory it is discharged. It is a displaceable quantity.

Lustman: That makes it generic to the concept of defense.

Rapaport: The defense causes the displacement.

Lustman: Yes, but if it were not displaceable to begin with--sure, it caused it--but if it were not displaceable to begin with you

could have no defense.

Rapaport: That is an argument which it may be possible to carry through. I never did it. You might want to try it someday. It is quite possible that that can be carried through systematically. I don't know anybody who tried it, but it is a possibility to do. You understand, these are roads not trodden. You ask me: I say fine, try it; I never tried it.

Now what about aim?

Sacks: "The aim of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction, which can only be obtained by removing the state of stimulation at the source of the instinct. But although the ultimate aim of each instinct remains unchangeable, there may yet be different paths leading to the same ultimate aim; so that an instinct may be found to have various nearer or intermediate aims, which are combined or interchanged with one another."
(p. 122)

Rapaport: Do you recognize what this intermediate aim is? Intermediate aims can be what are called in psychology "instrumental aims." For instance, the scopophilic aim is an intermediate aim in genital sexuality. Now on a higher ego level, for instance, working for money is an intermediate aim for the general arrangements of sexual gratification, of survival, and a lot of other things. But what he means here is the relation of means to ends. It is very important to see, not to get balled up. What he continues saying then is that many of the intermediate aims can be not just of this character but for instance of search character; and can become independent aims inhibited in respect to their final goal. And that's sublimation. Gentlemen, do you see what the aim is? What is the aim of the instinct?

Lustman: Satisfaction.

Rapaport: The aim is satisfaction; that is, discharge. You have to keep that definition clear because there is another definition--or lack of definition--that you should have noticed, and unless you keep this in mind you will be all balled up. Did you notice? Throughout this paper "aim" has been used a hundred and fifty times in a very different sense. And you don't notice it?

- London: Well, he often confuses it with the object itself.
- Rapaport: Partly. Partly something very different.
- Mahl: It gets balled up when he starts talking about activity and passivity.
- Rapaport: Absolutely balled up. So keep it in mind clearly. By the way, this balling up already occurred in the "Three Essays." He defined it there precisely the way he defines it here.
- London: He uses it later then as a kind of vector concept.
- Rapaport: In a way he uses it that way; we will come to it here.
The next thing is the sources of the instinct.
- Sacks: "By the source of an instinct is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an instinct." (p. 123)
- Rapaport: Do you notice that this is harmonious with the explanation we gave of this "represented in mental life" when it appeared in the definition of instinct? Dr. London, do you see that this supports the interpretation we gave there?
- London: No, I'm confused. I want to know what he means by
"...the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus..."
- Rapaport: We don't know that. We just assume that when you are in need of sexual gratification, when psychologically you are aroused sexually something somatic also happens, that represents itself psychologically as an arousal, which is in turn representable psychologically also in the form of dream images, fantasy images, etc.
- London: Is it essential to this concept to include the words "in an organ or part of the body"? Would it be sufficient to say "the somatic process whose stimulus..."?
- Rapaport: The question is a good one, and it is one which has been discussed in ethology also. It is the question whether these so-called erotogenic zones--for instance, the anus, the mouth, the genitals--which are somehow involved--are the sources of this energy or not.

They may be the executive mechanism. In ethology the question is whether it is, as Lorenz claimed, a reaction-specific energy which is connected with such a behavior as making a nest --does that nest-making instinct have a source in the organs involved in that? Or is it something more central? There is a big debate going on about it, and there is much evidence to show that some of that instinctive behavior may be, just as in a reflex, tied up in special apparatuses, but that in other cases the very displacements they see suggest central things. You will find this whole ethological argument in that new book on ethology by Thorpe. That's discussed in great detail there. By the way, also, when you read in Tinbergen, The Study of Instincts, about the whole problem of hierarchy of instincts, there the same issues are involved. Very important issues.

Go on.

- Sacks: "We do not know whether this process is invariably of a chemical nature or whether it may also correspond to the release of other, e.g. mechanical, forces. The study of the sources of instincts lies outside the scope of psychology. Although instincts are wholly determined by their origin in a somatic source, in mental life we know them only by their aims." (p. 123)
- Rapaport: Are you following? Now this aim, however, is already a complicated concept. Aims--why plural? The aim is only one--discharge. You notice?
- Mahl: He's now talking about the means, the intermediate aims.
- Rapaport: The means? If you follow that you will see that aim is doubly treated here, as I have already tried to point out.
- Here something comes up which I would like you to read, namely the point on which he brought in the aims already in "Three Essays". Would somebody please read the next paragraph?
- Mahl: "Are we to suppose that the different instincts which originate in the body and operate on the mind are also distinguished by different qualities, and that that is why they behave in qualitatively different ways in mental life? This supposition does not seem to be justified; we are much more likely to find the simpler assumption sufficient--that the instincts are all qualitatively alike

and owe the effect they make only to the amount of excitation they carry, or perhaps, in addition, to certain functions of that quantity. What distinguishes from one another the mental effects produced by the various instincts may be traced to the difference in their sources. In any event, it is only in a later connection that we shall be able to make plain what the problem of the quality of instincts signifies." (p. 123)

Rapaport: You see? A minute ago he said that the difference in the somatic origin does not make the difference between instincts. Now he says that the sources make that difference. In "Three Essays" he says that sources and aims make them different. But the aim--how can it make it different? The aim is ubiquitous. This point is one not noticed in the literature at all.

Mahl: Could you say something about this sentence? The difference in the mental effects produced by the different instincts? I feel as if there is something on a simple level that I still don't quite grasp.

Rapaport: The question is, how are two instincts different from each other? How is a scopophilic instinct--a partial drive, we call it that in psychoanalytic theory--how is it different from the anal partial drive? Or how is it different from the sadistic partial drive? Or how is it different from the homoerotic partial drive? (He talks about a homoerotic partial drive too, in "Three Essays.") How are they different? Are they different? No, he says, their differences come only from quantity and maybe from something else, and for this something else he brings back the source. It makes no sense.

London: He was probably worrying then about whether a different chemical might cause different instincts.

Rapaport: The question is whether it's a different kind of energy which comes from the anus than that which comes from the mouth.

Sacks: That might be a problem if you're hungry.

Rapaport: Here is the question: as a natural scientist, he knows damn well that all energies are the same. But as a natural scientist he also knows that their forms of manifestation vary--heat, light, electricity, gravitation, etc. Where should he place the locus of the differences here? The locus of differences in nature--general nature, not human nature--is clear. Where should he place the difference? He is utterly puzzled and confused on it, I must say. Nobody ever notices it. I don't propose to dwell on it further for the moment; we will come back to that in a

little while.

Let's have the point about pressure and that's the last.

London: "By the pressure of an instinct we understand its motor factor, the amount of force or the measure of the demand for work which it represents. The characteristic of exercising pressure is common to all instincts; it is in fact their very essence. Every instinct is a piece of activity; if we speak loosely of passive instincts, we can only mean instincts whose aim is passive." (p. 122).

Rapaport: Gentlemen, I must say that this is the most confused of all these. The shortest and most confused. It doesn't have the vector concept, and tries to make it, so calls it "motor factor." But "motor factor" is made to shift for something else, namely that it is something that is common to all instincts and makes them peremptory. So direction and peremptoriness are mixed up. Then immediately he mixes up the energy too. The pressure really should serve as the force. This would be the dynamic aspect of the instinct-concept. And it is a force; that's what gives it its impetus. Demand for work here should mean the amount of energy it uses. About the passivity: "aim is passive"--what the hell does passive aim mean? If the aim is discharge, what does that mean?

Sacks: Has to be active.

Rapaport: By definition, in a certain sense. But that doesn't settle it. You see how the clouds are gathering over that aim business? If one really would want to, one would let the thunders of God down on it. Again, stuff which has not been regarded.

London: Can the concept of discharge be at all compatible with the concept of activity-passivity?

Rapaport: There is a passage here that answers that question. We could have taken it up when we talked about external stimuli, but it is appropriate here too. Page 134.

London: "The relation of the ego to the external world is passive in so far as it receives stimuli from it and active when it reacts to these. It is forced by its instincts into a quite special degree of activity towards the external world, so that we might bring out the essential point if we say that the ego-subject is passive in respect of external stimuli but active through its own instincts." (p. 134)

Lustman: But somewhere earlier he said that the hypercathexis meets it--

Rapaport: Yes, in "The Two Principles," in the discussion about attention --that attention meets the sense-impression half-way. [S.E., Vol. XII, p. 220.]

Lustman: He clearly says there it's not passive.

Rapaport: He talks here ["Instincts and Their Vicissitudes"] about the original situation, not the secondary situation. My answer to you, Dr. London, is that as far as Freud is concerned, the aim is active in the original situation, while the reception of stimuli is passive. But in "The Two Principles" he goes beyond that, and shows that one can be active in relation to those stimuli also. (But don't forget that that activity is an activity to carry out the pleasure-pain principle, and that the reality principle does not disavow the pleasure-pain principle. It is a new means to carry out the pleasure-pain principle more adequately.) Attention is an extension of the activity of the instinct. This is the Freudian conception, as I see it, though classically this was not understood this way. I would say it wasn't understood at all; nobody cared about it. I am not giving you the classic interpretation, because there is no classic interpretation about this.

Mahl: When he says now that the ego is passive with respect to internal stimuli, but active in virtue of its own instincts, it seems to me that he is forgetting that he has said back here that the ego--or rather, consciousness--has been receiving stimuli from both inside and outside.

Rapaport: Where did he say that?

Mahl: On p. 119.

"Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an almost entirely helpless living organism, as yet unorientated in the world, which is receiving stimuli in its nervous substance. This organism will very soon be in a position to make a first distinction and a first orientation. On the one hand, it will be aware of stimuli--" (p. 119)

Rapaport: "Will very soon be in a position..." On p. 134 he is talking about that stage which is before the "soon." You see one level of attack on that problem in my autonomy paper.* These are

*["The Theory of Ego Autonomy: A Generalization," Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 22:13-35;1958.]

the heaviest problems. I can't help introducing a few of the issues which I have been concerned with over the many years, but we have to go on.

It is clear to you now what the pressure or impetus is about? It is in the main the vector force; the rest is all so that you have a vector. The instinct expends energy; the energy is displaceable, just as objects are changeable. It has an aim which is displaceable; this is aided and abetted by intermediary aims. These intermediary aims can become independent, buy their own brass cannon and go into business for themselves, as they become aim-inhibited instincts. Then you have the source question, and we have seen what that is like.

Now the next problem we have to deal with is what instincts we distinguish and what we know about them. I will consider that we have already covered this question. You know that this problem is touched on on pages 124 to 126.

The next is the definition of instinctual vicissitudes, and Freud's characterization of them. Let me have the passages.

Lustman:

"Our inquiry into the various vicissitudes which instincts undergo in the process of development and in the course of life must be confined to the sexual instincts, which are the more familiar to us. Observation shows us that an instinct may undergo the following vicissitudes:--

Reversal into its opposite.

Turning round upon the subject's own self.

Repression.

Sublimation.

Since I do not intend to treat of sublimation here and since repression requires a special chapter to itself, it only remains for us to describe and discuss the two first points."
(p. 126)

Rapaport: He should have said, "Since I don't know enough about sublimation."

Lustman:

"Bearing in mind that there are motive forces which work against an instinct's being carried through in an unmodified form, we may also regard these vicissitudes as modes of defence against the instincts." (pp. 126-127)

Rapaport: Any questions about this? Anything that you want to clarify?

Sacks: Yes. Why do we have to call them vicissitudes? Why don't we say that maybe these tendencies are intermediate aims?

Rapaport: Well, that could be an argument, and it would be a very interesting argument, Dr. Sacks. Could probably even be carried through. Nobody has carried it through yet. How useful it would be I can't say. But what about the text? Does this mean that all instinctual vicissitudes, according to Freud, are modes of defense?

Mahl: He says "these vicissitudes," the ones that he has just listed.

Lustman: Just the first two, reversal and--

Mahl: Oh no, not just the first two--all four.

Rapaport: No!

Lustman: No; only the first two.

Rapaport: Gentlemen, tell me where you encounter that issue again in this paper. Did you encounter it again?

Mahl: Page 132:

"They [turning around and reversal] perhaps correspond to the attempts at defence which at higher stages of the development of the ego are effected by other means."

Rapaport: Now go back to 126.

"Since I do not intend to treat of sublimation here and since repression requires a special chapter to itself, it only remains for us to describe and discuss the two first points. Bearing in mind that there are motive forces which work against an instinct's being carried through in an unmodified form, we may also regard these vicissitudes as modes of defence against the instincts."

I take it that the words "these vicissitudes" refer to repression and sublimation, because he hasn't yet started to discuss reversal and turning around on the subject. I think that I am supported by the passage on 132 which describes reversal and turning around as pre-defenses. Also, you don't find these in Anna Freud's list of defense mechanisms.

Lustman: Reversal of content is very close to reaction-formation.

Rapaport: Yes? What does Freud say about that?

Lustman: "Reversal of content is found in the single instance of the transformation of love into hate." (p. 127)

I don't know why it isn't as clear from hate into love.

Rapaport: What does he say about reaction-formation?

Mahl: He says it on p. 129:

"For the sake of completeness I may add that feelings of pity cannot be described as a result of a transformation of instinct occurring in sadism, but necessitate the notion of a reaction-formation against that instinct." (p. 129)

Rapaport: What is the difference between reaction-formation and reversal? It should be obvious to you. Give me an example of reaction-formation.

Lustman: The classic example is the eldest child who hates her siblings and then suddenly loves them and smothers them for the rest of her life.

Rapaport: What is the object of the instinct, to begin with?

Lustman: The sibling.

Rapaport: Yes. What is the object after reaction-formation?

Mahl: The same one.

Rapaport: The same. What is the difference between reaction-formation and reversal?

London: In reversal there's a change in the object.

Rapaport: Obviously. Don't you see? I know that this is difficult, and what I am doing is not quite fair, but you ain't reading carefully enough. This should be obvious to you.

London: But this has to be explored further. In reversal there does not necessarily have to be a change in the object.

"Reversal of content is found in the single instance of the transformation of love into hate." (p. 127)

Lustman: Love into hate. Why is that a change in the object?

Rapaport: Please, notice that when he talks about reversal, he makes two distinctions. There are two kinds of reversal. One of them is reversal of content, and the other is reversal of what?

London: Aims.

Rapaport: Yes, with at the same time a change in object. I demonstrated to you only that reaction-formation is not identical with the turning around upon the subject. You could ask me at this point how it is different from the reversal in content, and then I would ask you then what becomes the basis of the reversal of content. What does Freud say about reversal of content? What is the key issue here?

London: The change of love into hate.

Rapaport: But in his explanation of love and hate, what is the prerequisite of love and hate? What hates? What loves?

Mahl: The ego.

Rapaport: It is the ego which is a prerequisite. In reaction-formation you are not dealing with that complex organization which he describes as necessary for love and hate. The transformation into pity is a process on partial instinct, or on one instinct, while love and hate are complex organizations. Are you following? I am sorry, no simpler explanation will do here. If, that is, you accept the Freudian premises.

Mahl: I want to go back to the original question of whether these things are defenses. I would like to say how I understood this, and then I'd like to hear you correct me. I thought that a key sentence, on pp. 126-127, was where he said,

"Bearing in mind that there are motive forces which work against an instinct's being carried through in an unmodified form, we may also regard these vicissitudes as modes of defence against the instincts."

I saw reversal and turning around as being instances in which this carrying through unmodified was worked against. Therefore I say these are defenses.

Rapaport: Absolutely right. You remember that in the 1890's he had a concept of defense--defense against the memory of a reality event, namely the seduction. And against coming again into

that reality situation. That was defense against reality. That all went down the drain, and was replaced by repression, which was defense against an instinctual inner force. Now he needs the defenses; he introduces them in the form of instinctual vicissitudes. You could argue that. All I am saying is that it is possible that the distinction made here calls turning around and reversal predefenses, and calls repression and sublimation defenses. That was all the argument I tried to make. It's not incompatible with your interpretation at all. I was trying simply to call attention forcefully to the defense issue, because you are dealing here with what is the equivalent of the defense issue in this whole period. You know when the concept of defense comes again back in its own right into the theory?

Lustman: Anna Freud?

Rapaport: It comes back in The Problem of Anxiety. Anna Freud then elaborates on them. This is one of the major things we will dwell on in ego-psychology.

We have to go on. What is reversal and what is turning around? I would like first of all to get the definition clear. Let's read it.

Lustman: "Reversal of an instinct into its opposite resolves on closer examination into two different processes: a change from activity to passivity, and a reversal of its content. The two processes, being different in their nature, must be treated separately." (p. 127)

Then a sentence or two later:

"The reversal affects only the aims of the instincts. The active aim...is replaced by the passive aim..."
(p. 127)

Rapaport: Now what the hell does that mean?

Mahl: Means of discharge, not just discharging.

Rapaport: Somehow he talks about means. Gentlemen, I will just simply say that in my Worcester paper* I suggested that the aims

*["Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology," lecture given at Clark University, September 21, 1957, unpublished.]

are two different things in Freud. One of them is the discharge, which is the ubiquitous aim; the other is nothing else but what Erikson talks about as modes, which are the executive methods afforded by the zone in question. He says that reversal concerns the aims. We see the same problem here. Did you notice where Freud makes a very specific statement of this, quotes somebody else on this point?

Mahl: Pp. 132-133:

"In the auto-erotic instincts, the part played by the organic source is so decisive that, according to a plausible suggestion of Federn and Jekels, the form and function of the organ determine the activity or passivity of the instinctual aim."

Rapaport: You notice that it is again the executive means. But we still don't understand what active and passive means. We now begin to get an idea of aim; but the active-passive is still not clear. All right, let's try to see what is meant here. Can you explain his explanation of the reversal in relation to sadism and masochism? What is the process, how does it occur? There are first of all three phases. What are they?

Mahl: The first one is the active phase. The exercise of violence on somebody else, mastery on an object.

Rapaport: Aggression, sadistic--impact on an object. Second phase?

Mahl: Turning around to oneself.

Rapaport: The object is abandoned and?

Lustman: Is replaced by the subject's self.

Rapaport: Replaced by the subject's self, and what does that do?

Mahl: He says that it changes the aim from active to passive.

Rapaport: In other words, what does one want to have happen? Instead of beating, one wants to be beaten.

Mahl: But that's where I think it's wrong. One wants to beat oneself. That implies being beaten, but the doing the beating is still present. In this second stage is implied the reflexive voice business that he talks about.

Rapaport: Just read that second stage from the book.

Mahl: "(b) This object is given up and replaced by the subject's self. With the turning round upon the self the change from an active to a passive instinctual aim is also effected." (p. 127).

Rapaport: Yes. And now the third stage; what?

Mahl: "An extraneous person is once more sought as object; this person, in consequence of the alteration which has taken place in the instinctual aim, has to take over the role of the subject." (p. 127)

Rapaport: So here you have the three steps. Why is the middle step necessary? How does he explain that?

Mahl: To explain the obsessive-compulsive self-torment.

Rapaport: How do you call that in technical terms?

Lustman: Moral masochism?

Rapaport: Moral masochism connected with the unconscious sense of guilt.

Mahl: But he's inconsistent. This second stage is not just changed from active to passive, but it's into the reflexive middle voice, and I believe that this is because he has to say that the passive--

Rapaport: You understand that this is from the Greek, where you have three conjugations, don't you? Not just active and passive as you have in Latin and in all the Romance languages and all those which were derived from Romance languages. You have not only active and passive but you have a middle voice, a medial conjugation. That's where he takes it from. He was a good Greek, as you probably know; preserved his Greek for quite a while.

Mahl: But what about this business? How is he being consistent when he says on p. 128 that the active voice is changed not into the passive but into the reflexive middle voice--how is that statement consistent with the statement here on p. 127 that in the second stage there is a change from active to passive?

Rapaport: Obviously it is wrong. Insofar as it creates the potentiality for the third step, it is already a change from active to passive, meaning the direction has changed. But as long as it remains within the subject and no new object is sought, it is only a middle voice. You can construe it as a contradiction or

you construe it as not a contradiction.

So you have the sadism-masochism business clear now. How about the business with scopophilia? First, just the three steps. How does it work?

Mahl: The same way. Parallel steps.

Rapaport: Parallel steps. No need to review that.*

Where does the narcissistic business come in?

Mahl: In the object. The change in object.

Rapaport: How? Where does it come in?

Sacks: In the beginning it's autoerotic.

Rapaport: But first in connection with what impulse, partial drive?

Mahl: It comes in with the example of scopophilia.

Rapaport: What is the proposition?

Mahl: The subject gets pleasure out of looking at himself. That's where it comes in first.

Rapaport: The assumption is that pleasure is gotten first. In other words, there is a predecessor to these three phases in the autoerotic, narcissistic phase.

We should talk about the three polarities and about love and hate, but there is no time and we have covered several aspects of those things already.

*[Not quite parallel. See p. 130 of the paper.]

"Repression"

Rapaport: Gentlemen, what are the various definitions of repression? There are quite a few of them --poor definitions, but still we should see what they are. Where is the first one?

London: P. 146:

"One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet with resistances which seek to make it inoperative."

Rapaport: Yes. How would you put it in your own words? Repression is what?

Mahl: A vicissitude.

Rapaport: An instinctual vicissitude, according to this. Then he qualifies it: this is an instinctual vicissitude which does what?

London: Makes the impulse inoperative.

Rapaport: That happens when the impulse does what?

Sacks: Meets with resistance.

Rapaport: Meeting resistances; correct. (Note incidentally that "resistance" is for Freud an alternative term; he doesn't always use it for what it is, because he is the one who encounters the resistance.) At any rate, the impulse is up against the repressive barrier.

Now let's have the second definition.

Lustman: The same paragraph (p. 146):

"Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation; it is a concept which could not have been formulated before the time of psycho-analytic studies."

Rapaport: Well, let's see; what is condemnation?

London: It's acknowledgement and rejection of the impulse.

Rapaport: In the terms of "The Two Principles" there is a special word that should be used here.

London: Passing of judgment?

Rapaport: Yes, that's it. It is a judgment. Gentlemen, may I mention that Dr. Schafer, Dr. Gill, and I, in treating the comprehension

items of the Bellevue Scale, discussed some of the problems pertinent here.* Closer to the clinical level than to anything else; but still, we have discussed them. But you have to remember that that was written 14 years ago, when we didn't have the conceptual tools at our disposal. We were dealing with material and not theory.

Okay, so we see what condemnation is. What about flight?

London: It's an analogy.

Rapaport: Did we not meet flight as a problem before this?

Mahl: In Chapter Seven.

Rapaport: In Chapter Seven, for instance; where else?

London: In the definition of instincts.

Rapaport: Yes.

Lustman: Flight functions with external stimulation.

Rapaport: If you assume that the organism is unitary and withdrawal is a pattern that it is capable of, then you have to recognize this not merely as an analogy but as something more. What you see here when he evokes flight is the shadow of the theory of the 1890's, where that which was defended against was reality. I have mentioned that to you repeatedly, as a preparation for your later study of ego psychology. This is the theory to which he will return, in a funny way, in 1926.

We have here another question to which this flight problem is an answer, the question about historical predecessors. You see, what Freud does is define repression here as a stage which follows the primitive condition in which there is no clarity yet as to what is inside and what is outside, where the mechanism flight will be applied to more or less anything. Do you see where the proposition that it is an analogy breaks down?

London: It's an analogy only in the light of our present knowledge.

Rapaport: It is an analogy all right, but this analogy character breaks down if you realize that there is an ancestral condition in which the infant cannot know what is inside and what is outside, and if the organism has a flight-mechanism, that mechanism will be applied. You will see that clearly if you have in mind the undifferentiated phase, the phase which he talks about often, though

*[Diagnostic Psychological Testing, Vol. I, pp. 110-114.]

not calling it the undifferentiated phase. You remember that he talks about the differentiation to be made between inside and outside, over and over again, in every one of the papers we have read so far. In the beginning phase where there is no such differentiation, if the organism has an inborn mechanism of flight, it will be applied to any and all stimulation. So this statement is more than an analogy. In turn, on the other end is condemnation, which is a matter of judgment. One judges something and finds it bad. You know, this is the Bible speaking--"And God saw the light, and saw it was good." And man sees evil and says, it is bad. You know, see the evil--this is when the Israelites are stood up between Mount Ebal and Mount Gerizim--don't you remember your Bible? They are stood up and told, "I put before you good and evil, and you choose." It's the famous place that says if you choose the evil, then you will lie down in the evening and will say, would that it be morning, and will arise in the morning and will say, would that it were evening.* The obsessional torture described. Now I am not just trying to tell you that that's a very nice passage, but I am trying to tell that these primitive propositions--I saw it and it is good; I saw it and it is bad; if you do this and that, this is what will happen to you--these are the ancient, primitive descriptions of what happens to man when he gets mixed up between good and evil. If you read it clearly, you will see the anatomy of mankind, of human inner life, just as you see it here in Freud. It is the same business. By the way, you must understand that if you read such a thing as Ovid, Ars Amatoria, or Boccaccio, you are up against the same kind of thing, provided that what you want to get out of it is not just a little thrill. Oh, I don't mean that you shouldn't get a little thrill; man is not made of wood, or of iron. But there is a human nature in these things--not just the clinical description of man, but his very psychological anatomy is there.

We have to push on. Let's have the next point.

Lustman: There's a contradefinition and a definition on p. 147.

Rapaport: Which one do you have in mind?

Lustman: The contradefinition is

"Thus repression certainly does not arise in cases where the tension produced by lack of satisfaction of an instinctual impulse is raised to an unbearable degree."

*[Deuteronomy, 28:67.]

Rapaport: Yes. What does this "Thus" refer to?

London: From the example of hunger.

Rapaport: From both hunger and the pain that gnaws into the body. In those cases, what is the situation?

London: The impulse continues, and cannot be avoided.

Rapaport: It cannot be avoided. Repression is not of this character, he says.

"Nothing in the nature of a repression seems in this case to come remotely into question." (p. 147)

You can't repress it. It is peremptory in a way that no defense can handle. Dr. Lustman is absolutely right; this is a counter-definition, trying to show what it ain't. By the way, clinically, you know this statement isn't quite true. Clinically, those mechanisms which we call masochistic do do something to such a thing as pain. They don't repress it, but they make it unimportant, they make it tolerable, they make it pleasure. So it is clinically not simply true--theoretically it is true. You know, there are certain people who live with pain, and accept it.

Sacks: Freud.

Rapaport: Correct, he is one of them; there are many millions who have done it. The point here, in any case, is that repression cannot deal with these. What does repression do? Further definitions, please.

London: The next is on p. 147:

"...the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious."

Rapaport: Absolutely! The point is then can you or can you not push it out of consciousness? Prevent its becoming conscious? Render it inoperative? This is the point then. Now I think you have the definition, but I want one more quotation, please, which elaborates this one.

Mahl: P. 149:

"Repression in fact interferes only with the relation of the relation of the instinctual representative to one psychical system, namely, to that of the conscious."

Rapaport: Right. This is then spelled out in specifics; the same point we had there before.

Now let's have the relation to the pleasure principle.

Sacks: He begins to discuss it on p. 146:

"It is not easy in theory to deduce the possibility of such a thing as repression. Why should an instinctual impulse undergo a vicissitude like this? A necessary condition of its happening must clearly be that the instinct's attainment of its aim should produce unpleasure instead of pleasure. But we cannot well imagine such a contingency. There are no such instincts: satisfaction of an instinct is always pleasurable."

Rapaport: You notice here how he slips back into subjective terminology. He should have said, "satisfaction of an instinct is by definition what we call pleasure." Then pleasure is not a subjective term, but a concept, and it is equated with the satisfaction of the instinct. We have dwelt on this point repeatedly, remember? Once more: the only way to understand systematically and consistently Freud's treatment of pleasure---though he backslides from it---is to consider it a concept equivalent with discharge of tension. The subjective term "pleasure" may or may not correspond to the objective concept "pleasure." It's divorced from it. That's one of the cardinal things I tried to drive home, a thing which I hope you will always remember, reading anywhere in psychoanalytic theory the word "pleasure" or "pain." Well, I think Dr. Sacks' passage here is right. Let's see what is the explanation then; where does he go on with it?

Sacks: P. 146:

"We should have to assume certain peculiar circumstances, some sort of process by which the pleasure of satisfaction is changed into unpleasure."

Rapaport: Very good. Do you have the continuation of this?

Sacks: P. 147:

"We then learn that the satisfaction of an instinct which is under repression would be quite possible, and further, that in every instance such a satisfaction would be pleasurable in itself; but it

would be irreconcilable with other claims and intentions. It would, therefore, cause pleasure in one place and unpleasure in another."

Rapaport: You notice that this is nothing different from what I tried to say about the subjective term and the objective concept. Only he doesn't get through to the clarity to make this distinction. He is not a systematic man. Jones quotes him directly from a letter, in the second volume of the biography. Jones has asked, write about character, please write about character. This is a business which crops up again and again over 25 years, this issue of character. And he says, I can't. First of all, I am not competent to do that. Jung can do it, because he deals with the superficial layers first and goes down, I follow the opposite line, from the bottom up. Second, I am not a systematic thinker. I expect all the stimulation, all the impetus, to come from the clinical material, and I do only what that says to me. More or less verbatim.*

Would you read the next sentence?

Sacks: "It has consequently become a condition for repression that the motive force of unpleasure shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure obtained from satisfaction." (p. 147)

Rapaport: There is just one question I would like to ask you: How does he know that satisfaction of instinct under repression is possible? Did you make up your mind about that? He doesn't say; or does he say how he knows that?

Mahl: Well; conversion symptoms provide discharge, and they occur under repression.

Rapaport: All symptoms have been shown to do that. This is stated in a very direct way later, in the Introductory Lectures, and in a most direct way, in a full formulation of it, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle--symptoms are a pleasure that cannot be experienced as such.

Can we go on to the second question in the syllabus? All right. What are the historical predecessors? We have seen one in the point we had about flight, Is there anything else that you would want to add to that?

London: The other vicissitudes? P. 147:

*[Very nearly. The letter appears on page 65 of Vol. II of the biography.]

"This view of repression would be made more complete by assuming that, before the mental organization reaches this stage, the task of fending off instinctual impulses is dealt with by the other vicissitudes which instincts may undergo-- e.g. reversal into the opposite or turning round upon the subject's own self."

Sacks: There's also the separation between conscious and unconscious.

Rapaport: There has to be. This reference should make it clearer to you why I tried to say that these vicissitudes are predefenses, because they are supposed to work before the clear separation. Throughout this time he is struggling with that earliest time and its reconstruction.

Mahl: I don't see why you want to limit defense mechanisms only to those things that take place after the separation between the unconscious and conscious.

Rapaport: That's not really my purpose. My purpose is to try to show you that Freud is struggling with the understanding of what is possible only after a certain degree of structuralization is arrived at. I myself don't believe, as you know--and Freud doesn't either--that the separation is established at one point, that it doesn't exist before. We are repeatedly shown that there is a fluid transition here that he doesn't understand. My purpose is also to show you that the concept of the undifferentiated phase of Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein is not pulled out of the air. If you will have teachers who are orthodox analysts, you will find that they will talk about all the Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein material as if it were outlandish new stuff. I am taking pains to show you that the problem is here with us in what Freud wrote. In the beginning, in the 1890's, he dealt with things which now seem to him to be all repression. But he has to separate these mechanisms, since repression after all does not work before consciousness exists, because it refers to keeping out of consciousness. What about before that?

Now that problem can be stated in many ways. I prefer to state it in terms of how we are to understand the arising of these things. It is the same kind of thing as you will find in my autonomy paper, the old one.* It raised the question, what does the repressing; or talking about Moses saying that he struggled against it and became what he was--what struggled against it?

*["The Autonomy of the Ego," Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 15: 113-123; 1951. Also in Psychoanalytic Psychiatry and Psychology, eds. R. P. Knight and C. R. Friedman, New York, International Universities Press, 1954.]

Since consciousness is censorship at this stage of the theory, if there is no consciousness, what represses, what defends? These instinctual vicissitudes are an attempt to cope with defense before consciousness exists. You have encountered that, and we will soon get to it again. This is his problem, you know. It is not I who am bringing it; he brings that problem. I am translating it into this question; what is the beginning, what are the beginning conditions? But we have to let him talk, and he talks in terms of consciousness.

Let's go on. How about the prerequisites? We have been over it, but let's remind ourselves again. What are the prerequisites? One of them you had, Dr. Sacks.

Sacks: I said the distinction between what is conscious and what is unconscious.

Rapaport: Yes, that's one of them, but you had one earlier.

Sacks: "A necessary condition of its happening must clearly be that the instinct's attainment of its aim should produce unpleasure instead of pleasure." (p. 146)

Rapaport: This is one of the conditions. The second condition?

London: "...that the motive force of unpleasure shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure obtained from satisfaction." (p. 147)

Rapaport: That's right. Meaning that the realistic or ego economics, etc., should weigh more in the balance than the gratification itself. And the third--which really should be the first--that there be some kind of differentiation already.

Let's go on. What are the steps in the development of repression? Obviously the first step is that there be such a distinction. The prerequisites are the first step. Now let's see the next one.

Mahl: Primal repression.

Rapaport: Primal repression. Let's hear it. Let's see whether we understood it.

Mahl: P. 148.

"We have reason to assume that there is a primal repression, a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious. With this a fixation is established; the representative in question persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains attached to it. This is due to the properties of unconscious processes of which we shall speak later."

Rapaport: Did you understand? How?

London: Well, what he talks about as repression proper does not refer to this fundamental ideational presentation of the instinct. This is already established as a structure in the unconscious, as a fixation.

Mahl: I understood this as something happening over the course of time in a person's life, with the development of the two systems that he's just mentioned above.

Lustman: It seemed to me that he had to explain his feeling that the instinct is never known, and that all we ever deal with are derivatives of it; and the only way to do that was to postulate primal repression.

Rapaport: How do you think he arrived at this conception?

London: He arrived at it from clinical observation.

Rapaport: What clinical observation, sir?

Mahl: His ability to spot infantile memories and fantasies that were unconscious.

Rapaport: Yes. Did you ever read Studies on Hysteria and the papers following? If clinically, for instance, you trace something, what happens? Here is a symptom. You begin to trace it back. What is the most striking thing about tracing the origins of a symptom? Gentlemen, this is the issue of the complementary series. Didn't you ever run into it? The formulation itself comes from the "Three Essays."* Here you find the symptom, then you find behind it a precipitating event, then you find behind it another similar event, then you find others similar--a whole series of

*[S.E., Vol. VII, pp. 239-40.]

events. Historically, in the 1890's, Freud was pushing this back further and further, and came to infantile things, and was convinced then that it was an infantile seduction. Remember? Now this series is called a complementary series for the following reason: that environmental determinations play a principal role in the current things a patient talks about; as he goes down, more and more intrapsychic drive-factors play a role. There is always a complementarity between these, with experience playing less and less of a role as he goes back, and intrapsychic mechanisms playing more and more of a role. This is the so-called genetic series, or complementary series. When you do such a thing, then comes up a problem of general science, or theory, or philosophy. What is that?

London: Which came first, the chicken or the egg.

Rapaport: Well, that's one of such problems, but there is a general term for them: the problem of infinite regress. Where in hell does it end? One of the most paining problems from Aristotle on (though it was seen before Aristotle, by the way), the problem of infinite regress. This is an answer to the problem of infinite regress. It had to start somewhere. You understand that such things as the birth trauma are a peculiar and deus ex machina solution of infinite regress. You can't always go further and further and further back. That's impossible, and the logical demonstration of that we owe to Leibnitz. In theory building that's a fundamental problem. Clinically it is not important; clinically you have to make up your mind where in hell do things start, how far do you push things back. Now you know our answer to that is that we push it as far back as it is feasible and necessary.

But there is a further problem behind this complementary series as an answer to the problem of infinite regress. First you have to watch that this does not mean that the primally repressed was never in consciousness.

Mahl: This is the developmental aspect.

Rapaport: Yes. That this does not imply that. As a matter of fact, it implies its opposite, because it is said that the primally repressed impulse has ideational representation.

But suppose we don't talk about consciousness, and talk instead about the impulse and its thresholds. Primal repression somehow is a repression where the original thresholds have been so modified that the original primitive ideational representation and the impulse itself are rendered inoperative. Primal repression stands here for those repressions which occur in that very earliest phase, and they have a different character. They are fixations. They

have a different character because it is very hard to tackle them. Partly it is difficult to tackle them because really the kind of representations--or, as he calls it, presentations--that exist we can only get to the patient by our reconstruction. (Don't forget. We reconstruct them for him. When you read the Hartmann paper with me, then watch for that, because he talks about that explicitly, and he is the only man who really talks explicitly about it. Many of the things that we have to do in therapy are not even simply reconstructions in a proper sense, but constructions, because the patient, at the time of his childhood when these things hit him, couldn't construct it, therefore we can't reconstruct it, we really construct it for him.)

So you understand how systematically this is a problem of the infinite regress, how theoretically it is a problem behind which the undifferentiated phase looms, the earliest forms, before consciousness is really fully crystallized. Practically it is then the problem of fixation, construction, reconstruction, this kind of stuff. Now, you realize what this phrase means?

"...persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains attached to it." (p. 148)

What is this the corollary of, or the opposite of?

Mahl: Displaceability and mobility.

Rapaport: That's right. The displaceability which was recognized as the basic characteristic of human existence; while the fixedness is like what you see in animals. This is what he is struggling with. Okay. Now people, then we have the early step. Do you have a next step that you want still to add here, or should we go on to the attraction of the repressed?

Mahl: You could add an intermediate stage, that is, the production of derivatives, because it's those things on which repression proper acts.

Rapaport: Yes; that will become clear in the attraction of the repressed. Now let's have that attraction of the repressed; the passage first.

Mahl: P. 148:

"The second stage of repression, repression proper, affects mental derivatives of the repressed representative, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. On account of this association, these ideas experience the same fate as what was primally repressed. Repression proper, therefore, is actually an after-pressure. Moreover, it is

a mistake to emphasize only the repulsion which operates from the direction of the conscious upon what is to be repressed; quite as important is the attraction exercised by what was primally repressed upon everything with which it can establish a connection. Probably the trend towards repression would fail in its purpose if these two forces did not co-operate, if there were not something previously repressed ready to receive what is repelled by the conscious."

Rapaport: How do you understand this? Did we discuss this in detail before?

Mahl: Not in detail, but we got the idea. When we discussed this business of attraction in Chapter Seven, there it was based on the idea that there was a touching, really a displacement of cathexis, from unconscious structures...

Sacks: Here it is: p. 547 (footnote):

"In any account of the theory of repression it would have to be laid down that a thought becomes repressed as a result of the combined influence upon it of two factors. It is pushed from the one side (by the censorship of the Cs.) and pulled from the other (by the Ucs.), in the same kind of way in which people are conveyed to the top of the Great Pyramid."

Mahl: But this still seems different, to me, than the other idea, because this idea of touching implies to me that when something gets the cathexes--

Rapaport: Which idea of touching? Where do you have the word?

Mahl: Let me get the reference. P. 594 is the reference I have.

"Lurking in our preconscious, however, there are other purposive ideas, which are derived from sources in our unconscious and from wishes which are always on the alert. These may take control of the excitation attaching to the group of thoughts which has been left to its own devices, they may establish a connection between it and an unconscious wish, and they may 'transfer' to it--"

--that's the touching--

"--the energy belonging to the unconscious wish. Thenceforward the neglected or suppressed train of thought is in a position to persist, though the reinforcement it has received gives it no right of entry into consciousness. We may express this by saying that what has hitherto been a preconscious train of thought has now been 'drawn into the unconscious.'" (p. 594)

Rapaport: Very good. Did you have any other reference in mind, Dr. London?

London: There was the same thing said on p. 546, but I don't think--

Rapaport: Let's see, how does that come?

London: "...we cannot dismiss the probability that in dreams too the transformation of thoughts into visual images may be in part the result of the attraction which memories couched in visual form and eager for revival bring to bear upon thoughts cut off from consciousness and struggling to find expression."

Rapaport: Yes. How about reading something about that too beginning at the bottom of p. 545?

London: "...for evidence that in such instances of the regressive transformation of thoughts we must not overlook the influence of memories, mostly from childhood, which have been suppressed or have remained unconscious. The thoughts which are connected with a memory of this kind and which are forbidden expression by the censorship are, as it were, attracted by the memory into regression as being the form of representation in which the memory itself is couched."

Rapaport: Does anybody have the point where Freud talks about the relationship between the wish impulse or instinctual drive and the day-residue? Do you recall that point?

Mahl: Is it in the entrepreneur example?

Rapaport: It is around there, but he talks about the mutual need.

Mahl: P. 564:

"It will be seen, then, that the day's residues, among which we may now class the indifferent impressions, not only borrow something from the Ucs. when they succeed in taking a share in the formation of a dream--namely the instinctual force which is at the disposal of the repressed wish--but that they also offer the unconscious something indispensable--namely the necessary point of attachment for a transference." (p. 564)

Rapaport: That's right. You may remember that Dr. Loewald noted this point. Is it now clear to you what is the nature of this attraction?

London: I have a question: it seems to me that the question is not clear at this point because there are two problems that are being dealt with. One will be dealt with later, when he makes clear the unconscious aspects of the ego, and this is fused into the point that he's making here. And you have to take that into account. Once you have taken that into account, there still remains the question of the attraction of the unconscious--

Rapaport: But what does that attraction mean? How do you understand it? Is there an attraction?

Mahl: I'll tell you how I understand this now; although I must say that the word "force" and this idea of assimilation throw me off. But what I see, in terms of transfer of cathexis here, is that this implies that when the cathexes in the unconscious are transferred, anything that is then the recipient of this transferred energy--transferred cathexis--becomes subject to different rules, namely, the primary process.

Rapaport: And thereby--? it becomes subject to what?

Mahl: The secondary process.

Rapaport: To the repressive work of the secondary process.

Mahl: The preconscious stuff that receives the unconscious cathexes now becomes subject to primary process; doesn't this imply something unique about the cathexes in the unconscious? Unless one assumes that there is something unique about those cathexes, then if an idea just gets more cathexis, why should it now be subject to different rules? This is my question.

Rapaport: I don't know whether you really meant precisely what I will try to

say when you talked about unconscious ego. But I would like to explain something, in two steps. First, in a very rigid way, as I did the last time. I want to remind you. The first rigid way of talking about this is simply to say that Freud is absolutely confused. If there is an instinctual drive, and it has mobile cathexis, whatever receives any part of this cathexis--wherever it will be, including the Pcs.--is then unconscious, operates by the processes which rule there; and the controlling forces--secondary process, binding--are therefore going to bind this in the only way they can, namely by repressing barriers. Repression is only one force. Nothing else. This is a rigid, and from my point of view orthodox, way of formulating this. This criticizes Freud sharply. Is this rigid, nasty formulation clear?

Now if it is clear, come along with me to the second kind of formulation, which is very different. The keynote to it is partly what you spoke about, partly the emphasis you put on assimilation. Let's not assume a sharp boundary between Ucs. and the rest, but a whole series of layers of organization, a continuous transition between primary process and secondary process, which at every point has synthetic functions of its own, integrates at every level as development takes place. (This by the way refers to the confusion about where the censorship is.) If you consider this kind of situation, then the picture gets a little bit different. Let me try to show you how. Namely, you won't talk about a drive-impulse simply, but you will realize that at each level the derivative impulse is already integrating all that is around it, not only in terms of the upward driving force, but also the integrating force is a countercahcting organization.

Mahl: Can you be specific in that case? Can you give an illustration?

Rapaport: I want to make it plausible; I can't quite illustrate it. Let's suppose that an impulse is countercahcted, and a derivative impulse arises. This derivative will not be just an impulse, but a whole organization. Ideas will be around it; certain things will be excluded; certain things will be included. This is now an organization, no more a single force. When the underlying single force is brought to bear, the whole organization is brought to bear. Let's suppose that you talk about a man's reaction-formation at a certain point. It is cleanliness. Now when you talk about a man's cleanliness, you can talk about it as the reaction-formation to coprophagia or coprophilia. But if you do so, you have isolated something which you can't quite isolate, because with it go other attitudes. For instance, these very compulsive, cleanly, orderly people are likely to be in their undershirts or underpants very dirty. And together with cleanliness you also will find other negative forces, against disorder, against negative affects like disgust--a whole organization.

If it is such a whole organization, then this instinctual force cathecting an idea in the Pcs. brings along with it many negative organizational factors, not only the positive upward driving factor. It assimilates, and it assimilates not only in the upward driving sense, but assimilates in the sense of many counter-cathetic organizational factors also. This is the unconscious part of the ego, which is already included in determining the form of the drive that comes through.

Now it is quite certain that in some situations you will be quite safe clinically if you just take the first attitude. In others, you certainly will be all wet unless you take the second one. This is how I would understand what he is groping with. But please, understand: from the systematic point of view it is much the best to take the rigid view. Repression is repression; there is no attraction of the unconscious. That is what I would say every time you encounter it. If I am asked why Freud talks about it, I would say, this second explanation is what he talks about, but it is not a problem of repression. It is a problem of the complex organization we are dealing with. The job of concepts is to be parsimonious. That is the parsimonious explanation.

Our next question concerns the relations between censorship, resistance, consciousness, distance from drive, distortion, cathetic intensity. Let's start with distance from drive. Can you give me the reference?

Mahl: P. 149:

"If these derivatives have become sufficiently far removed from the repressed representative, whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by reason of the number of intermediate links inserted, they have free access to the conscious. It is as though the resistance of the conscious against them was a function of their distance from what was originally repressed."

Rapaport: So the main point about distance from drive is what?

Mahl: The farther away from drive the more likely a derivative is to become conscious.

Rapaport: But what is the definition of distance?

Mahl: Degree of distortion or number of intermediate links.

Rapaport: Are these then the only criteria of distance, or is there a further criterion?

Mahl: Cathexis.

Rapaport: Where is that?

Mahl: P. 150:

"A delicate balancing is here taking place, the play of which is hidden from us; its mode of operation, however, enables us to infer that it is a question of calling a halt when the cathexis of the unconscious reaches a certain intensity--an intensity beyond which the unconscious would break through to satisfaction."

Rapaport: That is, up to a given distance, defined also by the degree of intensity that goes with it, you don't have such a breakthrough, therefore such ideas can be what? Up to a degree of intensity, that is, up to a degree of distance or closeness, if you please, what can happen to the representation?

London: It can be conscious.

Rapaport: Yes. Without the danger of breakthrough into action. What about p. 152?

Lustman: "With unrepressed derivatives of the unconscious the fate of a particular idea is often decided by the degree of its activity or cathexis. It is an everyday occurrence that such an derivative remains unrepressed so long as it represents only a small amount of energy, although its content would be calculated to give rise to a conflict with what is dominant in consciousness. The quantitative factor proves decisive for this conflict: as soon as the basically obnoxious idea exceeds a certain degree of strength, the conflict becomes a real one, and it is precisely this activation that leads to repression. So that, where repression is concerned, an increase of energetic cathexis operates in the same sense as an approach to the unconscious, while a decrease of that cathexis operates in the same sense as remoteness from the unconscious or distortion. We see that the repressive trends may find a substitute for repression in a weakening of what is distasteful."

- London: This term "basically obnoxious" troubles me, and in some way it links to the earlier point about the examples of hunger and the peremptory drives that cannot be repressed. But he's been talking in economic terms so far, and here he brings in content in "basically obnoxious," and I wondered if that is necessary. I don't see that it's necessary that the drive-representation be obnoxious in order that delay be necessary; any kind of drive needs delay.
- Rapaport: People, how do you understand Dr. London's point, and do you concur, do you disagree? What amplification would you recommend for it?
- Lustman: My understanding of his using this term "obnoxious" just related to what he talked about initially in terms of pleasure and pain, and that it can be pleasure to one part and pain to another, and "obnoxious" just means that it can arouse unpleasure.
- London: But I think this point just betrays that Freud really meant the subjective interpretation.
- Rapaport: All the time he plays between the two, and I would agree with Dr. London that this is obnoxious to us that he shifts from one to the other. It is quite possible to take the orthodox view of it, as Dr. Lustman took it. There is another view that is possible to take--I would take that view, myself. Do you remember, in the Seventh Chapter, what role was allotted to indications of offensiveness?
- Mahl: Signal.
- Rapaport: In other words, over and above the simple pleasure and pain signals, the signals of obnoxiousness or pleasingness come about also as derivatives of affects--as affect-development is restricted increasingly. Remember the passage?

"...restricting the development of affect
in thought-activity to the minimum required
for acting as a signal." (p. 602)

So when he talks about obnoxiousness, we have to realize that there are affect-signals that he is getting clinically, and he is hard put, as yet, to figure out what these affect-signals amount to. They are not always proportional to intensity; at least he doesn't see that; that complex relationship between the intensity of the signal and the underlying tension is yet to be figured out. That comes much later.

Sacks: The Problem of Anxiety.

Rapaport: That's right. Remember, we said much earlier that the direct proportionality of tension and defense sooner or later is lost when signals control the defense, through up to a certain point the intensity of the drive-cathexis controls the defense. But here you see--and you will see it yet further in The Problem of Anxiety--the defense is controlled by the ego's giving the signal.

London: But he says, "as soon as the basically obnoxious idea..."

Rapaport: Look, "obnoxious" in this sense means no more than that the idea carries some kind of affective signal on the one hand, or something subject to judgment. The whole ego-psychological problem comes up here. Either you deal purely in terms of the pleasure-pain mechanism, or else you recognize that there are things beyond that and they have to be treated in ego-psychological terms. Then you get into such things as signals and judgment.

Lustman: Why can't signal also be a matter of intensity?

Rapaport: Because signal is not a matter of intensity. That's the very character of the signal. As soon as it starts being a matter of intensity, it has failed. That's that situation which you will see Fenichel characterize by the simile of a match stuck into a powder keg. The match which is supposed to serve only as a signal explodes the whole thing.

Sacks: If you make this orthodox interpretation that Dr. Lustman suggests, all you have to do is cut out the phrase that is so obnoxious to Dr. London.

Rapaport: That's right. But you have to understand that Dr. London spotted correctly a subjective terminology and that subjective terminology always indicates that there are further ego-psychological problems. The subjective terminology, even in relation to pleasure and pain, indicates ego-psychological problems, because in the other system it means something different--the other system being ego; or super-ego, for that matter. So you see how many facets this things has.

Now what I would like to see clearly is the relationship between distance, distortion, and cathectic intensity?

Mahl: They are inversely proportional to one another.

Rapaport: How and why?

Mahl: Take displacement. It leads to binding of the energy and in the course of this the intensity becomes less and less. The amount of energy transferred from one idea to another becomes less and less, and also--

- Rapaport: Yes. The point is simply that the ideal of mobility is never fully realized. As soon as you begin to have ideas you have made the first step to the development of the secondary process. By the way, the same problem is encountered by ethology. If you study ethology, you will see that the displacement-behaviors are always of lesser intensity than the drive-behavior. Why? Because the instinct encounters barriers--they say. From our point of view, it is simply that the mobility is scaled down; therefore the farther you displace it, the more intensity is lost on the way. But here is still another question. What about the distortion? Is that inversely proportional with the intensity? And why?
- Mahl: I would think that you would have more distortion of a presentation the more strongly it was cathected.
- Rapaport: Earlier you said that the--
- Mahl: No, then I only talked about distance. But distortion is a different process than displacement along the distance.
- Rapaport: But what about what Freud says here?
- "in consequence either of their remoteness or of their distortion, can pass the censorship of the conscious." (pp. 149-150)
- Mahl: Yes, but the inverse proportion applied here only to remoteness.
- "It is as though the resistance of the conscious against them was a function of their distance from what was originally repressed." (p. 149)
- Rapaport: Yes, but the next sentence immediately says the other. Read it.
- Mahl: "In carrying out the technique of psycho-analysis, we continually require the patient to produce such derivatives of the repressed as, in consequence either of their remoteness or of their distortion, can pass the censorship of the conscious." (pp. 149-150)
- Yes, but that doesn't say anything about the inverse proportion.
- Rapaport: He does say that the more distorted it is, the easier it passes to consciousness. Does he?
- Mahl: Yes. But I had the idea that there are two processes that

are operating here. One is distortion; the other is distance.

Rapaport: He makes that distinction. But why would distortion make it available to consciousness?

London: I don't see where there's a difference. The stronger the drive the more extensive the censorship, and only the more distorted material will evade the censorship.

Rapaport: You are talking in terms of evasion. But he says in the meanwhile that it depends on cathectic conditions that something should reach consciousness or not. If it has the peremptory cathexis, it can't reach consciousness. It has to be repressed. Is that correct? If it is distorted, it can reach consciousness. That means that distortion is also equivalent to the scaling down. Why?

Mahl: That must be due to anticathexis.

Rapaport: The distortion in this sense is the effect of the censorship. That does not vitiate what I tried to explain about that earlier, that what is called here censorship is an organization problem. Remember, we discussed that in considerable detail. Now we just simply take it for granted, we understand that and talk about it in gross terms of censorship. This has to be understood. In the case of distance of derivatives, little censorship comes in directly. Those are the possibilities for these extensive fantasy-formations, which until they become highlighted are not repressed at all. They can be recovered, and one is surprised, because it seems as though the whole thing has been so clearly formed. One wonders how it can be this clear. Very frequently found, for instance when you discover what kind of fantasies your patient has in intercourse. Very few people are really aware of it, but in the course of work you discover that the fantasy was very elaborate, that it was clearly a homoerotic or a complicated I-don't-know-what-kind-of paranoid fantasy about the whole thing. This is quite common, you understand; this is not something that you find only in a person who is terribly sick. Bisexuality is bisexuality; we all have this stuff. Do you see what I mean? That's the instance of reaching consciousness by the long path.

Then there is the distortion, where you can't find the fantasy at all, when you go after it clinically. You find heavily disguised derivatives only, out of which interpretation and reconstruction has to be made. Obviously, the transitions between these two are not so sharp as Freud would have us believe or as I am describing now. There are all the middle forms, particularly in our kinds of people, who are so complicated. Don't forget

that you are God-damned complicated people, compared with the rest. Well, not with the rest whom you find also going into analysis, but rather that rest whom you find in psychotherapy in a clinic, for instance, who are far less complicated in many ways, and in whom these things are not secondarily and tertiarily elaborated.

Well, be that as it may, we have to push on. Is there anything more here about these things than what we have already covered? Is there something striking about these passages about distortion, distance, and cathectic intensity?

London: One point that we hadn't made is that censorship and resistance are defined as attributes of consciousness.

Rapaport: Correct. That's the first point I would stress. Let's have those passages; point them out.

London: P. 149:

"If these derivatives have become sufficiently far removed from the repressed representative, whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by reason of the number of intermediate links inserted, they have free access to the conscious. It is as though the resistance of the conscious against them was a function of their distance from what was originally repressed. ...as, in consequence either of their remoteness or of their distortion, can pass the censorship of the conscious."

Rapaport: There is yet another place where you have that same thing. The next paragraph.

London: "We can lay down no general rule as to what degree of distortion and remoteness is necessary before the resistance on the part of the unconscious is removed." (p. 150)

Rapaport: In other words, censorship is a function of consciousness, and resistance, repression and censorship are equated here. You see, this is then a primitive state of affairs. As we go along, as Dr. Sacks already pointed out, later the censorship will be conceived of as on the boundaries between systems.

Before we go to the next question, I would call attention only to the bottom of p. 150, which one should mark to oneself because it is in direct relation to the discussion of idealization in "On Narcissism." Do you link that up, and did you see clearly

that that's the connection--that this links to pp. 93-94? You should also note the next passage on p. 151, namely the special device which modifies the conditions producing pleasure and pain. For instance, wit or jokes. This is the device which makes ~~something~~ seem to come from the outside. Take for instance the phenomenon of the wandering hand. "I didn't do it; the hand just wandered. I am not responsible." It comes from the outside. It should happen from the outside, so that it can be pleasure without sin, without guilt. Similarly in the joke situation, the same situation arises. It came from the outside, and I can withdraw from it any time. I can apply to it the measures of flight; I don't have to maintain the repressive barriers. Therefore there is a cathectic saving; that's the theory of wit, and this is how the book on wit ought to be read. I have referred to it and you will encounter it in "The Unconscious" again soon.

Tell me, is there anything else in this part, or should we go on to the fourth question? Well, then, let's go on. What are the two mechanisms of repression? Where does it start?

London: P. 153:

Rapaport: Well, I don't mind if you start it there; you will have to go back further, but let's have this one first.

London: "The general vicissitude which overtakes the idea that represents the instinct can hardly be anything else than that it should vanish from the conscious if it was previously conscious, or that it should be held back from consciousness if it was about to become conscious. The difference is not important; it amounts to much the same thing as the difference between my ordering an undesirable guest out of my drawing-room (or out of my front hall), and my refusing, after recognizing him, to let him cross my threshold at all."
(p. 153)

Then the footnote--

Rapaport: Yes, the sentinel, which is the censorship. How did you understand this passage?

London: We've already talked about this today, in terms of primal repression, that what is primally repressed originally had to have been conscious for it to have an ideational representation.

- Rapaport: Therefore it cannot be, in terms of this passage that you read, which case?
- London: That of holding it back if it is about to enter.
- Rapaport: All right. Dr. Mahl, what is your comment on that?
- Mahl: As I understand this, he's talking about withdrawal and the barrier, about withdrawal of cathexis and anticathexis.
- Rapaport: Right. The most common mistake--I think--in understanding the relationship between the primal repression and this passage is to equate the second of these two mechanisms with primal repression. Freud makes it even more difficult in a minute not to make that equation.
- London: I guess I'm still making the error, because I don't see why you have to keep these separate.
- Rapaport: Because the point is that the primally repressed also was once in consciousness, and then it got expelled. Remember our discussion of flight as a precursor of repression? It is ancestral. Barriers develop which keep out things which were once pushed out. Before those barriers are solidly established, there is only the possibility of withdrawal. Then what is withdrawn from will no more command your attention, will not command attention cathexis. There you see an ancestral thing, working over again. Suppose that there is something said that you don't want to hear. You will try not to attend to it. There is an animal which threatens you; you will run, and then it doesn't command your attention any more. But if something comes from inside, and enters your thoughts, withdrawal won't be so successful. You will try to think of something else. The rule of "don't think of white elephants"--it doesn't work. Instead you have to establish a barrier against it. But the first attempt is to take away the attention from it, not to pay attention to it.
- Mahl: He went into this in Chapter Seven. When he modeled the withdrawal of cathexis, stated that it was the prototype for repression, this was in terms of flight.
- Rapaport: Right. And here we see it now entering as two mechanism. That was not done there really. The other one, the counter-cathetic barrier, was not drawn out even in this much outline. It is not spelled out very fully here either. We are just told at this point (Dr. London correctly indicated the passage) that there are two ways. One is to keep them out, the other is to push them out. But we can't equate the "keep them out" with primal repression, although those which were primally repressed are indeed now kept out. That is the connection. But is that now

clear what the two mechanisms really are? And why it is so seductive to equate them? And please, Dr. London, for many years I equated them really directly. Don't feel bad about it. I was pretty well convinced for a while that that is the story. But it ain't that way. Clinically it ain't that way and theoretically it won't work. It ain't that way, even though you will find passages where Freud says "that which was never in consciousness." Here again is that confusion about the primordial state, undifferentiated state, where it is not clear what consciousness is like. There is still one more thing about these two mechanisms. Do you know something he says which we ought to see here? Do you have the passage?

Mahl: P. 151:

"The process of repression is not to be regarded as an event which takes place once, the results of which are permanent, as when some living thing has been killed and from that time onward is dead; repression demands a persistent expenditure of force, and if this were to cease the success of the repression would be jeopardized, so that a fresh act of repression would be necessary. We may suppose that the repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure. Thus the maintenance of a repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure of force, while its removal results in a saving from an economic point of view."

That's the statement about the counter-cathexis.

Rapaport: That's right. But "results in a saving" refers to what?

Mahl: One example is the one about humor.

Rapaport: That's right.

London: Can you put this concept of the attraction of the repressed in these sentences?

Rapaport: Our way of understanding that concept will bring in the fact that there is a steady pressure upwards. And that upward pressure is the thing you encounter in the very introduction of Anna Freud's The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence. She points out that it is really our ally in the therapeutic process--

by virtue of what?

Sacks: Arising impulses.

Rapaport: Yes. Why do they arise? What is the principle?

Sacks: The pleasure principle.

Rapaport: Correct. This is the pleasure principle. That's the classic interpretation, and that's a very important one, you understand. That's the kind of thing involved in the therapeutic alliance of patient and therapist. Okay. Now--

Mahl: He talks here about the mobility of repression too.

"The mobility of repression, incidentally, also finds expression in the psychical characteristics of the state of sleep, which alone renders possible the formation of dreams. With a return to waking life the repressive cathexes which have been drawn in are once more sent out." (p. 151)

Rapaport: This is the question of the displacement of the barrier, really; that in sleep there is a guarantee that nothing goes into real action.

London: The gates of motility are closed.

Rapaport: Yes.

On the side I just want to mention to you that Peter Wolff (from what I have read of his newest drafts) is now formulating quite elementary hypotheses concerning the first seven or eight days of life, concerning sleep conditions which, on the one hand are in terms like this, and on the other are equated to purely observational facts. Sooner or later those of you who are interested in keeping up with what goes on will want to keep up contact with other people who are doing something in one way or another to push this kind of theory further--into observation, into study, whether it is into psychotherapy or infancy or I don't know what. It is still a very isolated group who deals with this stuff, and its publications will not be available for a long while. So there is a real merit in trying to keep in touch with people like Stuart Miller here who is trying to study further in several directions, and several others of this group.

Well gentlemen, we see the two mechanisms. Is there anything more before we go on to the next question?

Mahl: There's another statement on pp. 154-155:

"...the mechanisms of repression have at least this one thing in common: a withdrawal of the cathexis of energy..."

Rapaport: Yes; you notice that here he doesn't know what he is talking about. He says "(or of libido, where we are dealing with sexual instincts)."

Mahl: Yes. This is confusing.

Rapaport: Doesn't make sense here at all. Now as long as we are dwelling on p. 154, note please the sentence just before this enumeration:

"I must, however, suggest that we should postpone this task, too, until we have formed reliable conceptions of the relations of the conscious to the unconscious."

There is another passage of similar portent on p. 148:

"...we must defer probing more deeply into the nature of repression until we have learnt more about the structure of the succession of psychical agencies..."

In all these he is already dissatisfied with the topographic point of view, with deciding, according to topographic belongingness, between these systems. These passages forecast his search for a structural point of view. You will see more of that in "The Unconscious," for example on p. 172:

"...using the words 'conscious' and 'unconscious' sometimes in a descriptive and sometimes in a systematic sense, in which latter they signify inclusion in particular systems and possession of certain characteristics."

And then he proposes to label them arbitrarily that way and hopes that that will make it possible for him now to examine these systems. It is already forecast that he is not so sure that the descriptive and the systematic go together altogether, and sooner or later he discovers that they don't.

We have to go on. You have now clear the whole thing about the two mechanisms. Can we go on to the two components of drive-representation? Very well. I wish you would read this, because this is the crucial proposition concerning all the theory of cognition and affect. You can't make a psychoanalytic theory of cognition or affect without regard to this proposition. Signifi-

cantly enough, all the people who have talked about repression and quoted from this paper--psychologists particularly--have disregarded this totally. This is an ancient story. Let's have it.

Mahl: P. 152:

"In our discussion so far we have dealt with the repression of an instinctual representative, and by the latter we have understood an idea or group of ideas which is cathected with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido or interest) coming from an instinct. Clinical observation now obliges us to divide up what we have hitherto regarded as a single entity; for it shows us that besides the idea, some other element representing the instinct has to be taken into account, and that this other element undergoes vicissitudes of repression which may be quite different from those undergone by the idea. For this other element of the psychical representative the term quota of affect has been generally adopted. It corresponds to the instinct in so far as the latter has become detached from the idea and finds expression, proportionate to its quantity, in processes which are sensed as affects. From this point on, in describing a case of repression, we shall have to follow up separately what, as the result of repression, becomes of the idea, and what becomes of the instinctual energy linked to it."

Rapaport: Who knows the passage in "The Unconscious" which is related to this one?

Mahl: P. 178:

"...but in comparison with unconscious ideas there is the important difference that unconscious ideas continue to exist after repression as actual structures in the system Ucs., whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing."

Rapaport: You understand which this "potential beginning" is? What should we call it?

Mahl: It's the quota of affect.

Rapaport: Quota of affect. Go ahead.

Mahl: "Strictly speaking, then, and although no fault can be found with the linguistic usage, there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas. But there may very well be in the system Ucs. affective structures which, like others, become conscious. The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes--basically of memory-traces--whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings." (p. 178)

Rapaport: This is the James-Lange theory; the reverberation upon the cortex. How about the footnote on the next page?

Mahl: "Affectivity manifests itself essentially in motor...discharge resulting in an (internal) alteration of the subject's own body without reference to the external world; motility, in actions designed to effect changes in the external world."

Rapaport: Yes. You know that this links back to that point in "The Two Principles." Do you recall the passage?

Mahl: Motor discharge and action.

Rapaport: That's right. Now how do you understand this whole business about two instinct-representations?

Mahl: Now the idea still has a charge; it's still cathected. In addition to that, there's another unit of cathexis, and both of these cathexes are going to strive for discharge. They have different courses. Repression may deal with one but not with the other. It may selectively control the two paths of discharge.

Rapaport: Okay, gentlemen; what about it? Dr. Mahl said how he understood this. Any other comments or surprises, anything else that you notice here?

London: Isn't this a further elaboration of the concept of mobility of cathexis?

Rapaport: What do you mean?

London: That the drive may undergo any number of courses; it may remain related to the specific idea, or thought, or it may shift and appear in relation to a different thought or idea.

Rapaport: That's the ideational end. But there is then the affect end.

London: The drive may be expressed in terms of affect.

Rapaport: Yes, but here is the new thing, that these are two different things. The first thing I think you should note is that most of the stuff we have been dealing with here, with the exception of the steady force to be exerted, was in the Seventh Chapter. We have already pointed out that that is not quite clear in the Seventh Chapter. We commented that the withdrawal of cathexis was in the Seventh Chapter.

Mahl: The steady force was indicated there, in a way.

Rapaport: It was indicated, but it wasn't quite clear. But here you deal with something not in the Seventh Chapter at all. The coordination of cognition and affectivity is accomplished here for the first time. This is what you have to notice. That is the crucial characteristic of this passage. Now genetically what you have to notice is something very different. Namely, what he is saying to you is this: here is the drive; there are three kinds of apparatuses in existence. There is a memory-apparatus, and there is an affect-apparatus. They are both inborn. (I am telling you that on the side. They happen to be both inborn.) There is also the voluntary motor apparatus. The original cathexis tends toward motility, but the other two get used also. And they differentiate only slowly. At first you don't see the difference. You have no idea whether the infant is thinking anything or remembering anything; you have no idea whether he is striving to do something. You don't know whether he is discharging energy in exuberance or in despair. They differentiate only slowly. But these apparatuses are in a way substitute presentational ways for the drive. The relationship we are dealing with is a fundamental relationship, groped for over many centuries, and experimentally evidenced in our time by all kinds of studies, but particularly systematically by Werner and Wapner and their associates.* It's a complicated story. Also, what you

*[See, for example, "Toward a General Theory of Perception," Psychological Review, 59:4, 1952, pp. 324-338.]

call "body language", clinically, has its ancestors in this business that we are talking about here.

What we have to recognize is that those apparatuses are congenitally given. Without realizing that, Freud has reference here clearly to that point, particularly in that footnote on 179:

"Affectivity manifests itself essentially in motor (secretory and vasomotor)---"

--both these he calls motor--

"--discharge resulting in an (internal) alteration of the subject's own body without reference to the external world; motility, in actions designed to effect changes in the external world."

That he relates them to such originally existing apparatuses is crucial for the future development of the theory. Whatever was said about apparatuses by Hartmann's ego psychology, or modes in Erikson's ego psychology, or in Freud's own work about anxiety in the affects and inborn hysterical attacks--all that is in here, and that has to be regarded.

So the drive-cathexes can take three different ways. One, into action; two, into the affect channels (quote of affect is that part which can be channeled off through the affect-discharge channels); and the third way it can take is to the memory-thought apparatus. This is what we are told. Clear enough for the moment?

Well, if we have that done, unless you have anything else on this, I would just like to ask, what are their fates in repression?

London:

"The quantitative factor of the instinctual representative has three possible vicissitudes, as we can see from a cursory survey of the observations made by psycho-analysis: either the instinct is altogether suppressed, so that no trace of it is found--" (p. 153)

Rapaport:

And together with that the affect is suppressed totally. You will encounter this issue later in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable." You had better peel your eyes for it, so that you do remember.

- London: "...or it appears as an affect which is in some way or other qualitatively coloured, or it is changed into anxiety." (p. 153)
- Rapaport: You see, the second is what I was talking about. An affect discharge channel is used. The third is a transformation into anxiety. What is that? Did we encounter that before?
- Mahl: In dreams.
- Rapaport: Yes, for one instance. This is the toxic theory, which is being maintained steadily; it will be maintained until 1926, and in a certain sense even there a little bit. Please continue.

London: "The two latter possibilities set us the task of taking into account, as a further instinctual vicissitude, the transformation into affects, and especially into anxiety, of the psychical energies of instincts." (p. 153)

Rapaport: You see, adding now a fifth one. But here, this is not simply defense. Defense it gets to be only on one level, in defense against anxiety by libidinization. That is what Fenichel calls it, and there is a paper on it.*

I think we have to quit the fourth question. The fifth one is the humdinger. What are the relationships of substitute-formation and symptom-formation in the various psychoneuroses? First of all, what is the general relationship between substitute-formation and symptom-formation? Do you have the reference?

London: P. 154:

"The general probability would seem to be that the two are widely different, and that it is not the repression itself which produces substitutive formations and symptoms, but that these latter are indications of a return of the repressed and owe their existence to quite other processes. It would also seem advisable to examine the mechanisms by which substitutes and symptoms are formed before considering the mechanisms of repression."

Rapaport: Well, what do you understand?

*["Defense against Anxiety, Particularly by Libidinization," Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel, Vol. I, pp. 303-317.]

London: Generally, both substitute-formation and symptom-formation indicate a return of the repressed. The mechanism of repression does not coincide with the mechanism of substitute-formation, or with that of symptom-formation. There are many different mechanisms of substitute-formation.

Rapaport: Gentlemen, do you understand this idea? What are we being told fundamentally, with this proposition?

Lustman: Well, he spells this out; he says if repression works, we know nothing of it, and what we know of repression is when it doesn't work, and what we know of it is from this, the return of the repressed.

Rapaport: Where is that?

Mahl: That's in "The Unconscious." P. 166:

"How are we to arrive at a knowledge of the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious."

Rapaport: Yes. But there is a more specific passage about repression.

"Repressions that have failed will of course have more claim on our interest than any that may have been successful; for the latter will for the most part escape our examination." (p. 153)

Do we see what the relationships are between repression, substitute-formation, and symptom-formation? What is this return of the repressed, and how does he talk about it later in this section? He has another term for the return of the repressed, that causes substitution and symptom-formation. What is the term he uses for it? Repression fails, and substitute-formation is effected--what does he call that?

Lustman: The derivative?

Rapaport: It is a derivative, but what is it? P. 155:

"And for this reason, too, the work of the neurosis does not cease. It proceeds to a second phase, in order to attain its immediate and more important purpose."

Or on p. 156:

"In conversion hysteria the process of repression is completed with the formation of the symptom and does not, as in anxiety hysteria, need to continue to a second phase --or rather, strictly speaking, to continue endlessly."

Second phase. Or unlimited number of phases. What is being conveyed to us?

London: That the failure of repression is not simply the disappearing of the repression, but other mechanisms are called into action too, to produce the return of the repressed.

Rapaport: To produce that and to prevent it.

Mahl: It's a continuing process, forever and ever progressing.

Rapaport: Here you see the roots of the conception of hierarchy. Gentlemen, just a footnote: many a time people have kind of reproached me that I have in an arbitrary fashion in the seventh part of Organization and Pathology of Thought, talked about hierarchy as something self-understood. I also was reproached on the affect paper for that. True, I don't indicate what the roots of it are, but this is the root of the conception. I will later have the opportunity to show you, when we discuss ego psychology, Freudian and orthodox treatments of early ego-psychological issues, where the same point clinically is again and again thrown into our faces. Clinically. This is the importance of this second, third, etc., phase; this is the importance of substitute-formation.

What is the relation between substitute-formation, symptom, and repression in the various psychoneuroses? Let's have it in anxiety hysteria.

Lustman: It's on p. 155:

"From the field of anxiety hysteria I will choose a well-analysed example of an animal phobia. The instinctual impulse subjected to repression here is a libidinal attitude towards the father, coupled with fear of him."

Rapaport: So what is being repressed?

Lustman: The instinctual impulse.

Rapaport: All right. Go where the substitute is stated. Which is the substitute-formation?

Lustman: The animal.

"After repression, this impulse vanishes out of consciousness: the father does not appear in it as an object of libido. As a substitute for him we find in a corresponding place some animal which is more or less fitted to be an object of anxiety." (p. 155)

Rapaport: Now this is the substitute. But is this the whole story of substitute-formation, or what is the whole story?

Lustman: The affect becomes anxiety.

Rapaport: According to this toxicological theory the libido is transformed into anxiety, so the substitute-formation is what? What is the substitute formation for this instinctual impulse that is in question? The fear of the animal is the substitute formation. And in this case what is the relation between symptom and substitute-formation? Do you have the passage?

Lustman: P. 155:

"What follows is an attempt at flight--the formation of the phobia proper, of a number of avoidances which are intended to prevent a release of the anxiety."

Rapaport: So what is the symptom? Where is the symptom and where is the substitute-formation?

Lustman: The symptom is this avoiding behavior.

Rapaport: The symptom is the flight. The substitute you see is the fear of the animal; the flight is the symptom--that other thing which we call phobia. You see, the word does not represent it clearly. But you see the bifurcation. The repression is one thing, but in the second phase repression produces the substitute-formation.

Mahl: The return of the repressed produces the substitute-formation.

Rapaport: The return of the repressed in the indirect way produces that, and then the second phase produces the symptom itself, the symptom proper.

London: In an unrecognized phobia, you would have substitute-formation without symptom.

Rapaport: Which is the unrecognized phobia? What do you mean?

- London: Well, clinically, people often are phobic about things and so long as the phobia isn't put to the test it's unrecognized. Say someone has a fear of heights, and as long as he isn't exposed to heights, he isn't even aware of it.
- Rapaport: Sorry; they have the flight well built in, and the second phase issues. There is no third phase. By the time you see the phobia clinically, there has been a third phase and a fourth and a fifth; there are forces which pin them into the situation and they have to be in the situation. For instance, let's suppose that you take a man who has a sedentary occupation, as I have. It may be that in my youth I experienced real agoraphobic things, particularly of distances. That means that I successfully chose an occupation and a way of life, etc., etc., which removed me from the agoraphobic world. But if I had chosen to be a traveling salesman, that would have been a third phase.
- London: Counterphobic behavior then would be one of these subsequent phases.
- Rapaport: There would be something that forces me to do a counter-phobic thing which forces me then into a reality situation which forces me back again. As a matter of fact I don't mind telling you that in time of tension in my youth, I had agoraphobic experiences--mild ones, not very severe. I would be reasonably sure that the solutions for my own life were partly determined by those very mild kinds of experiences.
- I think we will have to consider the questions answered and go on to the next paper.